Previous teaching notes focused on the logic and mechanics of a quality-differentiated linear demand structure. This note takes up the question of potential bias in how markets respond to quality-related aspects of consumer choice. Earlier examples demonstrated instances where monopoly interests might conflict with those of consumers in matters of quality choice. This article points to a more general propensity toward excessively high levels of quality under a monopoly market structure.
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