The aim of the paper is to provide an explanation of involuntary unemployment in a classical (post-Ricardian) framework. The model describes a three-stage bargaining process with four agents (governments, firms, unions, workers). In the first stage, firms determine the wage offered, following a short-run version of the wages fund theory. In the second stage, unionists determine the wage demanded, which depends on workers' tendency to conflict, while firms decide the number of employed under a "right to manage" hypothesis. In the third stage, governments tax the wages fund and pay unemployment benefits. Public intervention is subject to a trade-off between accumulation and legitimation.
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