The behavior of regulatory agencies as it relates to our understanding of corporate crime and corporate harm has not been well studied by criminologists. Indeed, examinations of the federal regulatory system and the behavior of its individual agencies have been largely absent from the criminological literature. This article addresses this deficiency by examining the fining practices of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, which is charged with upholding a number of federal laws that regulate the automobile industry. We analyzed all cases in four regulatory areas that resulted in fines between 1970 and 1997 and in addition observed the impact of various presidential administrations and the 1970s-1980s oil embargo. The results concur with earlier findings regarding the limited regulatory practices observed during the Reagan administration, and they also suggest that fines have a limited impact on corporate behavior. The article concludes by recommending that future researchers focus on the deterrent value of fines and the shifting influence of social and political changes on regulatory practices within white-collar crime enforcement.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Adler, R.
, & Lord, C. (1991). Environmental crimes: Raising the stakes. George Washington Law Review, 59, 781-861.
2.
Barnett, H.
(1990). Political environments and implementation failures: The case of superfund enforcement. Law & Policy, 12, 225-246.
3.
Bene, S.
(1991). Why not fine attomeys? An economic approach to lawyer disciplinary sanctions. Stanford Law Review, 43, 864-941.
4.
Bureau of Justice Statistics
. (1988). Annual report, 1987. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics.
5.
Burkholz, H.
(1994). The FDA follies. New York: Basic Books.
6.
Burns, R.
(1999). Realities of automobile safety. Transportation Quarterly, 53, 83-92.
7.
Calavita, K.
, & Pontell, H. (1994). The state and white collar crime. Law & Society Review, 28, 297-324.
8.
Chappell, L.
(1997, January 20). Takata fine seen as NHTSA warning to suppliers. Automotive News, p. 4.
9.
Clinard, M.
, & Yeager, P. (1980). Corporate crime. New York: Free Press.
10.
Cohen, M.
(1992). Environmental crime and punishment: Legal/economic theory and empirical evidence on enforcement of federal environmental statutes. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 82, 1054-1108.
11.
Costly cruisers
. (1994, May9). AutoWeek, p. 5.
12.
Cullen, F.
, Maakestad, W., & Cavender, G. (1984). The Ford Pinto case and beyond. In E. Hochstedler (Ed.), Corporations as criminals (pp. 107-130). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
13.
Cullen, F.
, Maakestad, W., & Cavender, G. (1987). Corporate crime under attack. Cincinnati: Anderson.
14.
Edwards, S.
(1998). A history of the U.S. environmental movement. In M. Clifford (Ed.), Environmental crime: Enforcement, policy, and social responsibility (pp. 31-76). Gaithersburg, MD: Aspen.
15.
Elzinga, K.
, & Breit, W. (1976). The antitrust penalties: A study in law and economics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
16.
Firestone to pay fine of $500,000 in recall dispute with U.S. unit
. (1980, May 13). New York Times, p. 16.
17.
Fisse, B.
(1986). Sanctions against corporations: Economic efficiency or legal efficacy? In W. Groves & G. Newman (Eds.), Punishment and privilege (pp. 23-54). Albany, NY: Harrow and Heston.
18.
Frank, N.
(1984). Policing corporate crime: A typology of enforcement styles. Justice Quarterly, 1, 235-252.
19.
Frank, N.
, & Lynch, M. (1992). Corporate crime, corporate violence: A primer. New York: Harrow & Heston.
20.
Friedrichs, D.
(1995). State crime or governmental crime: Making sense of the conceptual confusion. In J. Ross (Ed.), Controlling state crime: An introduction (pp. 53-79). New York: Garland.
21.
Friedrichs, D.
(1996). Trusted criminals. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
22.
GM facing first big three CAFE penalty
. (1997, May 1). Ward's Auto World, p. 27.
23.
Government update: Chrysler pays NHTSA fine for faulty fuel system
. (1997, May 15). Autoparts Report, available via Dow Jones Interactive.
24.
Hayes, D.
(1996, May 19). Buyer beware: Hazardous products prompt recall efforts by manufactures, government, advocacy groups. Kansas City Star, p. F1.
25.
Hyatt, B.
(1998). The federal environmental regulatory structure. In M. Clifford (Ed.), Environmental crime: Enforcement, policy, and social responsibility (pp. 115-141). Gaithersburg, MD: Aspen.
26.
Langan, P.
, & Cunniff, M. (1992). Recidivism of felons on probation, 1986-89. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.
27.
Lester, J.
(1989). Environmental politics and policy. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
28.
Lucchetti, A.
(1996, August 19). Autos: Used-car sales soar, fueling mileage scams. Wall Street Journal, p. B1.
29.
Lynch, M.
, Michalowski, R., & Groves, W. (2000). The new primer in radical criminology. Money, NY: Willow Tree Press.
30.
Mann, K.
(1992). Punitive civil sanctions: The middle ground between criminal and civil law. Yale Law Review, 101, 1795-1874.
31.
Mayer, M.
(1990). The greatest-ever bank robbery. New York: Scribner.
32.
Meier, K.
(1985). Regulation: Politics, bureaucracy, and economics. New York: St. Martin's Press.
33.
Meier, K.
, & Morgan, D. (1981). Speed kills: A longitudinal analysis of traffic fatalities and the 55 mph speed limit. Policy Studies Review, 1, 157-167.
34.
Mercedes pays $20-million fine for failure on fuel economy
. (1988, December 31). Los Angeles Times, p. 1.
35.
Metzger, M.
, & Schwenk, C. (1990). Decision making models, devil's advocacy, and the control of corporate crime. American Business Law Journal, 28, 323-377.
36.
Mokhiber, R.
(1988). Corporate crime and violence—Big business power and the abuse of the public trust. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books.
37.
Nadel, M.
(1971). The politics of consumer protection. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merril.
38.
Nader, R.
(1959/2000). The safe car you can't buy. In V. Navasky (Ed.), Perspectives (1865-2000) (pp. 73-78). New York: Nation Books.
39.
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
. (1998). Traffic safety facts, 1997. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation.
40.
Pizzo, S.
, & Muolo, P. (1993, May 9). Take the money and run. New York Times Magazine, pp. 26, 56-92.
41.
Poveda, T.
(1990). Lawlessness and reform: The FBI in transition. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.
42.
Rosoff, S.
, Pontell, H., & Tillman, R. (2002). Profit without honor: White-collar crime and the looting of America (2nd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
43.
Schneider, V.
, & Wiersema, B. (1990). Limits and use of the Uniform Crime Reports. In D. MacKenzie, P. Baunach, & R. Roberg (Eds.), Measuring crime: Large-scale, long-range efforts (pp. 21-48). Albany: SUNY Press.
44.
Schott, D.
(1985, August 6). Odometer fraud common in cars sold after leasing. Chicago Sun-Times, p. 30.
45.
Simon, D.
(2001). Elite deviance (7th ed.). Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
46.
Stoffer, H.
(2001, July 30). Automakers miss mark on CAFE: Some pay penalty for noncompliance as tougher standards are considered. Automotive News, p. 4.
47.
Strong, D.
(1988). Dreamers and defenders: American conservationists. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
48.
Sutherland E.
(1940). White-collar criminality. American Sociological Review, 5, 1-12.
49.
Sutherland, E.
(1949). White collar crime. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
50.
Tappan, P.
(1947). Who is the criminal?American Sociological Review, 12, 96-102.
51.
Toyota settles recall charges
. (1994, May 2). Automotive News, p. 42.
52.
Used-cars: Going by the numbers
. (1987, December 6). Chicago Sun-Times, p. 17.
53.
Wilson, J.
(1980). Introduction In J. Wilson (Ed.), The politics of regulation (pp. vii-xii). New York: Basic Books.
54.
Yoder, S.
(1978). Criminal sanctions for corporate illegality. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 69, 40-58.
