The poor are often far removed from the legal system not only as a result of the lack of funds, but also because the law is complicated to the point that it is all but completely alien to them. Yet, in society the legal problems of these people are multitudinous, ranging from everyday relationships with landlords and welfare agencies to the area of criminal cases in which so many impoverished citizens find themselves embroiled.
The Supreme Court, since the milestone case of Gideon v. Wainwright in 1963, focused upon the guarantee to counsel for indigents in the many stages of criminal proceedings from arrest to sentencing, and appeal. Judicial activism in the Escobedo (1964), Miranda (1966), Wade (1967), Coleman (1970), Argersinger (1972), and Mempa (1967) cases provided bridges of procedural precedents that ensure fairness for the poor defendant. The procedural criteria established in those six key cases are sweeping remedies for the vulnerable position in which the destitute accused finds himself upon being arrested. The analysis here suggests that the defendant should have the advantage of a lawyer at every step in the criminal justice system. When an individual is arrested, the atmosphere of the police station is tense, and the stakes are high, sometimes involving many years of imprisonment. At the same time, the charges brought against him appear awesome and mysterious.
More than any recent case on the right to counsel, Brewer v. Williams (1977) displays the dilemma faced by the Court in dealing with the boundaries between the investigatory and accusatory stages of criminal justice. The unique nature of the facts of this 5-4 decision left the judges sharply divided, with Justice Stewart explaining in the majority opinion that the Court should be vigilant in preserving the integrity of the right to counsel. The dissenters, led by Chief Justice Burger, wrote an impassioned attack against extending the exclusionary rule beyond a reasonable threshold.
By expanding the right to counselfor indigent defendants, the Court has, in effect, eradicated what Justice Douglas termed "invidious discrimination" against a disadvantaged class in our society. To appreciate the significance of the fully developed role of today's Court as guardian of the civil liberties of the poor, one need only to look at the insensitivity that the 19th century Court expressed toward indigence when it referred to "the moral pestilence of paupers" in the City of New York v. Miln (1837) case.
