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Abstract

Are preferences for redistribution based on self-interest, ideology, or identity? This paper describes an experiment where participants play a game that requires both luck and skill for cash payoffs. At the end of the game, participants vote on the distribution of payoffs. Options range from full equality to unequal payments based on final rank. These votes are then analyzed; results show that self-interest, ideology, and identity all impact how participants vote. Those who do well are much more likely to vote for an unequal payoff while those who do poorly are likely to vote for an equal payoff. The degree of acceptable inequality, however, is influenced both by ideology (stated preferences over redistribution) and identity (race and age). The experiment also led to some changes in perspective, with those who did poorly in the game in particular being highly likely to shift their views in favor of redistribution.

Keywords

inequality redistribution experiment

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