As progressive pension reforms seek to increase the opportunities for stakeholder involvement, they confront an existing set of class relations that by design exclude workers, retirees, and the state from real economic participation. This article argues that pension reforms must explicitly recognize the class underpinnings that jeopardize their success; proposes a workable, class-sensitive orientation for pension reforms; and includes the legislative context for governance reforms.
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