Abstract
The aim of the present article is to submit to criticism the idea, originally taken from Durkheim, that commonsense reasoning errs radically when it comes to social reality. We will begin by proposing an interpretation of Durkheim's theory of “prenotions” or preconceptions. We will then compare this theory with the conception of common sense of the philosopher G.E. Moore, who, contrary to Durkheim, maintains that the ordinary view of the world is basically true. Comparison of Durkheim's and Moore's theories will enable us to distinguish between ordinary individual concepts (concepts ordinaires individuels, COI), which are connected with the individual and his or her immediate environment, and ordinary social concepts (concepts ordinaires sociaux, COS), which have as their object collective facts. We will then attempt to explore the relationship between these two kinds of ordinary concepts. The conception of common sense that results from this reflection will be described as gradualist and evolutionist.
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