Abstract
In the first article of this special issue of the Journal of Psychoeducational Assessment, I critiqued Flynn’s theoretical explanation of the Flynn effect because he depended too heavily on an apparently huge generational gain on the WISC Similarities subtest; I claimed he was comparing apples with oranges because that subtest changed too much when the WISC was first revised. Four sets of esteemed researchers were invited to respond to my article and also to an article by Zhou, Zhu, and Weiss—Flynn, Sternberg, McGrew, and Ceci and Kanaya. Flynn disagrees strongly with my critique of his theory, a theory that posits striking generational shifts from concrete (utilitarian) thinking to a kind of fluid reasoning that Flynn nicknames “scientific spectacles.” In this final article of the special issue, I respond to Flynn’s claims, and also to the points made by the other invited respondents. In addition, I respond to the range of opinions expressed by the scholars who were invited to write an essay on whether or not IQs should be adjusted for the Flynn effect in capital punishment cases (Fletcher et al., Hagan et al., and Reynolds et al.). Ultimately, I disagree with Flynn’s explanation of the Flynn effect, but I agree with his position that IQs should be adjusted for the effect in death penalty cases.
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