Brain Structures and Ego States

Abstract

This article, the sequel to an earlier publication entitled “Mind Structures and Ego States” (Hine, 1997), considers recent research on neural functioning and its implications for the meaning of terms such as “ego,” “self,” and “mind.” The author draws, in particular, on the work of neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux (LeDoux, 2002; Nader, Schafe, & LeDoux, 2003). She joins a current of thinking in neuroscience that proposes that the sense of self as an entity is not an abstract metaphysical state but a product of the complex systems, and systems of systems, of neurons and their accompanying synaptic activity that underlie the development of such subjective experiences as self and mind. Insight into this synaptic activity is offered through the analysis of how sense is made of a set of common ambiguous pictures. Also drawing on the work of Stern (1985) and Nelson and Gruendel (1981), the author suggests a theory of Generalized Representations to describe the way this sense can be built up by babies and brains into the complex systems we call ego states. The connections between this understanding and transactional analysis are discussed, including some of the implications for our evolving understanding of the Parent, Adult, and Child systems, therapeutic interventions, and stroking and discounting processes. In addition, the article focuses on the interconnections among three levels of human functioning: the whole personality, mental process, and neural activity.