Why does contracting underperform in the production of publicly financed goods? Producers for private markets survive through marketism, defined as the strategic exclusion of segments of a community, whereas producers of publicly financed goods are pressured to be inclusive. Inclusivity is achieved through universalism, an operational mode with three requisites: (1) a workforce with lateral competency to respond to contingencies, (2) interfunction asset sharing and coordination, and (3) an environment that protects professional discretion. Universalism and marketism are divergent strategies, and public-private contracts cannot cost-effectively resolve their incongruities.
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