In this paper, we expand the double price elasticity theory developed by Greenhut, Hwang, and Ohta (1974) by including a general cost condition for a profit-maximizing monopolist, cartel, or price leader. Our model generalizes the conventional second-order condition as it incorporates the non-converging price elasticity. Contrary to the textbook prediction, a structural changes or an income effect in tobacco, crude oil and other demand inelastic markets can render the price elasticity of demand to oscillate for a long time but never reach its theoretical limit even in a very long time.
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