Recruitment in the Indian Armed Forces,1939–1945

Abstract

The British rulers pushed India into the Second World War without taking the Indians into confidence. The Indian National Congress opposed any type of co-operation with the British war effort. The political climate deteriorated with each passing day. The Quit India Movement, launched in August 1942, further aggravated the unrest. Further, the Japanese had subjugated Malaya and Burma and were threatening India. The need for augmenting the armed forces was pressing indeed. However, the moot question is how, despite the Congress’s opposition to the war, over two million Indians joined the armed forces to support the British, leading to the largest voluntary force worldwide. This article seeks to investigate the reasons for the expansion of the Indian armed forces during the war. The article also seeks to examine the impact of the large mobilisation of Indian youth. It is based on interviews and biographies of the men who joined the armed forces during the war, as well as the original records available at the National Archives of India and some other archives.

Introduction

Prospects of an imminent war with Germany in 1939 alarmed the British, and they decided to rope in her overseas colonies in their war effort. Consequently, the mobilisation of the Indian armed forces also commenced at a faster pace. Russophobia still engaged the mind of British Indian rulers. The Middle East, where vital British interests were at stake, was also under threat. The political unrest in India was again a cause for worry and demanded more troops for internal security. Subsequently, the Japanese involvement brought the war much closer to India.

The emerging threat necessitated a massive expansion of the Indian armed forces. A large number of Indians had to be recruited to meet the manpower requirements of the war. It was not an easy task, indeed. Unlike the First World War, when all the resources of India were placed at the disposal of British authorities, the political climate in the 1930s was somewhat different. The unilateral declaration of Indian participation in the war, without taking the Legislative Assembly or Indian political leadership in confidence, created a storm of protests.

Reactions to Manpower Mobilisation

On the declaration of war, the Congress Working Committee issued a statement that ‘India could not associate herself with a war which was supposedly being fought for democratic freedom but denied the very freedom to her’. ¹ In a resolution at the Ramgarh Session in March 1940, Congress unequivocally declared its opposition to the war effort. ² Meanwhile, Japan entered the war in December 1941, captured Malaya, Singapore and Burma by early 1942, and threatened India. In August 1942, the Congress launched the Quit India Movement, leading to violent protests in several parts of the country, adversely impacting the war effort. Protesters came out in open in various parts of the country, especially the United Province and Bihar and uprooted the railway tracks. Communications to Assam, at a crucial time when there was a great need to move men and material to the north-east remained suspended for days together. The government tried hard and deployed fifty-seven battalions of the army and a massive police force to quell the internal disturbances. ³ The British found themselves in a very tight spot, and on 31 August 1942 anxious Linlithgow, Viceroy to India, wrote to Winston Churchill: ‘I am engaged here in meeting by far the most serious rebellion since that of 1857, the gravity and extent of which we have so far concealed from the world for reasons of military security’. ⁴ A BBC official who was on a four-month tour to India wrote in his memorandum to the British Cabinet, ‘we have just shot more Indians than we have ever done at one time since the Mutiny; the bitterness against us has intensified’. ⁵ The question arises: In the face of this opposition, why did so many Indians rush to recruitment centres for enlistment, making the Indian armed forces the largest voluntary force in the world during the war?

The opposition to war, indeed, was not unanimous. Among Indians, two opposing views existed on this issue. While Congress opposed any kind of support for the war effort, ⁶ the Muslim League, after some initial hesitation, ensured the entry of maximum number of Muslims into the army. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, during a meeting in March 1940, assured the Viceroy that ‘Muslims would not retard the war effort’. ⁷ British authorities considered Jinnah a trump against the Congress, and this brought him closer to Viceroy, increasing his prestige and influence over the government and strengthening his claim for a separate country for Muslims. ⁸ Further, Indian members of the Legislative Assembly and Council of State pleaded for recruitment of more people from their region or community. ⁹ In the process, there developed a competition amongst leaders to demonstrate their loyalty to the British Raj. ¹⁰

The war provided an opportunity to Indians to join the military profession. Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, leader of Hindu Mahasabha, exhorted the Indians to join the armed forces. He wrote to the Viceroy that his party ‘has been actively and effectively working in persuading the Hindus by thousands to join the Army, Navy and Air Force’. ¹¹ Further, his party believed that it was the question of recruitment that would count after the war. ¹² A local leader of Hindu Sabha even wrote a letter to the Viceroy supporting the candidature of a person who had taken part in a Satyagraha agitation. ¹³ The Communist Party of India started terming the war the Peoples’ War. ¹⁴ The ruling party of Punjab (the Unionist Party) went farther, stating that people who were not supporting the war effort should be denied voting rights. ¹⁵ Some leaders, even those related to Congress, were apprehensive about recruitment from their community. Master Tara Singh, a Sikh leader, wrote to M. K. Gandhi not to do anything that would hamper the Sikh recruitment. ¹⁶

Some representatives of the ‘depressed classes’ ¹⁷ made an appeal to their community to stand by the government and render all assistance in the execution of war. They even voiced a demand for raising their own battalions. On 13 September 1939, Rai Sahib Hari Prasad Tamta, MLA and leader of the depressed classes, while addressing a large public rally at Almora, appealed to the Viceroy to raise a battalion of depressed classes. ¹⁸ The president of the Kori community also urged the government to raise an exclusive battalion of his community. ¹⁹ All India Jatav Youth League passed a resolution in their annual conference at Agra demanding recruitment from their caste. ²⁰ B. R. Ambedkar, a prominent leader of the depressed classes appealed the government to raise a regiment of Mahars, a scheduled caste of Central Province and Berar, for the combat corps. He also advised the Mahars to seize the opportunity for enlistment in the army. ²¹ In November 1943, one Piare Lall Kureel moved a resolution in the Legislative Assembly urging the Governor-General in Council that ‘the key service of the Army should be thrown open to members of all the schedules castes and that the military service should not be the monopoly of a few privileged classes’. ²² Amidst these mixed responses, more than two and a half million men and women served the Indian Armed Forces during the war. Earlier, the Indian Army comprised about 200,000 personnel.

Perception of Soldiers

The men joined the Indian armed forces for different reasons. A subedar of 19 Hyderabad Regiment, when interviewed, replied,

Half of the village used to sleep on empty stomach in the night. I was busy ploughing the field for a good crop. But, I was not the kind of person who could continue this hard labour in the field; even that was not appreciated by family members, so I wanted to get rid of this. ²³

He got enlisted in the army in June 1941. The story of a Havildar of the Patiala State Infantry (later Punjab Regiment) was no different. His family was struggling to make a living from a meagre agricultural income. While tilling the field, he noticed a group of boys going alongside the field for a recruitment rally. He joined the group of prospective recruits and enroled in the army. ²⁴ Honorary Captain Ishwar Singh also joined the army to improve the economic condition of the family. ²⁵ All these men belonged to South East Punjab, where agriculture solely depended on the mercy of rain. Thus, hard work and small yield in agriculture forced many young men from peasant families to seek better pasture in the army. ²⁶

The story of families who did not own agricultural land was no different. Chunni Lal, a landless schedule caste of district Gurgaon, finding no work in his village and area, shifted along with his uncle to Kanpur to work in a leather firm. The war gave him an opportunity to join the army, and he got enlisted in Pioneer Corps in 1941. Subsequently, he shifted to the Chamar Regiment when it was raised in 1943. ²⁷ The Willcox Committee also noticed that the highest rate of recruitment came from the areas that were economically poor and where pay and pension were relied upon for supporting families and relatives. ²⁸

Soldiering was considered a respectable profession, especially in communities that were codified as martial races during the British Raj. Subedar Risal Singh reportedly preferred to join the army than to serve as a labourer in railways near his home, as it suited his caste. ²⁹ According to Kaushik Roy, a military historian, Jat recruits from Daryaganj, an urban area in Delhi, enlisted in the army because soldiering was considered more respectable than working as porters or waiters nearby. ³⁰ The preference for military profession among people of some castes thus appears to have enabled the army ‘to compete with the wages offered by contractors’. ³¹ Soldiering, besides employment, also added to the social status of the individual.

For some Indians, serving the army had been a tradition for generations, and the glamour of the uniform a powerful attraction. Major Hansraj of Una (now in Himachal Pradesh) joined the ranks in mid-1941 because he was greatly impressed by his father, a Dufadar in Hudson Horse who used to visit the village, mounted on a horse in a smart military uniform. ³² However, according to Hansraj, the immediate reason for his joining the army was a tussle with the hostel superintendent in the college that led him and one of his friends to leave college and head for the recruitment office. Sri Ram, later Naib Subedar, joined the artillery as his father had served in the regiment. His maternal uncle, also a gunner, took him to Artillery Centre Ambala and got him enlisted. According to Sri Ram, besides family tradition, the poor economic condition of the family also contributed to his entry into the army. ³³ Sowar (later Major) Abhe Ram of the 2nd Lancer joined the army as his two brothers served in the same regiment. ³⁴ He mentioned that the army was the ultimate profession; he had to join sooner or later. Havildar Anand Padalkar, from a village near Kolhapur, also followed the tradition of military service of his family and village and approached the recruitment centre for enlistment in the Maratha Light Infantry at Pune. Being literate, he was recruited into the sappers. ³⁵ Sagat Singh, later Lieutenant-General, also had a tradition of military service. His father served the Bikaner State Forces with distinction. While studying in college, Sagat was taken by a State Force Major to the commanding officer of Ganga Risala. Being well educated, he was recruited directly as an NCO in the State Force. ³⁶ Lieutenant-General P. S. Bhagat also followed his two elder brothers in the Indian Army. ³⁷ There are many such examples where family tradition inspired youths to join the armed forces. ³⁸

Some candidates responded to the call for a particular service. T. N. Gadhiok (later Air Marshal) joined as a pilot, impressed by the talk of a Wing Commander who visited his college. ³⁹ Y. V. Malse (later Air Marshal), who was studying at Ferguson College in Pune, also responded to the call of the Indian Air Force for pilots from Pune University. ⁴⁰ For some, it was the love of flying machines. The war offered them a good opportunity to turn their dream into reality. Four Engineer brothers, Aspy, Jehangir, Ronnie and Minoo, joined the Indian Air Force because they loved aviation. ⁴¹ Ratnagar (later Air Commodore) wanted to pursue a career as a pilot, and the War offered him an opportunity to fulfil his dream. ⁴² P. C. Lal (later Air Chief Marshal) joined Air Force because he had already obtained a civilian pilot licence. In September 1939, he got an offer from the Air Headquarters. Lal appeared before the Air Force Selection Board in October 1939, and got selected. ⁴³ R. D. Katari (later Admiral), trained on the Training Ship Dufferin for the merchant navy, had a long-cherished desire to join the Indian Navy. The war provided him with an opportunity to fulfil his desire, and he joined the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) soon after the war broke out. ⁴⁴ These educated men belonged to well-to-do families and could have explored other avenues as well. However, they preferred to respond to the call of a particular service that attracted them.

Many joined as commissioned officers because, besides the good salary, the officers’ rank provided social status. ⁴⁵ The status of a commissioned officer in the defence forces indeed attracted many educated youths to the Indian Army in the pre-war period also. Some boys from affluent families who could not succeed in getting direct commission through a highly competitive exam conducted by the Federal Public Service Commission (now Union Public Service Commission) joined the ranks so as to avail of the quota of reserved vacancies. Young men like Dilip Chaudhuri, Ranbir Bakshi, Badhvar, Iftikhar and others joined as sepoys in the Indian Army to compete for the officer cadre through reserved vacancies. ⁴⁶

Intense publicity drives by the government also persuaded many Indians to join the Indian Army. One Indian Lieutenant wrote in his letter: ‘I have joined the army to serve my country… This is the people’s war. Everybody should try to drive the fascist Jap from our country… It is the duty of every Indian to volunteer himself to join the war’. ⁴⁷ One Bhandari Ram, who joined the ranks, later said ‘War had started and British needed men. It was our duty to join Army and protect our country as if British lost we shall be ruled by other masters’. ⁴⁸ He continued, if Indians were to help the British in the war effort and prove their mettle, ‘we could ask them for our much due birth right “Freedom” after the War’. Similarly, a Pathan soldier mentioned to Malcolm Darling that Hitler was not India’s enemy and still Indian soldiers fought and suffered in the war so that, in return, they (Indians) might get freedom from British rule. ⁴⁹ Maulana Azad has summed up this feeling, stating that a large proportion of young men from different provinces and social classes joined the armed forces as they believed that the British would keep their word after the war and India would be free. ⁵⁰ Aney, a member of the Viceroy’s expanded council, while addressing the students of a college in Jabalpur, urged the students to have a patriotic heart, explaining that if India succeeded in raising and organising its military forces on proper lines during this war, then it would be hard for anyone in this world to suppress the Indian voice and demands. ⁵¹

Lieutenant-Colonel Phythian-Adams, an officer of the Madras Regiment, worked as a Civil Liaison Officer in the Madras Presidency and South Indian States during 1940–1945. He travelled extensively to encourage the youth to join the army. According to him, Madrasi recruits were motivated by a spirit of adventure and the chance of going overseas, something many of their fathers had done during the First World War. Further, they had a desire to do something to defend their homes from the Axis threat of invasion. ⁵² But there were others who complained that Madrasis were not getting employment in the army, and many were suffering due to the lack of jobs. Earlier in 1938, Sir David Devadoss, advocating the enlistment of Madrasis in the Indian armed forces, moved a resolution in the Council of State that ‘Unemployment question in Madras is a pressing question. Educated young men are starving due to unemployment. Such men if drafted into the army, the Presidency [Madras Presidency] as a whole will be benefitted’. ⁵³ Govind Swami, from Madurai, stated in an interview that he joined the army mainly because of the economic condition. ⁵⁴ Phythian-Adams also subsequently admitted that economic reasons were the key factor for enlistment in Madras. ⁵⁵

T. N. Kaul, an ICS and District Magistrate of Unnao (United Provinces), who actively supported the nationwide recruitment drive, also states that the poor economic situation was the compelling reason for people to join the armed forces. ⁵⁶ The same appears to hold true for those joining the Women’s Auxiliary Corps (India) (WAC (I)), the first women’s army in India, as many Indian girls joined because of financial considerations. ⁵⁷

Thus, poor economic conditions and unemployment were the two major factors that impelled many Indians to join the ranks in the army. The Willcox Committee also said that the principal motive for enlistment in the army during the war was economic. ⁵⁸ In the early twentieth century, Jeffrey Greenhut writes that the army offered an excellent career, food, a reasonable salary and a decent pension. ⁵⁹ He adds that there were other non-quantifiable aspects, such as uniforms, traditions, solidarity in regiments and occasional adventures. This perception was still popular among the people even during the Second World War, though to a lesser extent. It was a temporary recruitment for the war period that would not make one eligible for pension. Also, it was not the time for occasional adventures but a full-blown world war that, in fact, meant long separation from family, rigorous hardship and possible loss of limb or even life.

Some youth joined the armed forces by sheer chance. An educated young man, Dilbagh Singh (later Air Chief Marshal), who joined the officer cadre of the Air Force in January 1944, wanted to become a professor of chemistry. An advertisement in The Tribune in October 1943, which he incidentally saw, prompted him to join the Air Force. ⁶⁰ Similarly, O. P. Mehra (later Air Chief Marshal) hoped to complete a doctorate in history. But his father’s conversations with one of his friends regarding economic stretch led him to change his decision and join the Air Force in November 1940. ⁶¹

J. F. R. Jacob (later Lieutenant General), a young man from Kolkata, had a strong reason to join the army even though he belonged to an affluent family. Being a Jew himself, he was appalled by the Nazi invasion and the atrocities on the Jews. While pursuing his graduation at Saint Xavier’s College, Kolkata, he made up his mind to join the army and fight. He did not share this with his parents until he received his joining letter in mid-1941. ⁶²

Some seem to have joined the armed forces with a more calculating outlook. The war offered an opportunity to get into the army and gain expertise in military affairs. In their view, even if India got independence by non-violent means, the country would still need the army to defend itself. Thus, by joining the military institutions, nationalists could acquire experience and expertise. ⁶³ According to Harjinder Singh (later Air Vice Marshal), he joined the Indian Air Force as an airman, as he believed that the country one day would get independence and would need its own Air Force. ⁶⁴ Subhas Chandra Bose, prominent Indian leader also according to a letter by the Chief of the General Staff (India), is reported to have said, ‘in the last phase of the national struggle, the Indian Army will have to play an important role’. ⁶⁵ V.D. Savarkar also emphasised the militarisation of Indian youth to create an ultimate push towards freedom. ⁶⁶ There are evidences that some men who joined the army during the war were highly inclined. ⁶⁷ B. C. Dutt, a sailor accused in HMIS Talwar mutiny case, when asked by Major-General Rees why he bought the book on politics, replied, ‘Why should I not? I am interested in politics’. ⁶⁸ According to a British Brigadier of the Indian Army, the old Indians were apolitical, while those who joined during the war had increased interest in politics. He recalled that a group of Indian officers regularly tuned in to the Japanese English language broadcasts, probably to listen to Subhash Chandra Bose. ⁶⁹

Some young men appear to have quietly left their homes to get enlisted, particularly in Labour Battalion. The officer commanding of the battalion received numerous letters from anxious relatives asking about their absconding offspring and husbands. ⁷⁰ Even men from middle-class families visited the recruiting office and got enlisted without informing their families. The Adjutant General pointed out in a circular to all units that letters were being received from well-to-do families asking if their ward was in the army. He appealed to the soldiers to inform their families about their enlistment. ⁷¹ Thus, variety of reasons led the Indians to join the armed forces during the war.

Some sources speak about the use of some kind of coercion by the authorities to bolster recruitment. When traditional recruiting areas were exhausted, British authorities looked for some non-enlisted classes of Punjab to augment the army. Force was sometimes applied to overcome the reluctance of such men to enlist. ⁷² The district-wise recruitment quota allotted confidentially to the commissioner of each district in the Lahore region was found satisfactory by the committee headed by the Adjutant General. ⁷³ According to Ian Talbot, some village officials were also ordered to bring a certain number of recruits and were threatened with suspension if they failed to do so. ⁷⁴ K. C. Yadav, belonging to a soldier family of Punjab (now Haryana), then a young boy, says that some able-bodied men of surrounding villages ran to hide in the crop-laden fields to avoid the village officials’ (lambardars, zaildars and so on) recruitment drive. ⁷⁵ However, during interviews with the war veterans of World War II, all denied the use of any kind of force in enlistments. The element of force thus hardly held any ground and, at least, was not common during this war. ⁷⁶

Adverse Factors to Recruitment Efforts

It is notable that many Indians who were otherwise suited for military service did not opt for it. There were a number of reasons, including Indian political environment, racial discrimination, attraction to civil service amongst educated youths, apprehension of parents and so on. These factors prevented some enlistments. The Ginwala Committee, formed to select pilots for the Indian Air Force, pointed out that one-third of the candidates who were found suitable for the interview did not respond to the call of the Committee. ⁷⁷ A contemporary article also pointed out that the best material from the universities and schools was not coming forward to join the armed forces. ⁷⁸ Many college students, particularly in Bihar, expressed strong resentment against British rule. They wanted to get rid of the British, even if they were to be ruled by some other master. ⁷⁹ Even among the men who had joined, a few were influenced by the prevailing political environment and did not like to continue. An officer wanted to leave the Indian Air Force because he was influenced by Congress call. ⁸⁰ In another case, a young Parsee, Lt. Dadachanji, who had studied in England, volunteered for the wartime emergency commission. However, he did not like the orders that put him on internal security duty, as it would have forced him to shoot his own countrymen. He resigned, citing political reasons. ⁸¹ General Headquarters was apprehensive of the increasing demand for discharge on political ground. ⁸² Thus, it is very likely that some candidates might have stayed away from recruiting deliberately due to political reasons. The effect, however, appears generally in the eastern part of the United Province and Bihar Province, where political agitations were more prominent. Further, parents too had different views for their wards about joining the armed forces. Some were reluctant regarding the enlistment of their sons, especially at a time when the War was being fought. ⁸³ It was a matter of concern to even the Commander-in-Chief, India, General Auchinleck, he wrote to the Secretary, War Department and AOC (India) on the issue. ⁸⁴ The Willcox Committee also pointed out that political motives and adverse home influences kept back some who could otherwise have been suitable. ⁸⁵

The other factor that dissuaded the candidates from coming forward was the racial and economic discrimination that prevailed in the Indian Army. This led to discontentment among the serving Indian Commissioned Officers, affecting the recruitment, with the result that the best type of young Indians did not come forward in sufficient numbers. ⁸⁶ There is a view that, star students of the university still preferred good posts in the government civil service and business houses. ⁸⁷

Conclusion

Thus, the Indian response to the recruitment drive in the armed forces was mixed. The then-leading political party of India, the Congress, was set against supporting the war effort. The Quit India Movement launched by the party disrupted government machinery at a time when the British were hard-pressed on all fronts, and their resources were stretched to the limit. The Muslim League supported the war efforts on its own terms. Some parties, like Hindu Mahasabha, the Unionist Party and so on, actively supported the recruitment drive in their own way and exhorted people to enlist. Most Indian members in the Council of State and Central Legislative Assembly pleaded for more recruitment from their regions, communities and castes. Leaders of depressed classes pleaded for their due share in the armed forces and encouraged people to get enlisted. The appeals of the Congress influenced some to refuse the call but had no wider impact on the British ability to recruit over two million men and women for the War. When the British authorities could not cope with the ever-increasing manpower demand of the traditional martial classes, they opened the door to non-enlisted classes as well. They had recruited the men of seventy-five non enlited classes during World War I, but went back to old precedence of recruiting from martial classes after the war. Perhaps they did not take a lesson from the similar manpower crunch during the previous war.

The support and efforts of various parties and leaders brought obvious results. Over 20% of recruitable Muslim males contributed 30.5% of the total combatant strength of the Indian Army. By the end of the war, the strength of Muslims in the army had increased over fifteen times of their pre-war strength. ⁸⁸ The Hindus (including Gurkhas) contributed over 52% of the total combatant strength, over nineteen times of their pre-war strength. ⁸⁹ Of these, the non-enlisted Hindu classes (excluding Madras classes), which had an insignificant share in recruitment till 1939, contributed over 34% of the total recruits. Depressed classes like Chamars, Mahars, Minas and so on, contributed no less than 5% of the Hindu share during the war. ⁹⁰ The strength of Sikhs, though six times higher than their pre-war strength, dropped from 17.5% in 1939 to 6% of the total combatant strength of the Indian Army by the end of the war. ⁹¹ On the contrary, Madras classes, which contributed some 3% in 1939, increased to over 15% of the combatant strength by August 1945. ⁹²

The crunch of manpower led to re-raising of the Regiment of Mahars, a depressed class of the Bombay presidency. The Sikh Light Infantry regiment comprised Mazbhi and Ramdasia Sikhs, depressed castes from Punjab province. Some exclusive regiments and units of depressed classes, such as the Chamar Regiment and the Lingayat battalion, were also raised. Many men from depressed classes were taken in Pioneers, Army Service Corps and other services of the army. The recruitment of depressed classes was a good start in making the military service inclusive. The Mahars and Sikh Light Infantry continue to serve the Army of Independent India.

As discussed above, various factors contributed in determining the Indian response to the recruiting drives. Unemployment and poor financial conditions were the two main factors that prompted young men and women to opt for the military service. Men of some classes/castes preferred jobs in the armed forces over menial works that could be available nearby. The raising of some infantry battalions from depressed classes encouraged many to enlist. Supplementing meagre agricultural income was a significant attraction for boys of yeomen cultivators. Besides the salary, respect attached to the military profession was a major motivating factor in attracting men of martial races. Welfare schemes and benefits provided by the government to men in uniform in some districts, especially in Punjab, cemented this bond. ⁹³ Attraction for uniform and family tradition were also deciding factors in many cases. Educated youth joined the officer cadre as it enhanced their status and respect in society.

Economic considerations, such as rising prices, food scarcity and intermittent droughts, also made the Indian youth from the peasant classes to join the armed forces. Differences with parents and family members at times became the immediate cause of enlistment as huge employment opportunities had opened up due to the war.

The Indian soldiers proved their mettle in supporting the British, but after the war, they felt betrayed as the promised self-rule was nowhere in sight. The INA (Indian National Army) trials created a popular reaction in the country, irrespective of region or religion. The British felt exceedingly worried as the popular resentment could percolate into the armed forces. The fear proved right, and in February 1946, coupled with other factors, the ratings of RIN came out in open support of INA, chanting ‘Jai Hind’, the INA official salutation, in the streets of Bombay and various naval establishments. Locals supported their cause and joined the agitation. ⁹⁴ Some transport and supply companies of the army in Bombay also resorted to collective insubordination to the British officers. The Signals Training Centre at Jabalpur broke barracks and paraded, shouting slogans in protest. Thousands of Indian Air Force personnel also went on strike at different air force bases in the country. ⁹⁵ Further, there was massive public support for all these agitations. The British military’s control over India was losing its grip. It was also feared that over a million men being demobilised, spread all over the country, could also prove dangerous. Long drawn freedom struggle had already bolstered Indian claim for independence while current events contributed in accelerating the process. This was due to the huge entry of Indians into the armed forces due to the exigencies of the war. It was the end of what India did to war and the beginning of what war did to India.