The current debates and conflicts over constructivist science studies are, in part, conflicts over organizational territory and professional discretion. Once a distinction between several levels of observation is being drawn, however, seemingly incompatible approaches to truth, rationality, and objectivity can be reconciled. This reconciliation between science and its constructivist observers builds upon a moral order shared by all communications that expect trustworthiness and generalized disinterestedness. What this moral order cannot accommodate is not constructivism, but standpoint epistemologies that tie claims for privileged knowledge to ascriptive statuses. Such standpoint epistemologies turn science into ideological conflict, and jam the operation of objectivity.
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