The Consultancy disease is a type of rent seeking behavior in academia, and occurs when scholars spend time searching and working in public and private consultancies. It is shown that the Consultancy disease leads to lower equilibrium levels of academic work. Higher standards for scientific productivity and publications help to fight the disease.
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