Over the past 50 years, a remarkable degree of trade liberalization has been achieved through GATT/WTO negotiations. In this paper, we describe work that provides a theoretical interpretation of this institution. We emphasize two key features of GATT/WTO: reciprocity and enforcement. We also identify important areas for future research. The work described here contributes to the fields of International Trade and Applied Game Theory.
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