This paper describes a simple theoretical model of competing interest groups and uses a modified Cournot model with endogenous policy. The focus is on how different assumptions over internal lobby group organization affect the outcome of lobby competition. The results of the paper formalize some of the basic tenets and propositions contained in Olson's (1965) The Logic of Collective Action and provides a more explicit, game-theoretic structure for examining issues raised by Becker in his (1983) paper A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence.
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