Motive,Intention,and Morality in the Criminal Law

Abstract

A remarkably persistent dispute in the criminal law concerns the relevance of a defendant's motive to his or her criminal liability. Specifically, the issue is whether a good or permissible motive should exculpate someone who has committed a criminal act. According to the orthodox rule, the defendant's motive is strictly irrelevant to liability. Recently, though, there has been a barrage of criticism aimed at this doctrine. Critics charge that the doctrine is not only false—judges do regularly consider motive—but also morally inexcusable, because a permissible motive ought to lessen the blameworthiness of the defendant. The present article defends the orthodox doctrine. It is argued both that it is factually accurate as a description of how judges behave but also, more importantly, that there is a sound moral basis for the doctrine that motives are irrelevant with respect to criminal liability. Critics have mischaracterized the role that motive plays in moral theory and practice, and careful attention to the significance of motive demonstrates that the orthodox criminal law doctrine is quite in line with our moral practices.