This essay contends that deterrence is a relevant consideration to whether death is a justifiable punishment for murder. If the death penalty deters murder, then unless it is inflicted some presumably innocent person will be killed. So if the death penalty deters murderers, a choice must be made between the life of someone convicted of murder and that of an innocent person. We sketch out a retributivist theory ofentitlement to punishment whereby the past wrongdoing of the murderer is a reason for choosing to take his life, rather than allowing the death of an innocent person. This differs from the traditional view of deterrence as a strictly forward-looking rationale for punishment.
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