Building on economic norms theory, I argue that the causes of international conflict may be contextual rather than constant over time. I explore the temporal patterns in the predictors of conflict in data on European conflict between 1870 and 2001, using an endogenous Markov chain Monte Carlo Poisson change-point model. I find that the period can be divided into two time periods, different in terms of the direction of the effect of the main conflict predictors. While democracy has a positive effect on conflict in the period between 1870 and 1938, it has a negative effect from 1938 to 2001. Likewise, trade initially has no impact on conflict, but later exerts a pacifying effect. Post-estimation analyses suggest that such patterns are best explained by the externalization of contractual norms, which is consistent with economic norms theory.
BarbieriK (1996) Economic interdependence: A path to peace or a source of interstate conflict?Journal of Peace Research3(1): 29–49.
2.
BarbieriKKeshkOMGPollinsBM (2009) Trading data: Evaluating our assumptions and coding rules. Conflict Management and Peace Science26(5): 471–491.
3.
BearceDHBondanellaS (2007) Intergovernmental organizations, socialization, and member-state interest convergence. International Organization61(4): 703–733.
4.
BenhabibJPrzeworskiA (2006) The political economy of redistribution under democracy. Economic Theory29(2): 271–290.
5.
BennettDSStamAC (1998) The declining advantages of democracy a combined model of war outcomes and duration. Journal of Conflict Resolution42(3): 344–366.
6.
BennettDSStamAC (2004) The Behavioral Origins of War. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press.
7.
BoixC (2003) Democracy and Redistribution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8.
BraumoellerBF (2008) Systemic politics and the origins of great power conflict. American Political Science Review102(1):1–17.
9.
Bueno de MesquitaB (2004) The methodological study of politics. In: ShapiroISmithRMMasoudTE (eds) Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
10.
Bueno de MesquitaBLalmanD (1988) Empirical support for systemic and dyadic explanations of international conflict. World Politics41(1): 1–20.
11.
Bueno de MesquitaBLalmanD (1992) War and Reason. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
12.
BullH (1977) The Anarchical Society. New York: Columbia University Press.
13.
CedermanL-EGleditschKS (2004) Conquest and regime change: An evolutionary model of the spread of democracy and peace. International Studies Quarterly48(3): 603–629.
14.
CedermanL-ERaoMP (2001) Exploring the dynamics of the democratic peace. Journal of Conflict Resolution45(6): 818–833.
15.
ChatagnierJTKavaklıKC (2014) From economic competition to military combat: Export similarity and international conflict. Working paper.
16.
ChibS (1998) Estimations and comparison of multiple change-point models. Journal of Econometrics86: 221–241.
17.
CranmerSJDesmaraisBAKirklandJH (2012) Towards a network theory of alliance formation. International Interactions38(3): 295–324.
18.
CrescenziMJCEnterlineA (1999) Ripples from wages? A systemic, time series analysis of democracy, democratization, and interstate war. Journal of Peace Research36(1): 75–94.
19.
CutlerAC (1999) Locating “authority” in the global political economy. International Studies Quarterly43(1): 59–81.
20.
DeutschKWSingerJD (1964) Multipolar power systems and international stability. World Politics16(3): 390–406.
FearonJDWendtA (2002) Rationalism v. constructivism: A skeptical view. In: CarlsnaesWRisseTSimmonsBA (eds) Handbook of International Relations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
25.
FergusonN (2002) Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power. New York: Basic Books.
26.
FergusonYHMansbachRW (1991) Between celebration and despair. International Studies Quarterly35(4): 363–386.
27.
FergusonYHMansbachRW (2003) The Elusive Quest Continues: Theory and Global Politics. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
28.
FinnemoreM (1996) National Interests in International Security. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
29.
Fruhwirth-SchnatterSWagnerH (2006) Auxiliary mixture sampling for parameter-driven models of time series of small counts with applications to state space modelling. Biometrika93(4): 827–841.
30.
GaddisJL (1986) The long peace: Elements of stability in the postwar international system. International Security10(4): 99–142.
31.
GartzkeEA (2007) The capitalist peace. American Journal of Political Science51(1): 166–191.
32.
GeertzC (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books.
33.
GhosnFPalmerGBremerS (2004) The MID3 data set, 1993–2001: Procedures, coding rules, and description. Conflict Management and Peace Science21(2): 133–154.
34.
GiblerDM (2012) The Territorial Peace: Borders, State Development, and International Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
35.
GiblerDMTirJ (2014) Territorial peace and democratic clustering. Journal of Politics76(1): 27–40.
36.
GillJ (2006) Essential Mathematics for Political and Social Research. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
37.
GleditschKSHegreH (1997) Peace and democracy: Three levels of analysis. Journal of Conflict Resolution41(2): 283–310.
38.
GleditschKSWardMD (2000) War and peace in space and time: The role of democratization. International Studies Quarterly44(1): 1–29.
39.
GowaJ (1989) Rational hegemons, excludable goods, and small groups: An epitaph for hegemonic stability theory?World Politics41(3): 307–324.
40.
GranatoJInglehartRLeblangD (1996) The effect of cultural values on economic development: Theory, hypotheses, and some empirical tests. American Journal of Political Science40(3): 607–632.
41.
GreenDPKimSYYoonDH (2001) Dirty pool. International Organization55(2): 441–468.
42.
GriecoJM (1988) Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: A realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism. International Organization42(3): 485–507.
43.
HollifieldJF (1992) Immigrants, Markets, and States: The Political Economy of Postwar Europe. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
44.
HolstiKJ (1991) Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648–1989. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
45.
IkenberryJG (1993) Creating yesterday’s new world order: Keynesian “new thinking” and the Anglo-American postwar settlement. In: GoldsteinJKeohaneRO (eds) Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
46.
KegleyCWJrRaymondGA (1982) Alliance norms and war: A new piece in an old puzzle. International Studies Quarterly26(4): 572–595.
47.
KennedyPM (1980) The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914. London: Allen & Unwin.
48.
KeshkOMGPollinsBMReuvenyR (2004) Trade still follows the flag: The primacy of politics in a simultaneous model of interdependence and armed conflict. Journal of Politics66(4): 1155–1179.
49.
LeedsBARitterJMMitchellSMLongAG (2002) Alliance treaty obligations and provisions, 1815–1944. International Interactions28(3): 261–284.
50.
LiQResnickA (2003) Democratic institutions and foreign direct investment inflows to developing countries. International Organization57(1): 175–211.
51.
MansbachRWVazquezJA (1981) In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics. New York: Columbia University Press.
52.
MaozZ (2006) Network polarization, network interdependence, and international conflict, 1816–2002. Journal of Peace Research43(4): 391–411.
53.
MaozZAbdolaliN (1989) Regime types and international conflict, 1817–1976. Journal of Conflict Resolution33(1): 3–33.
54.
MarshallMGJaggersK (2008) Polity IV project: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800–2007. Version p4v2008e [Computer File].
55.
MartinADQuinnKMParkJH (2011) MCMCpack: Markov chain Monte Carlo in R. Journal of Statistical Software42(9): 1–21.
56.
McDonaldPJ (2004) Peace through trade or free trade?Journal of Conflict Resolution48(4): 547–572.
57.
MitchellSM (2002) A Kantian system? Democracy and third-party conflict resolution. American Journal of Political Science46(4): 749–759.
58.
MitchellSMGatesSHegreH (1999) Evolution in democracy–war dynamics. Journal of Conflict Resolution43(6): 771–792.
59.
MousseauM (2000) Market prosperity, democratic consolidation, and democratic peace. Journal of Conflict Resolution44(4): 472–507.
60.
MousseauM (2003) The nexus of market society, liberal preferences, and democratic peace: Interdisciplinary theory and evidence. International Studies Quarterly47(4): 483–510.
61.
MousseauM (2009) The social market roots of democratic peace. International Security33(4): 52–86.
62.
MousseauM (2012) The democratic peace unraveled: It’s the economy. International Studies Quarterly57(1): 186–197.
63.
MuellerJ (1989) Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War. New York: Basic Books.
64.
MuellerJ (2009) Quiet Cataclysm: Reflection on the Recent Transformation of World Politics. New York: HarperCollins.
65.
NorthDCWallisJWWeingastBR (2009) Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
66.
OnealJRRussettB (1997) The classical liberals were right: Democracy, interdependence, and conflict, 1950–1985. International Studies Quarterly41(2): 267–295.
67.
ParkJH (2010) Structural change in U.S. presidents’ use of force. American Journal of Political Science54(3): 766–782.
68.
PetersonTMThiesCG (2012) Beyond Ricardo: The link between intraindustry trade and peace. British Journal of Political Science42(4): 747–767.
69.
PevehouseJCNordstromTWarnkeK (2004) The COW-2 International Organizations Dataset 2.0. Conflict Management and Peace Science21(2): 101–119.
70.
RaslerKAThompsonW (2005) Puzzles of the Democratic Preace: Theory, Geopolitics, and the Transformation of World Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian.
71.
RaslerKAThompsonW (2012) Systemic theories of conflict. In: MitchellSMDiehlPFMorrowJD (eds) Guide to the Scientific Study of International Processes. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
72.
RayJLSingerJD (1973) Power in the international system. Sociological Methods and Research1(4): 403–437.
73.
RuggieJG (1982) International regimes, transactions, and change: Embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order. International Organization36(2): 379–415.
74.
SchweickartD (2002) After Capitalism. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
75.
SeneseP (1997) Costs and demands: International sources of dispute challenges and reciprocation. Journal of Conflict Resolution41(3): 407–427.
76.
SenesePDVasquezJA (2008) The Steps to War: An Empirical Study. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
77.
SingerJDBremerSStuckeyJ (1972) Capability distribution, uncertainty, and major power war, 1820–1965. In: RussettB (ed.) Peace, War, and Numbers. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
78.
SmithA (1996) To intervene or not to intervene: A biased decision. Journal of Conflict Resolution40(1): 16–40.
79.
SmithJM (2000) The politics of dispute settlement design: Explaining legalism in regional trade pacts. International Organization54(1): 137–180.
80.
SnidalD (1991) International cooperation among relative gains maximizers. International Studies Quarterly35(4): 387–402.
81.
ThiesCG (2008) The construction of a Latin American interstate culture of rivalry. International Interactions34(3): 231–257.
82.
VasquezJA (2009) The War Puzzle Revisited. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
83.
WaltzKN (1979) Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill.
84.
WatsonP (2006) Ideas: A History of Intellectual Thought and Invention from Fire to Freud. New York: HarperCollins.
85.
WendtA (1999) Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
