How are patterns of military spending shaped by political leaders who have substantive policy preferences and need the support of their constituents to remain in power? A formal model developed to address this question indicates leaders’ preferences, political vulnerability, and motivation and their domestic audiences’ preferences jointly influence equilibrium military spending. I find variation in patterns of military spending consistent with the model's implications between 1946 and 2010. My analyses demonstrate that leaders’ desire to remain in power and individual-level characteristics and domestic audiences’ preferences jointly shape policy outcomes and, accordingly, suggest studying the interactions among them can provide insights into a range of topics central to peace science.
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