What explains UN member-state personnel withdrawals from peacekeeping operations? Withdrawals can occur at the behest of contributor states, as contributions are voluntary. We argue that withdrawal is motivated by violence in the peacekeeping operation host state. Research shows that well-resourced missions improve the prospects of success. Personnel withdrawals are dangerous, as they are more likely when continued deployments are needed. We thus need to understand why some states resist withdrawing in the face of instability. We argue that democracies are more stalwart than their counterparts given their constituency interests, the democratic benefits of peacekeeping and the political cover offered to democratic policymakers.
AnkerL (2005) Peacekeeping and public opinion. Canadian Military Journal Summer2005: 23–32.
2.
AryaS (2015) Conflicts, oil and peacekeeping in South Sudan. Journal of the United Service Institution of IndiaCXLV(600): 1–7.
3.
BaisK (1994) The Minefield of a Peacekeeping Force. Dutch Blue Helmets in Cambodia. The Hague: SDU Uitgeverij Koninginnegracht.
4.
BauschAW (2017) Democracy and war effort: an experiment. Journal of Conflict Resolution61(4): 814–838.
5.
BellamyAJWilliamsPD (2015) Trends in peace operations, 1947–2013. In: The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.13–42.
6.
BensonMKathmanJD (2014) United Nations bias and force commitments in civil conflicts. The Journal of Politics76(2): 350–363.
7.
BothN (2000) From Indifference to Entrapment: The Netherlands and the Yugoslav Crisis, 1990–1995. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
8.
BoveVEliaL (2011) Supplying peace: Participation in and troop contribution to peacekeeping missions. Journal of Peace Research48(6): 699–714.
Bueno de MesquitaB (2003) Principles of International Politics: People’s Power, Preferences, and Perceptions, 2nd ed.Washignton, DC: CQ Press.
11.
Bueno de MesquitaBSiversonRM (1995) War and the survival of political leaders: A comparative study of regime types and political accountability. American Political Science Review89(4): 841–855.
12.
Bueno de MesquitaBMorrowJDSiversonRM, et al. (1999) Policy failure and political survival: The contribution of political institutions. Journal of Conflict Resolution43(2): 147–161.
13.
BullionA (1997) India and UN peacekeeping operations. International Peacekeeping4(1): 98–114.
14.
BurkJ (1999) Public support for peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the casualties hypothesis. Political Science Quarterly114(1): 53–78.
15.
CarnegieAMikulaschekC (2020) The promise of peacekeeping: Protecting civilians in civil wars. International Organization74(4): 810–832.
16.
ClaytonGDorussenH (2021) The effectiveness of mediation and peacekeeping for ending conflict. Journal of Peace Research59(2): 150–165.
17.
CrocoSE (2011) The decider’s dilemma: Leader culpability, war outcomes, and domestic punishment. American Political Science Review105(3): 457–477.
18.
CrocoSEWeeksJL (2016) War outcomes and leader tenure. World Politics68(4): 577–607.
19.
CroicuMSundbergR (2017) UCDP GED Codebook, v. 17.1. Uppsala, Sweden: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University.
20.
CruzCAdS (2017) Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We Need to Change the Way We Are Doing Business. New York: United Nations.
21.
CunliffeP (2018) From peacekeepers to praetorians—How participating in peacekeeping operations may subvert democracy. International Relations32(2): 218–239.
22.
DahlRA (1983) Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
23.
DayAGorurAHoltVK, et al. (2020) The Political Practice of Peacekeeping: How Strategies for Peace Operations are Developed and Implemented. New York, NY: United Nations University.
24.
DebsAGoemansHE (2010) Regime type, the fate of leaders, and war. American Political Science Review104(3): 430–445.
25.
DiamondLLinzJLipsetS (1988) Democracy in Developing Countries. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
26.
DruckmanDDiehlP (2009) Dimensions of the conflict environment: Implications for peace operation success. Journal of International Peacekeeping13(1–2): 6–44.
27.
DuursmaAGledhillJ (2019) Voted out: Regime type, elections and contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations. European Journal of International Relations25(4): 1157–1185.
28.
EckKHultmanL (2007) One-sided violence against civilians in war: Insights from new fatality data. Journal of Peace Research44(2): 233–246.
29.
FinnemoreM (2004) The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force. Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press.
30.
FjeldeHHultmanLLindberg BromleyS (2016) Offsetting losses: Bargaining power and rebel attacks on peacekeepers. International Studies Quarterly60(4): 611–623.
31.
FortnaVP (2004) Does peacekeeping keep peace? International intervention and the duration of peace after civil war. International Studies Quarterly48(2): 269–292.
32.
FortnaVPHuangR (2012) Democratization after civil war: A brush-clearing exercise. International Studies Quarterly56(4): 801–808.
33.
GaibulloevKSandlerTShimizuH (2009) Demands for UN and non-UN peacekeeping: Nonvoluntary versus voluntary contributions to a public good. Journal of Conflict Resolution53(6): 827–852.
34.
GartnerSS (2008) The multiple effects of casualties on public support for war: An experimental approach. American Political Science Review102(1): 95–106.
35.
GartnerSSSeguraGM (1998) War, casualties, and public opinion. Journal of Conflict Resolution42(3): 278–300.
36.
GartnerSSSeguraGM (2021) Costly Calculations: A Theory of War, Casualties, and Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
37.
GartnerSSSeguraGMBarrattB (2004) Casualties, positions, and senate elections in the Vietnam War. Political Research Quarterly53(3): 467–477.
38.
GastilRD (2017) The comparative survey of freedom: experiences and suggestions. In: On Measuring Democracy. New York, NY: Routledge, pp.21–46.
39.
GatesSHegreHJonesMP, et al. (2006) Institutional inconsistency and political instability: polity duration, 1800–2000. American Journal of Political Science50(4): 893–908.
40.
GeddesB (2003) Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
41.
GelpiC (2010) Performing on cue? The formation of public opinion toward war. Journal of Conflict Resolution54(1): 88–116.
42.
GelpiCFeaverPDReiflerJ (2009) Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
43.
GelpiCFGriesdorfM (2001) Winners or losers? Democracies in international crisis, 1918–94. American Political Science Review95(3): 633–647.
44.
GiblerDM (2007) Bordering on peace: Democracy, territorial issues, and conflict. International Studies Quarterly51(3): 509–532.
45.
GilliganMStedmanSJ (2003) Where do the peacekeepers go?International Studies Review5(4): 37–54.
46.
GleditschKSWardMD (2006) Diffusion and the international context of democratization. International Organization60(4): 911–933.
47.
GleditschNPWallensteenPErikssonM, et al. (2002) Armed conflict 1946–2001: A new dataset. Journal of Peace Research39(5): 615–637.
48.
GoemansHE (2008) Which way out? The manner and consequences of losing office. Journal of Conflict Resolution52(6): 771–794.
49.
GreigJM (2005) Stepping into the fray: When do mediators mediate?American Journal of Political Science49(2): 249–266.
50.
HenkeME (2019) UN fatalities 1948–2015: A new dataset. Conflict Management and Peace Science36(4): 425–442.
51.
HenselPRMitchellSM (2015) Lessons from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project. Journal of Peace Research52(1): 116–119.
52.
HultmanLKathmanJDShannonM (2013) United Nations peacekeeping and civilian protection in civil war. American Journal of Political Science57(4): 875–891.
53.
HultmanLKathmanJDShannonM (2014) Beyond keeping peace: United Nations effectiveness in the midst of fighting. American Political Science Review108(4): 737–753.
54.
HultmanLKathmanJDShannonM (2019) Peacekeeping in the Midst of War. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
55.
IrelandMJGartnerSS (2001) Time to fight: government type and conflict initiation in parliamentary systems. Journal of Conflict Resolution45(5): 547–568.
56.
JentlesonBWBrittonRL (1998) Still pretty prudent: Post-Cold War American public opinion on the use of military force. Journal of Conflict Resolution42(4): 395–417.
57.
JettDC (2000) Why Peacekeeping Fails. New York: Springer.
58.
JonesBD (2001) Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner.
59.
JoshiM (2013) United Nations peacekeeping, democratic process, and the durability of peace after civil wars. International Studies Perspectives14(3): 362–382.
60.
JoshiM (2020) An institutional explanation of troop contributions in UN peacekeeping missions. International Peacekeeping27(5): 785–809.
61.
KarlsrudJ (2019) For the greater good?: “Good states” turning UN peacekeeping towards counterterrorism. International Journal74(1): 65–83.
62.
KarlsrudJSmithAC (2015) Europe’s Return to UN Peacekeeping in Africa? Lessons from Mali. New York, NY: International Peace Institute.
63.
KathmanJD (2013) United Nations peacekeeping personnel commitments, 1990–2011. Conflict Management and Peace Science30(5): 532–549.
64.
KathmanJDBensonM (2019) Cut short? United Nations peacekeeping and civil war duration to negotiated settlements. Journal of Conflict Resolution63(7): 1601–1629.
65.
KathmanJDMelinMM (2017) Who keeps the peace? Understanding state contributions to UN peacekeeping operations. International Studies Quarterly61(1): 150–162.
66.
KathmanJDWoodRM (2016) Stopping the killing during the “peace”: Peacekeeping and the severity of postconflict civilian victimization. Foreign Policy Analysis12(2): 149–169.
67.
KlepC (1998) Peacekeepers in a warlike situation: The Dutch experience. Peace Operations Between Peace and War: Four Studies. Nummer11: 59–69.
68.
KrepsSMaxeyS (2018) Mechanisms of morality: Sources of support for humanitarian intervention. Journal of Conflict Resolution62(8): 1814–1842.
69.
KreutzJ (2010) How and when armed conflicts end: introducing the UCDP conflict termination dataset. Journal of Peace Research47(2): 243–250.
70.
La BalmeN (2003) The French and the use of force: Public perceptions and their impact on the policy-making process. In: Public Opinion and the International Use of Force. London, UK: Routledge, pp.199–216.
71.
LebovicJH (2010) Passing the Burden: Contributions to UN Peace Operations in the Post-Cold War Era. International Studies Association, New Orleans, LA.
72.
LevinA (2019) Peacekeeper fatalities and force commitments to UN operations. Conflict Management and Peace Science38(3): 292–315.
73.
LevinJMacKayJNasirzadehA (2016) Selectorate theory and the democratic peacekeeping hypothesis: Evidence from Fiji and Bangladesh. International Peacekeeping23(1): 107–132.
74.
LundgrenM (2018) Backdoor peacekeeping: Does participation in UN peacekeeping reduce coups at home?Journal of Peace Research55(4): 508–523.
75.
LundgrenMOksamytnaKBoveV (2021) Politics or performance? Leadership accountability in UN peacekeeping. Journal of Conflict Resolution66(1): 32–60.
76.
MarshallMGGurrTRJaggersK (2016) Polity IV project: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800–2015. Center for Systemic Peace.
77.
MartinPFortmannM (2001) Obstacle, partner, or scapegoat?Options Politiques: 66.
78.
MorganTCPalmerG (2000) A model of foreign policy substitutability: Selecting the right tools for the right job(s). Journal of Conflict Resolution44(1): 11–32.
79.
Nation RC (2003) War in the Balkans, 1991–2002. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute.
80.
PassmoreTJShannonMHartAF (2018) Rallying the troops: Collective action and self-interest in UN peacekeeping contributions. Journal of Peace Research55(3): 366–379.
81.
PetterssonTHogbladhSObergM (2019) Organized violence, 1989–2018 and peace agreements. Journal of Peace Research56(4): 589–603.
82.
PevehouseJRussettB (2006) Democratic international governmental organizations promote peace. International Organization60(4): 969–1000.
83.
PushkinaD (2006) A recipe for success? Ingredients of a successful peacekeeping mission. International Peacekeeping13(2): 133–149.
84.
RaesSDu BoisCButsC (2019) Supplying UN peacekeepers: An assessment of the body bag syndrome among OECD nations. International Peacekeeping26(1): 111–136.
85.
ReiterDStamAC (1998) Democracy, war initiation, and victory. American Political Science Review92(2): 377–390.
86.
RomijnP (2002) Srebrenica: reconstruction, background, consequences, and analyses of the fall of a ‘safe’ area. The Srebrenica Report. Netherlands Institute of War Documentation, Amsetrdam.
87.
RuggeriAGizelisT-IDorussenH (2013) Managing mistrust: An analysis of cooperation with UN peacekeeping in Africa. Journal of Conflict Resolution57(3): 387–409.
88.
SambanisN (2008) Short-and long-term effects of United Nations peace operations. The World Bank Economic Review22(1): 9–32.
89.
SirinCVKochMT (2015) Dictators and death: Casualty sensitivity of autocracies in militarized interstate disputes. International Studies Quarterly59(4): 802–814.
90.
SloanJ (2014) The evolution of the use of force in UN peacekeeping. Journal of Strategic Studies37(5): 674–702.
91.
StinnettDMTirJDiehlPF, et al. (2002) The correlates of war (cow) project direct contiguity data, version 3.0. Conflict Management and Peace Science19(2): 59–67.
92.
StojekSMTirJ (2014) The supply side of United Nations peacekeeping operations: trade ties and United Nations-led deployments to civil war states. European Journal of International Relations21(2): 352–376.
93.
SullivanPL (2008) Sustaining the fight: A cross-sectional time-series analysis of public support for ongoing military interventions. Conflict Management and Peace Science25(2): 112–135.
94.
SundbergRMelanderE (2013) Introducing the UCDP georeferenced event dataset. Journal of Peace Research50(4): 523–532.
95.
TardyT (2015) United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR—Bosnia and Herzegovina). In: The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, pp.383–394.
96.
TomzMRWeeksJL (2013) Public opinion and the democratic peace. American Political Science Review107(4): 849–865.
97.
TownsenAAReederBW (2014) Where do peacekeepers go when they go?: Explaining the spatial heterogeneity of peacekeeping deployments. Journal of International Peacekeeping18(1-2): 69–91.
98.
UzonyiG (2015) Refugee flows and state contributions to post-Cold War UN peacekeeping missions. Journal of Peace Research52(6): 743–757.
99.
Van Der MeulenJDe KoninkM (2003) Risky missions: Dutch public opinion on peace-keeping in the Balkans. In: Public Opinion and the International Use of Force. London, UK: Routledge, pp.130–152.
100.
Van WilligenN (2016) A Dutch return to UN peacekeeping?International Peacekeeping23(5): 702–720.
101.
Van WykC (2013) Uganda withdraw from UN operations: Threat or bluff, the effect on Central Africa. Africa Conflict Monthly Monitor2: 59–61.
102.
VasquezJHenehanMT (2001) Territorial disputes and the probability of war, 1816–1992. Journal of Peace Research38(2): 123–138.
103.
Von BillerbeckSTanseyO (2019) Enabling autocracy? Peacebuilding and post-conflict authoritarianism in the Democratic Republic of Congo. European Journal of International Relations25(3): 698–722.
104.
WalterBF (2003) Explaining the intractability of territorial conflict. International Studies Review5(4): 137–153.
105.
WeeksJL (2008) Autocratic audience costs: regime type and signaling resolve. International Organization62(1): 35–64.
106.
WeeksJL (2012) Strongmen and straw men: Authoritarian regimes and the initiation of international conflict. American Political Science Review106(2): 326–347.
WillmotHSheeranSSharlandL (2015) Safety and Security Challenges in UN Peace Operations. New York: International Peace Institute.
109.
WillsS (2009) Protecting Civilians: Obligations of Peacekeepers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
110.
World Peace Foundation (2016) African Politics, African Peace. Tufts University, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
111.
Wright T and Greig JM (2012) Staying the course: Assessing the durability of peacekeeping operations. Conflict Management and Peace Science 29(2): 127–147.
112.
ZürcherCManningCEvensonKD, et al. (2013) Costly Democracy: Peacebuilding and Democratization After War. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
