Quantitative research on arms transfers has not adequately accounted for broader theories of international relations. We review the specialized literature on arms transfers and examine how arms transfers fit with the broad international relations theories. We derive and test seven hypotheses based on realist, liberal and constructivist theories using a dataset of all non-US/Russian aircraft transfers between 1990 and 2010. We find limited support for realist hypotheses. We find little support for hypotheses derived from the Democratic Peace literature, but some support for liberal trade arguments. We also find some support for constructivist arguments based on shared identity and prestige measures.
AkermanASeimAL (2014) The global arms trade network 1950–2007. Journal of Comparative Economics42(3): 535–551.
2.
BierstekerTJ (2002) State, sovereignty and territory. In CarlsnaesWRisseTSimmonsB (eds) Handbook of International Relations. London: Sage.
3.
BlackJ (2016) Air Power: A Global History. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
4.
BlantonS (1999) Instruments of security or tools of repression? Arms imports and human rights conditions in developing countries. Journal of Peace Research36(2): 233–244.
5.
BlantonS (2005) Foreign policy in transition? Human rights, democracy, and US arms exports. International Studies Quarterly49(4): 647–668.
6.
BrauerJ (2003) Potential and actual arms production. In LevinePSmithR (eds) The Arms Trade, Security and Conflict. Abingdon: Routledge.
7.
BrauerJDunneP (2004) Arms Trade and Economic Development: Theory, Policy, and Cases in Arms Trade Offsets. New York: Routledge.
8.
BullH (1979) The state’s positive role in world affairs. Daedalus108: 111–123.
9.
BuzanBHerringE (1998) The Arms Dynamic in World Politics. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
10.
BymanDLWaxmanMC (2000) Kosovo and the great air power debate. International Security24: 5–38.
11.
CatrinaC (1988) Arms Transfers and Dependence. New York: Taylor & Francis.
ChatterjeeP (1975) Arms, Alliances and Stability: The Development of the Structure of International Politics. London: Macmillan.
14.
ColaresiMPThompsonWR (2005) Alliances, arms buildups and recurrent conflict: Testing a steps-to-war model. The Journal of Politics67: 345–364.
15.
ComolaM (2012) Democracies, politics, and arms supply. Review of International Economics20(1): 150–163.
16.
De SoysaIMidfordP (2012) Enter the dragon! An empirical analysis of Chinese versus US arms transfers to autocrats and violators of human rights, 1989–20061. International Studies Quarterly56(4): 843–856.
17.
DiehlPFCrescenziMJC (1998) Reconfiguring the arms race–war debate. Journal of Peace Research35: 111–118.
18.
EikenberryKW (1995) Explaining and Influencing Chinese Arms Transfers. Coillingdale, PA: DIANE Publishing.
19.
EricksonJL (2011) Market imperative meets normative power: Human rights and European arms transfer policy. European Journal of International Relations19(2): 209–234.
20.
EricksonJL (2015) Dangerous Trade: Arms Exports, Human Rights, and International Reputation. New York: Columbia University Press.
21.
Foreign & Commonwealth Office. (1967) Prospects for Arms Sales: Policy. FCO 46/188. Accessed as National Archives, January2017.
22.
FranzeseRJHaysJC (2007) Spatial econometric models of cross-sectional interdependence in political science panel and time-series-cross-section data. Political Analysis15: 140–164.
23.
GaltungJ (1964) A structural theory of aggression. Journal of Peace Research1(2): 95–119.
24.
GarthoffRL (1980) American reaction to Soviet aircraft in Cuba, 1962 and 1978. Political Science Quarterly95: 427–439.
25.
GiblerDMRiderTJHutchisonML (2005) Taking arms against a sea of troubles: Conventional arms races during periods of rivalry. Journal of Peace Research42: 131–147.
26.
GilpinR (1988) The theory of hegemonic War. Journal of Interdisciplinary History18: 591–613.
27.
GleditschK (2002) Expanded trade and GDP data. Journal of Conflict Resolution46 (5): 176–214.
28.
GrayCS (1993) Weapons Don’t Make War: Policy, Strategy, and Military Technology. University Press of Kansas.
29.
GrayCS (1996) Arms races and other pathetic fallacies: A case for deconstruction. Review of International Studies22: 323–335.
30.
HartleyK (2000) The benefits and costs of the UK arms trade. Defence and Peace Economics11: 445–459.
31.
HartleyKMartinS (2003) The economics of UK arms exports. In LevinePSmithR (eds) The Arms Trade, Security and Conflict. Abingdon: Routledge.
32.
HenselPRMitchellSM (2007) The Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) Project Supplementary Data Set: Colonial History Data Set. Available from: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/5EMETG, Harvard Dataverse, V2.
33.
HirschmanAO (1980) National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
34.
HolmesKR (1988) Measuring the conventional balance in Europe. International Security12: 166–173.
35.
HuthPKRussettB (1984) What makes deterrence work? Cases from 1900 to 1980. World Politics36: 496–526.
36.
JeppersonRLWendtAKatzensteinPJ (1996) Norms, identity, and culture in national security. In KatzensteinPJ (ed.) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press.
37.
JohnsonRAI (2017) The role and capabilities of major weapon systems transferred between 1950 and 2010: Empirical examinations of an arms transfer data set. Defence and Peace Economics28: 272–297.
38.
JohnsonRAI (2019) Decision-making in the arms of a dependent relationship: Explaining shifts in importer acquisition patterns of major weapon systems, 1955–2007. Defence and Peace Economics. DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2019.1618651
39.
JohnsonRAIWillardsonSL (2018) Human rights and democratic arms transfers: Rhetoric versus reality with different types of major weapon systems. International Studies Quarterly62(2): 453–464.
40.
KaderaK (2001) The Power–Conflict Story: A Dynamic Model of Interstate Rivalry. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
41.
KaldorM (1982) The Baroque Arsenal. New York: Hill and Wang.
42.
KapsteinEB (1992) The Political Economy of National Security: A Global Perspective. New York: McGraw-Hill.
43.
KellerWWNolanJE (1997) The arms trade: Business as usual?Foreign Policy109: 113–125.
44.
KinsellaD (1994) Conflict in context: Arms transfers and third world rivalries during the Cold War. American Journal of Political Science38(3): 557–581.
45.
KinsellaD (1998) Arms transfer dependence and foreign policy conflict. Journal of Peace Research35(1): 7–23.
46.
KinsellaD (2002) Rivalry, reaction, and weapons proliferation: A time-series analysis of global arms transfers. International Studies Quarterly46(2): 209–230.
47.
KinsellaDChimaJS (2001) Symbols of statehood: Military industrialization and public discourse in India. Review of International Studies27(3): 353–373.
48.
KinsellaDTillemaH (1995) Arms and aggression in the Middle East: Overt military interventions, 1948–1991. Journal of Conflict Resolution39(2): 306.
49.
KlareMT (1993) The next great arms race. Foreign Affairs72: 136–152.
50.
KrauseK (1991) Military statecraft: Power and influence in Soviet and American arms transfer relationships. International Studies Quarterly35(3): 313–336.
51.
KrauseK (1992) Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
52.
KrauseV (2004) Hazardous weapons? Effects of arms transfers and defense pacts on militarized disputes, 1950–1995. International Interactions30(4): 349.
53.
KyddA (2000) Arms races and arms control: Modeling the hawk perspective. American Journal of Political Science44: 228–244.
54.
LakeDA (2009) Hierarchy in International Relations. Cornell University Press.
55.
LeedsBRitterJMitchellSLongA (2002) Alliance treaty obligations and provisions, 1815–1944. International Interactions28(3): 237–260.
56.
LevinePMouzukisFSmithR (2003) Arms export controls and emerging domestic producers. In LevinePSmithR (eds) The Arms Trade, Security and Conflict. Abingdon: Routledge.
57.
LieberKAAlexanderG (2005) Waiting for balancing: Why the world is not pushing back. International Security30: 109–139.
58.
MaozZ (2006) Network polarization, network interdependence, and international conflict, 1816–2002. Journal of Peace Research43: 391–411.
59.
MaozZ (2011) Networks of Nations: The Evolution, Structure, and Impact of International Networks, 1816–2001. New York: Cambridge University Press.
60.
MaozZRussettB (1993) Normative and structural causes of democratic peace, 1946–1986. The American Political Science Review87: 624–638.
61.
MarshallMGurrTJaggersK (2010) Polity IV Project.
62.
Ministry of Defence (1965) Arms sales organisation. DEFE 23/1. Accessed at National Archives 14January2017.
63.
MintzAHeoU (2014) Triads in international relations: The effect of superpower aid, trade, and arms transfers on conflict in the Middle East. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy20(3): 441–459.
64.
MorgenthauHJ (1962) Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Knopf.
65.
MorrowJD (1993) Arms versus allies: Trade-offs in the search for security. International Organization47: 207–233.
66.
MostBAStarrH (1989) Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics. University of South Carolina Press.
67.
OrganskiAFKKuglerJ (1981) The War Ledger. University of Chicago Press.
68.
PapeRA (1990) Coercive air power in the Vietnam War. International Security15: 103–146.
69.
PapeRA (1996) Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War, 1st edn. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
70.
PearsonFS (1994) The Global Spread of Arms: Political Economy of International Security. Oxford: Westview Press.
71.
PevehouseJCWNordstromTMcManusRWJamisonAS (2020) Tracking organizations in the world: The Correlates of War IGO Version 3.0 Datasets. Journal of Peace Research57(3): 492–503.
72.
PlatteHLeuffenD (2016) German arms exports: Between normative aspirations and political reality. German Politics25(4): 561–580.
73.
QingminZ (2006) The bureaucratic politics of US arms sales to Taiwan. The Chinese Journal of International Politics1: 231–265.
74.
RenshonJ (2016) Status deficits and war. International Organization70(3): 513–550.
75.
RosenbergJ (1990) What’s the matter with realism?Review of International Studies16: 285–303.
76.
RotbergRI (2004) When States Fail: Causes and Consequences. Princeton University Press.
SampleSG (2018) Anticipating war? War preparations and the steps-to-war thesis. British Journal of Political Science48: 489–511.
79.
SanjianGS (1991) Great power arms transfers: Modeling the decision-making processes of hegemonic, industrial, and restrictive exporters. International Studies Quarterly35: 173–193.
80.
SchwellerRL (1997) New realist research on alliances: Refining, not refuting, Waltz’s balancing proposition. The American Political Science Review91: 927–930.
81.
SingerJD (1987) Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816–1985. International Interactions, 14: 115–132.
82.
SingerJDSmallM (1966) The Composition and status ordering of the international system: 1815–1940. World Politics18: 236–282.
83.
SingerJDBremerSStuckeyJ (1972) Capability distribution, uncertainty, and major power war, 1820–1965. In RussettB (ed.) Peace, War, and Numbers. London: Sage.
84.
SIPRI (1975) The Arms Trade with the Third World: Revised and Abridged Version. New York: Holmes and Meier.
85.
SislinJ (1994) Arms as influence: The determinants of successful influence. Journal of Conflict Resolution38: 665–689.
86.
SmithRHummAFontanelJ (1985) The economics of exporting arms. Journal of Peace Research22: 239–247.
87.
SnyderGH (1997) Alliance Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
88.
SpindelJ (2018) Beyond military power: The symbolic politics of conventional weapons transfers. Dissertation, University of Minnesota. Available at: https://conservancy.umn.edu/handle/11299/199011. (accessed 10 July 2019).
89.
StanleyJPeartonM (1972) The International Trade in Arms. New York: Praeger.
90.
StohlRGrillotS (2009) The International Arms Trade. Cambridge: Polity Press.
91.
SuchmanMCEyreDP (1992) Military procurement as rational myth: Notes on the social construction of weapons proliferation. Sociological Forum7(1): 137–161.
92.
ThiesCG (2013) The roles of bipolarity: A role theoretic understanding of the effects of ideas and material factors on the Cold War. International Studies Perspectives14: 269–288.
93.
ToftMD (2006) Issue indivisibility and time horizons as rationalist explanations for war. Security Studies15: 34–69.
94.
van EveraS (1998) Offense, defense, and the causes of war. International Security22: 5–43.
95.
VasquezJA (1995) Why do neighbors fight? Proximity, interaction, or territoriality. Journal of Peace Research32(3): 277–293.
Yarhi-MiloKLanoszkaACooperZ (2016) To arm or to ally?: The patron’s dilemma and the strategic logic of arms transfers and alliances. International Security41: 90–139.
105.
ZehfussM (2002) Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
