Allport, G.W. (1979) The Nature of Prejudice (3rd edn). Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.
2.
Axelrod, R.M. (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
3.
Bator, F.M. (1957) “The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization”, American Economic Review, 47: 22-59.
4.
Becker, G.S. (1976) The Economic Approach to Human Behavior. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
5.
Becker, G.S. (1981) A Treatise on the Family. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
6.
Buchanan, J.M. (1975) The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
7.
Chiang, A.C. (1984) Fundamental Methods in Mathematical Economics (3rd edn). New York: McGraw-Hill.
8.
Cowell, F.A. (1977) Measuring Inequality. Oxford: Philip Allan.
9.
Eisenstein, H. (1984) Contemporary Feminist Thought. London: George Allen and Unwin.
10.
Elster, J. (1983) Sour Grapes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
11.
Elster, J. (1984) Ulysses and the Sirens (rev. edn). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
12.
Elster, J. (1985) “Rationality, Morality and Collective Action”, Ethics, 96: 136-155.
13.
Elster, J. (ed.) (1986) The Multiple Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
14.
Fishkin, J.S. (1982) The Limits of Obligation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
15.
Foley, D.K. (1975) “Problems vs. Conflicts: Economic Theory and Ideology”, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings65: 231-236.
16.
Hamlin, A.P. (1986) Ethics, Economics and the State. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books.
17.
Harsanyi, J.C. (1977) Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
18.
Hirschman, A. O. (1981) Essays in Trespassing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
19.
Janis, I. L. (1972) Victims of Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
20.
Luce, R. D. and Raiffa, H. (1957) Games and Decisions. New York: John Wiley.
21.
Mackenzie, R. B. and Tullock, G. (1975) The New World of Economics. Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin.
22.
Moreh, J. (1985) “On Harrod's First Refining Principle”, Theory and Decision19: 103-125.
23.
Moreh, J. (1986) “Women, Men and Society”, Kyklos39: 209-229.
24.
Nozick, R. (1975) Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic Books.
25.
Oliver, P. , Marwell, G. and Teixeira, R. (1985) “A Theory of the Critical Mass. Interdependence, Group Heterogeneity and the Production of Collective Action”, American Journal of Sociology91: 522-556.
26.
Parfit, D. (1984) Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
27.
Pfeiffer, R. S. (1985) “The Responsibility of Men for the Oppression of Women”, Journal of Applied Philosophy2: 217-229.
28.
Phelps Brown, H. (1977) The Inequality of Pay. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
29.
Radford, R. A. (1945) “The Economic Organisation of a P. O. W. Camp”, Economica12: 189-201.
30.
Rapoport, A. (1970) n-Person Game Theory. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
31.
Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
32.
Schelling, T. C. (1960) The Strategy of Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
33.
Schelling, T. C. (1984a) “Self-command in Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice”, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 74.
34.
Schelling, T. C. (1984b) Choice and Consequences. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
35.
Schotter, A. (1981) The Economic Theory of Social Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
36.
Sen, A. K. (1977) “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory”, Philosophy and Public Affairs6: 317-344.
37.
Sen, A. K. (1985) “Rationality and Uncertainty”, Theory and Decision18: 109-127.
38.
Simon, H. (1957) Models of Man. New York: John Wiley.
39.
Spence, A. M. (1974) Market Signalling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening Processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
40.
Tavris, C. and Wade, C. (1984) The Longest War (2nd edn). New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
41.
Thurow, L. C. (1975) Generating Inequality. London: Macmillan.
42.
Ullman-Margalit, E. (1977) The Emergence of Norms. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
43.
Witt, U. (1986) “Evolution and Stability of Cooperation without Enforceable Contracts”, Kyklos39: 245-266.
