During the last decade, the Supreme Court has been vacillating in itsapproach to affirmative action (AA)--from stricker scrutiny standards to moreliberal standards--seriously complicating the job of public administration.Whyhas the Court been so ambivalent towards AA ? This article shows that thetwo-tieranalytic framework the Court has formulated for judicial review is notasystematic test enabling coherentapplication but largely a set of conflictingand often polarized value preferences. This "conglomerate" framework haspermitted the Court to make essentially inconsistent choices, depending onwho sits on the bench and is able to forge the opinion. With the retirement ofJustices Brennan (1990) and Marshall (1991)--the ardent supporters ofaffirmative action--the Court will certainly embark upon a strict scrutiny path.Inevitably then, AA debate will change in focus, gradually moving away fromthe idea of quotas to a case-by-case approach. The challenge here would beto structure AA policyin a way that is consistent with the language of the EqualProtection of the Laws. If, for instance, merit is the only constitutionallyacceptable criterion, AA policymayhave to be focused on the concept of merit,defining it in a way that is not going to be disadvantageous to a particulargroup. Thatmaymean that "merit" is definedbroadlyin terms of whata personis capable of contributing to his or her employerand the larger community inwhich he or she is a part.
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