Recent Legal Developments: Criminal Justice Decisions of the United States Supreme Court,2022 Term

Abstract

In this paper, we review and analyze the criminal justice–related decisions of the 2022 term of the United States Supreme Court. We also provide a summary of the Court's voting patterns and opinion authorship. Fourteen of the Court's 58 decisions touched on criminal justice. There were significant decisions involving the First Amendment, the Sixth Amendment, and federal criminal statutes. Each of these is discussed in turn.

Introduction

During its 2022 term, the United States Supreme Court issued a total of 58 decisions on the merits. Of these, 14 (24%) dealt primarily with a criminal justice–related issue. This follows the 2021 term which had only 13 criminal justice–related decisions. While the number of criminal justice–related decisions was relatively low, a number of these decisions dealt with significant, if not particularly newsworthy, issues such as the interpretation of federal statutes. A few, however, dealt with more controversial issues, including the interplay of the First Amendment and criminal justice and the Sixth Amendment.

The spate of appointments to the Court in recent years has resulted in a lineup of six conservative and three liberal justices. While the terms conservative and liberal are somewhat ambiguous, in general, this lineup is reasonably accurate. The data on how Justices vote bears this out. Justice Kavanaugh (96%) was most frequently in the majority, followed closely by Chief Justice Roberts (95%), while Justice Thomas was in the majority in only 76% of all decisions, the lowest of any Justice.

As for opinion writing, majority opinion authorship was divided quite evenly, with every justice writing either 6 or 7 majority opinions except for Justice Sotomayor, who wrote 5. This even distribution of opinions has been a hallmark of the Roberts Court and speaks to the Chief Justice's management skills. As in years past, Justice Thomas was the most prolific opinion writer, with the most opinions overall (22), including 6 majority opinions, 7 concurring opinions, and 9 dissenting opinions. Justice Gorsuch was close behind, with 21 opinions. For the first time in 10 years, Justice Kagan did not produce the fewest opinions—she came in second in this category, with 11. Chief Justice Roberts was the least prolific opinion writer, authoring just 7 opinions.

Justice Gorsuch wrote the most concurring opinions, with 10. Justice Thomas issued by far the most dissenting opinions (9). He also wrote the most solo dissents, with 6. This is in line with years past. While Justice Thomas is a reliable conservative vote, he has a unique approach to many areas of the law, and this often leads him to write separately to lay out his position. Interestingly, Justice Ketanji-Brown, the newest member of the Court, had the second most solo dissents with 3.

We present below a summary and analysis of the most significant decisions involving criminal justice. There were 14 criminal justice–related decisions, including two decisions involving consolidated cases. The cases are divided, somewhat roughly, into categories.

First Amendment

Counterman v. Colorado

Billy Counterman was charged with stalking and causing emotional stress after sending a number of Facebook messages, some of which implied violence, to local musician, Whalen. Counterman claimed his Facebook messages were not “true threats” because he did not intend to harm Whalen and, therefore, were protected speech under the First Amendment. Colorado applied an objective, “reasonable person standard” in which a speaker is liable if a reasonable person (not necessarily the speaker) finds a statement threatening and determined that Counterman's messages did constitute a “true threat.” Counterman was convicted, his first appeal failed, and the Colorado Supreme Court refused to review the case.

Justice Kagan, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kavanaugh, and Jackson, delivered the 7-2 decision for the Supreme Court which vacated the judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. Justice Kagan determined that a subjective standard, in which a speaker is or should be aware that his statements could be regarded as threatening, was the appropriate standard. Therefore, the state must now prove that a defendant knew and disregarded the risk of their speech being interpreted as threatening for the statement to be a “true threat.” Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Gorsuch, authored a lengthy concurrence agreeing with the majority that “true threat” cases should use a subjective mens rea standard but disagreeing that recklessness was sufficient to violate that standard. Justice Barrett, joined by Justice Thomas, authored a dissent disagreeing with the majority that a subjective mens rea is needed and instead proposed that the objective reasonable person standard is serviceable for most unprotected speech cases, so the same standard should be applied to “true threat” cases. In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas added that the majority's opinion should not have used New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) to inform the analysis in this case. Justice Thomas has long advocated overturning the Sullivan precedent.

Fifth Amendment

Smith v. United States

Timothy Smith was found guilty of stealing trade secrets from a company named StrikeLines, the headquarters of which was located in the Northern District of Florida. However, at the time of the crime, Smith accessed StrikeLines's servers located in the Middle District of Florida from his home in the Southern District of Alabama. Smith moved for dismissal on the ground that there was no venue for the trial, which was rejected by the District Court. Smith then moved for acquittal following his conviction, again citing improper venue, which was denied by the District Court. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated Smith's conviction but did not grant Smith immunity from retrial. Smith appealed this ruling, arguing that the Venue and Vicinage Clauses in the Constitution are tied to the Double Jeopardy Clause, and that a retrial of this matter in either his home state of Alabama or the Middle District of Florida would constitute double jeopardy. Smith's argument rested on the fact that acquittals by juries prevent the defendant from being retried for the same case, and that acquittals for violations of the Venue and Vicinage Clauses should have the same effect.

The Supreme Court unanimously (9-0) affirmed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Justice Alito authored the opinion for the Court, citing extensive case law and the attitudes of the founding generation to explain the decision. In the history of the United States, double jeopardy protections have never been granted for errors of trial procedure except in cases of violations of the Speedy Trial Clause. In trials of improper venue and in trials of improperly selected juries alike, the remedy for errors in trial procedure has been to vacate the judgment of the court and authorize retrial of the case, as the acquittal based on a trial error does not indicate the defendant's lack of culpability in the criminal offense in the same way that an acquittal from a jury does.

Sixth Amendment

Samia v. United States

Adam Samia, Carl Stillwell, and Joseph Hunter were convicted in a joint trial for crimes surrounding the for-hire murder of Catherine Lee. During this trial the prosecution introduced Stillwell's confession, which was modified to omit any mention of Samia, replacing his name with phrases such as “the other person.” This redaction was made in an attempt to have the confession admitted despite two previous Supreme Court decisions which limited the use of confessions by codefendants. In Bruton v. United States (1968), the Court held that a nontestifying codefendant's confession could not be used at trial even if there was a jury instruction given stating the jury should not use the confession against the person who did not confess. In Gray v. Maryland (1998), the prosecution attempted to introduce a codefendant's confession while inserting a blank space in the place of the other defendant's name, but the Supreme Court determined this redaction was insufficient. Following his conviction, Samia appealed on the grounds that the admission of Stillwell's out-of-court confession violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Samia argued that despite the omission of his name, Stillwell's confession implicated Samia as the one who killed Lee. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Samia's claim.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Second Circuit in a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Thomas (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh). Justice Thomas asserted that the redaction of Samia's name from the confession and the court's instruction that the jury should not consider Stillwell's confession when determining Samia's guilt meant that there was no violation of Samia's Sixth Amendment rights. The Court's judgment establishes that a codefendant's out-of-court confession is admissible when it is appropriately redacted and jury instructions are given, regardless of the impact of the confession in context. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Kagan (joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson) argues that the majority misapplied Bruton, and that it is the impact of the confession on the jury and not the manner in which the confession is presented that matters. Justice Jackson authored a separate dissenting opinion, adding that the majority's claim that a jury instruction is sufficient to prevent a jury from using a confession by a codefendant against another defendant ignores reality.

Eighth Amendment

Cruz v. Arizona

John Montenegro Cruz received a death sentence in Arizona for the murder of a police officer. During the trial, the judge instructed the jury they could vote for or against the death penalty, and if they voted against it, he would impose a sentence of either life without parole or life with the possibility of parole after 25 years. Under Arizona law, Cruz would not be able to receive parole and the only possible form of release would be through executive clemency. At his trial and on appeal, Cruz argued that his due process rights were violated by the trial court's decision to not allow him to inform the jury that a life sentence in the state is always without parole. Cruz cited Simmons v. South Carolina, with the lower courts rejecting this argument, believing that it did not apply to Arizona because of the different sentencing and parole structure. Decisions by the Arizona Supreme Court that Simmons did not apply to the state were overturned in Lynch v. Arizona, which occurred after Cruz's conviction. Cruz then filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing that the ruling in Lynch was a significant change in law. The Arizona Supreme Court decided that Lynch was not a significant change in law and denied the claim.

In a 5-4 decision, with the majority opinion authored by Justice Sotomayor and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson, the Court reversed the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court. Justice Sotomayor asserted that the Arizona Supreme Court erred in determining that Lynch was not a significant change in the law. Justice Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch. They claimed that the Court did not have the right to change a state court's interpretation of state law and that the Arizona Supreme Court did not misinterpret state law.

Due Process

Reed v. Goertz

Rodney Reed was found guilty and sentenced to death for the 1996 rape and murder of Stacey Sites. The trial court denied Reed's 2014 petition for testing of the DNA evidence from the case, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed that denial as well as Reed's subsequent petition for a rehearing. Reed later brought a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Texas's postconviction DNA statute violated his due process rights; this claim was dismissed by the District Court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Fifth Circuit Court held that Reed's lawsuit was not timely; specifically, it had to be filed within two years of the trial court's denial of his request for DNA testing.

The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision with the majority opinion authored by Justice Kavanaugh and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson, reversed the Fifth Circuit's ruling. Justice Kavanaugh explained that instead of the statute of limitations being two years after the trial court's denial of Reed's motion for DNA evidence re-resting, the statute of limitations was two years after the Court of Criminal Appeals denied his subsequent motion for a rehearing. This means that Reed's suit was timely. Justice Thomas dissented, arguing that there was no subject matter jurisdiction for this case. Justices Alito and Gorsuch also dissented, arguing that the Fifth Circuit was correct in stating that the claim was not timely.

Statutory Interpretation

Percoco v. United States

Joseph Percoco served as Governor Cuomo of New York's Executive Deputy Secretary from 2011 to 2016, with a brief resignation from his position in 2014 when he stepped down from his position to run Governor Cuomo's reelection campaign for eight months, resuming his position following the election. It was during this time that Percoco received payments totaling $35,000 from a real estate developer, Steven Aiello. Aiello had asked Percoco for help in his attempt to avoid entering into a “Labor Peace Agreement” that was required with labor unions to receive state funding for a project. Percoco contacted a senior official at a state agency, resulting in the state agency letting Aiello know that the agreement would not be required. Percoco was charged with multiple fraud counts, with the focus of the case on the charge of conspiracy to commit honest-services wire fraud. At trial, Percoco argued that he was a private citizen at the time, and private citizens cannot be charged with committing honest-services wire fraud. The jury was instructed that they could vote to convict Percoco for honest-services wire fraud if “he dominated and controlled any governmental business” and “people working in the government actually relied on him because of a special relationship he had with the government.” Percoco was convicted and the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction based on United States v. Marigotta (1982).

In a unanimous decision (9-0) authored by Justice Alito, the Court reversed and remanded the case. They determined that the jury instruction was not an appropriate test for deciding if an individual could be convicted of honest-services fraud as a private citizen. Reviewing previous cases related to the charge, the Court concluded that Marigotta's standard was too vague. The “intangible right of honest services” was not properly defined, and the vagueness of the standard could apply to any number of people involved in government. Justice Gorsuch authored a concurring judgment with Justice Thomas, in which they argued that honest-services fraud cannot be defined, and that no jury instruction on the topic would have supported it. The vagueness of this law allows prosecutors to choose when to implement it and does not allow individuals to know when their actions may conflict with it.

Ciminelli v. United States

Louis Ciminelli was convicted of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U. S. C. §1343 and 18 U. S. C. §1349, after his construction company LPCiminelli paid in excess of $250,000 to secure contracts with the “Buffalo Billion” initiative in New York. Ciminelli, lobbyist Todd Howe, and project developer and manager Alain Kaloyeros added LPCiminelli to a list of “preferred developers” for construction projects and added unique characteristics of LPCiminelli to the preferred qualifications list for other projects. These actions ensured that LPCiminelli received a $750 million contract. The conviction of Ciminelli and his codefendants rested solely on the argument that under the wire fraud statute, a long-held precedent of the “right-to-control theory of wire fraud” meant that the right to control one's own economic interests is considered property. At trial, the court argued that Ciminelli had acted in such a way as to “deprive a victim of potentially valuable economic information necessary to make discretionary economic decisions” by engaging in this scheme. On appeal, Ciminelli argued that the right to control one's own assets was not property. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.

The Supreme Court unanimously (9-0) reversed the Second Circuit. Justice Thomas authored the majority opinion with Justice Alito authoring a concurring opinion. Thomas reasoned that the right to control one's own assets is not property and that holding an intangible asset such as the right to control alongside the fraud statute expands the jurisdiction of the Court inappropriately. Thus, the “right to control” theory used by the Second Circuit did not provide a valid basis for liability under the federal wire fraud statute. Justice Alito concurred but claimed that some aspects of the majority opinion were not necessary considering the narrow scope of the question posed to the Court.

Twitter v. Taamneh

Following an ISIS terrorist attack in 2017, victims’ family members, including Taamneh, filed suit under 18 U.S.C. § 2333 alleging that ISIS had been aided and abetted by the technology companies Twitter, Google, and Facebook. The District Court dismissed Taamneh's claim, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that decision.

The Supreme Court unanimously (9-0) reversed the Ninth Circuit, with Justice Thomas penning the opinion. Thomas asserted that Twitter's provision of services to the general public gives rise to no more culpability for the bad acts of its users than a mail service or phone service. Thomas analyzed the facts of the case alongside Halberstam v. Welch, the language of the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), and additional case law to make this determination. Thomas concludes that because the social media platform did not provide “substantial assistance” to ISIS and did not wish to bring about the bad acts of its members, the actions of Twitter did not rise to a standard of culpability associated with aiding and abetting. Per the language of JASTA, the defendants must also have “aid[ed] and abet[ted] the act of international terrorism that injured the plaintiffs.” In other words, Taamneh did not demonstrate that Twitter's failure to police the content of its users aided and abetted the specific ISIS-sponsored attack which caused injury to the victims.

United States ex rel. Schutte v. Supervalu Inc. and United States ex rel. Proctor v. Safeway

In these consolidated cases, SuperValu and Safeway were accused of violating the False Claims Act (FCA). There are two components of the FCA: “(1) the falsity of the claim and (2) the defendant's knowledge of the claim's falsity.” The knowledge requirement was at issue here. According to the government, Medicaid and Medicare were defrauded by these companies through the reimbursement for pharmaceutical drugs. The companies sold prescription drugs to their customers at a discounted rate but charged Medicare and Medicaid a higher retail cost for drugs. The government argued the discounted rate, rather than the posted retail price, was the “usual and customary” rate. The government provided evidence that Safeway and SuperValu executives voiced concern with officials upon finding out about these practices, suggesting the companies believed that the practice was unlawful. The District Court granted a summary judgment to both companies, holding that the subjective belief of the companies was irrelevant. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed both cases.

In a unanimous (9-0) decision authored by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts. The key issue was if SuperValu and Safeway knowingly defrauded the government through their billing practices. There was sufficient evidence presented to indicate the defendants knew at the time they submitted their reimbursement claims that the claims were false. The Court held that the phrase “usual and customary” is not vague, that the companies knew that the prices were not their “usual and customary” ones, and that they were aware of the risk when they submitted their claims.

Dubin v. United States

David Dubin managed a psychological services company with his father. He submitted a claim for psychological testing that overstated the qualifications of the psychological associate who had conducted the test and changed the date of testing. This overstatement resulted in the claim reimbursement from Medicaid being higher than it should have been, totaling $338. The government charged Dubin with healthcare fraud and aggravated identity theft, with aggravated identity theft being the focus of the case. Because Dubin used a patient's Medicaid reimbursement number as identification for the improper billing, the government argued he committed identity theft. Dubin was convicted on both counts. Dubin appealed, arguing the aggravated identity theft charge was improper because he did not misrepresent who received a health care service, he merely misrepresented what service was performed. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.

In a unanimous (9-0) decision authored by Justice Sotomayor, Dubin's conviction for aggravated identity theft was vacated. The Court examined the specific language in the statute and found that the key terms were vague. Dubin's use of the patient's Medicaid number was not a key component of the offense. Justice Sotomayor determined that the statute's language limited it to instances in which a person fraudulently misappropriated another's identity. Justice Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, arguing that the aggravated identity statute as a major concern was unconstitutionally vague.

Lora v. United States

Efrain Lora was accused of being a gang leader and serving as a scout in the death of a rival drug dealer. He was convicted of aiding and abetting, along with conspiring to distribute drugs. The focus of this case is on the aiding and abetting charge, §924(j) of the United States Code. At sentencing, Lora argued that under §924 (j), the District Court had the authority to run the two sentences concurrently. The District Court disagreed, arguing that they did not have the discretion to run the sentences concurrently, and applied the mandatory minimum from §924(c). Lora was sentenced to 25 years on the drug distribution count and 5 years on the §924(j) count, to be served consecutively. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

Justice Jackson authored the unanimous (9-0) decision by the Court. The issue at the heart of the case was whether §924(c), which requires that sentences run consecutively, should apply to §924(j). As §924(j) was added several years after §924(c) existed, the Court concluded that if Congress had wanted to have §924(c) apply to §924(j), they would have explicitly stated that it did. As Congress did not do so, Jackson concluded that §924(j) did not bar imposing concurrent rather than consecutive sentences. Therefore, the District Court did have the ability to assign the sentences concurrently. The judgment was vacated and remanded. This decision will likely lead to many people sentenced to consecutive sentences under §924 to seek post-conviction relief.

Pugin v. Garland and Garland v. Cordero-Garcia

In two consolidated cases, Pugin v. Garland and Garland v. Cordero-Garcia, immigration proceedings deemed the two petitioners to be “removable” from the United States due to convictions for offenses “relating to the obstruction of justice.” Federal law allows for the removal of noncitizens found guilty of aggravated felonies, with obstruction of justice included in this category. In the case of Pugin v. Garland, the Fourth Circuit determined that a conviction for being an accessory after the fact was related to obstruction of justice, even in a case that was not pending. The Ninth Circuit, in the case of Garland v. Cordero-Garcia, found Cordero-Garcia did not commit an obstruction of justice offense when dissuading an individual from testifying in a case that was not pending. The issue in both cases is whether an offense can be considered obstruction of justice when the case is not actively pending.

Justice Kavanagh delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Barrett, and Jackson in a 6-3 vote. The Court's decision was based on the determination that “obstruction of justice” falls under the definition of “aggravated felony” across multiple sources, including dictionary definitions, federal and state laws, and the Model Penal Code. The Court concluded that there is no requirement that an investigation be pending in order for there to be an obstruction of justice charge. In doing so, they affirmed the Fourth Circuit's rejection of the requirement that the investigation be pending and reversed the Ninth Circuit's holding that it must be pending. Justice Jackson authored a concurring opinion, discussing Congress's intent with the definition. Justice Sotomayor penned a dissent, joined by Justices Gorsuch and Kagan. They argue that obstruction of justice does require a pending investigation, based on factors including the definition of the offense itself and Congress's use of “witness tampering” separate from “obstruction of justice.” With this, Sotomayor indicates the Court should have “erred on the side of under inclusiveness” in defining this term.

Jones v. Hendrix

Marcus Jones was convicted in 2000 of two counts of illegally possessing a firearm due to his status as a felon and one count of making false statements to obtain a firearm. After his sentence was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, Jones filed a habeas corpus petition per 28 U.S.C § 2255 which resulted in his conviction for making false statements being vacated. The Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Rehaif v. United States (2019) that the government must prove that a defendant is aware of their status as a felon in order to be guilty of firearm possession as a felon meant that Jones was technically innocent of that charge, as the government did not prove he was aware of his status as a felon during his 2000 trial. Jones sought to file a second habeas corpus petition, seeking his release. He was barred from doing so by a provision in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) which prohibited the filing of multiple habeas corpus petitions under § 2255. Jones then petitioned the District Court under § 2255's “saving clause” which would allow him to circumvent AEDPA and utilize the general habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C § 2241. This motion was dismissed by the District Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's judgment in a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Thomas (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Gorsuch, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett). Justice Thomas explained that the “saving clause” of § 2255 was intended for very narrow conditions which were not met in Jones's case. Therefore, even though Jones had been made legally innocent of a crime of which he was convicted, he was unable to generate a habeas corpus petition to gain relief from his now unlawful conviction. More broadly, Justice Thomas's opinion implies that factual innocence does not allow federal prisoners to petition for habeas corpus relief if they have already made a petition under § 2255. Justice Jackson, in a lengthy dissent, argued the majority had completely misinterpreted the AEDPA and cautioned that this decision completely removes avenues for relief sought by factually innocent federal prisoners. Justice Sotomayor (joined by Justice Kagan) also dissented, agreeing with Justice Jackson, and arguing that the majority decision means people who are actually innocent may have no opportunity to challenge their wrongful conviction in court. They took the unusual step of both signing their opinion, a traditional means of indicating their extreme dissatisfaction with the majority.

United States v. Hansen

Helaman Hansen told noncitizens that they could do a so-called “adult adoption” in order to gain United States citizenship, encouraging the individuals to come to and reside illegally in the United States. He encouraged more than 450 individuals to pay him approximately two million dollars to participate in the program. He was charged with violating United States Code §1324, which prohibits individuals from encouraging or inducing noncitizens to come to, enter, or reside in the United States knowing that it would be in violation of the law. Additionally, it was determined that this was done for Hansen's private financial gain, resulting in a higher penalty. Hansen challenged this clause based on First Amendment overbreadth grounds, arguing that his encouraging others to stay in the United States after their visas had expired was protected speech. The District Court rejected Hansen's claim, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Hansen that §1324 was unconstitutionally overbroad.

In a 7-2 decision, with the majority opinion authored by Justice Barrett, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit ruling. The Court examined the terms “encourage” and “induce,” finding that these terms were used in the context of legal terms for solicitation and facilitation rather than the context of everyday speech. Therefore, these legal terms of art had a more limited meaning and consequently were not overbroad. In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas expressed concern about the application of the overbreadth doctrine by lower courts. Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor, authored the dissenting opinion. Justice Jackson argued that the Court used standards outside of the usual practice in the interpretation of statutes and agreed with the Ninth Circuit that the “encouragement” provision was overbroad.

Conclusion

The 2022 term had no high-profile decisions involving criminal justice. There were nonetheless several low-profile but significant decisions that will have an impact on the day-to-day administration of the criminal justice system. These cases included decisions involving the First Amendment, the Sixth Amendment, and the interpretation of criminal statutes.

It appears that there is a clear 6-3 split on criminal justice–related cases, with the conservative majority dominating. Exceptions exist and will likely continue to appear, but only time will tell if the conservative bloc holds together. The Court has taken and decided relatively few criminal justice–related cases in recent years, and even fewer of these have received much attention. Whether this is the beginning of a trend or an aberration remains to be seen. The Court has accepted several high-profile cases dealing with controversial subjects such as gun control, so the 2023 term should prove more interesting.