Abstract
In the term that concluded in June 1991, the Supreme Court was clearly an institution on the doctrinal move in the field of criminal justice, although the fluidity of the justices' voting alignments betrayed some groping for the rationale for that movement. Both old and recent precedents were abandoned, and the once highly touted bright lines provided by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), were further obscured. In a death penalty decision, Payne v. Tennessee, see below, announced on the last day of the term, Chief Justice Rehnquist gave an unmistakable signal that other criminal justice precedents were hardly to be considered sacrosanct. Because of the increasingly overt influence of the more recently appointed justices, the term represented a discernible lurch in the ongoing shift away from the Warren Court's legacy. Indeed, if the 1990 Term is to be viewed as a barometer, the Supreme Court's impact on criminal justice issues in the decade of the 1990s could rival that of the Warren Court in the 1960s.
All of the major Fourth Amendment decisions in the past term produced defeats for the defense, whereas the interrogation cases had mixed results. In the "fair trial" area, yet more ripples were created by the progeny of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Although several defendants who had received death sentences obtained relief, the two decisions having the broadest doctrinal implications for capital punishment litigation were clear-cut victories for the government. Finally, the Court announced its most definitive edict to date in support of the judicial hands-off principle in the area of prison litigation.
If, as is often heard, Mapp v. Ohio began the criminal justice revolution of the 1960s, the 1990 Term offers the clearest evidence yet that the counterrevolution is flourishing.
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