Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Ross Levine (2004) argue that financial sector development in a country disproportionately benefits its poor. When controls for improvement in the security of property rights and the fairness of the legal system, freedom to trade internationally and levels of trust are added to their research, the benefits from financial sector development disappear. Financial sector development seems to proxy for these institutions or be a mechanism through which they work.
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