Abstract
This paper explores the role of asymmetric information as a cause of Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In the classic bargaining model of war, negotiations break down when one side privately believes that it is sufficiently more likely perform better in battle than the other side expects. There is strong evidence that this mechanism was at play on the eve of the invasion. Chronic problems with Russian civil–military institutions created both an army unprepared for the conflict and a lack of awareness of this within the Kremlin. In contrast, Ukraine had reports of these problems and also had private information regarding its own resolve. Consequently, the Kremlin's demands on the eve of the conflict exceeded what Ukraine was willing to concede. Russia invaded as a result.
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