What is the effect of nuclear latency on states’ conflict behaviors? Defined as the ability to produce fissile material without the actual possession of nuclear weapons, nuclear latency is much more common in the international system than nuclear weapons are. Yet present studies might have underestimated its impact on conflict. We argue that, given its ambiguous nature as a dual-use technology, nuclear latency has the potential to significantly alter the effect of leader type on conflict. In particular, while conventional wisdom about hawks and doves suggests that the former should be more prone to conflict than the latter, nuclear latency blurs the distinction between leader's types. Bridging together studies of nuclear latency and leader type, we study how nuclear latency shapes the impact of leader type on the propensity of initiating conflict or being targeted. We find that in the absence of latency, hawkish leaders are more likely to initiate disputes than dovish leaders. However, latency muddies the waters. Thus, leader characteristics does not affect dispute initiation for latent states.
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