The technical efficiency of 140 freeholds and 114 tenant farms on the Rensselaerwyck manorial estate in New York (USA) in 1850 is assessed using mathematical programming Data Envelopment Analysis. Freeholds are roughly 5% more efficient, a small difference likely owing to the fixed rent perpetual leases of the tenants. When both types are projected onto their respective production possibility frontiers, the pure tenancy penalty shrinks to about one percent. Farm wealth is remarkably equally distributed under both organizational forms, which contradicts the view that initial land inequality (manorial estates) is self-perpetuating.
AbdulaiA.OwusuV.GoetzR. (2011). Land tenure differences and investment in land improvement measures: Theoretical and empirical analysis. Journal of Development Economics, 96(1), 66–78. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2010.08.002
2.
AlchianA. A.DemsetzH. (1973). The property rights paradigm. Journal of Economic History, 33(1), 16–27.
3.
BenitezR.Coll-SerranoV.BolosV. J. (2021). Dear-Shiny: An interactive web app for data envelopment analysis. Sustainability, 13(12), 6774. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13126774
4.
BroderickW. F. (Ed.), (1978). Brunswick: A pictorial history. Brunswick historical Society.
5.
CardF. W. (1907). Farm management. Doubleday & Co.
6.
CheungS. N. S. (1969). Theory of share tenancy. University of Chicago Press.
7.
ChiangY. T.LaBelleJ. (2022).How does human capital affect wealth inequality?St Louis Federal Reserve Bank. https://www.stlouisfed.org/
8.
CoelliT. J.Prasada RaoD. S.O’DonnellC. J.BatteseG. F. (2005). An introduction to efficiency and productivity analysis (2nd ed.). Springer.
9.
CooperW. W.SeifordL. M.ToneK. (2007). Data envelopment analysis (2nd Ed.). Springer.
10.
EllisD. M. (1942). An agrarian history of Eastern New York 1790-1850. Ph.D. thesis. Cornell University.
EngermanS. L.SokoloffK. L. (2011). Once upon a time in the Americas: Land and immigration policies in the new world. In CostaD. L.LamoreuaxN. R. (Eds.), Understanding long-run economic growth (pp. 13–48). University of Chicago Press.
13.
FederG.FeenyD. (1991). Land tenure and property rights: Theory and implications for development Policy. The World Bank Economic Review, 5(1), 135–153. https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/5.1.135
FrenchJ. H., (1859). Gazetteer of the State of New York. R. Pearsall smith.
16.
GreeneW. H. (2007). Nlogit5 econometric software. Econometric Software, Inc.
17.
HeadyE. 0 (1947). Economics of farm leasing systems. Journal of Farm Economics, 29(3), 659–678. https://doi.org/10.2307/1232906
18.
JohnsonO. E. G. (1972). Economic analysis, the legal framework and land tenure System. Journal of Law and Economics, 15(1), 259–276. https://doi.org/10.1086/466736
19.
KanjiG. K. (1993). 100 statistical tests. Sage Publications.
20.
McCurdyC. W. (2001). The anti-rent era in New York law and politics, 1839-1865. University of North Carolina Press.
21.
MurrayD. (1897) The anti-rent episode in the State of New York, annual report of the American historical Association for 1896 (I, pp. 137–173). Government Printing Office.
22.
New York (State) Documents of the Assembly of the State of New York. (1846) Tilden Report on the Difficulties Existing Between the Proprietors of Certain Leasehold Estates and Their Tenants (Vol. 5, No. 156). Carroll and Cook. Available at: https://www.hathitrust.org/
