Abstract
Expressway traffic crashes often result in higher fatalities and more severe congestion compared with incidents on regular roads, creating significant challenges for timely emergency response. Vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) vehicles offer a potential solution to bypass surface-level bottlenecks and efficiently deliver emergency personnel and supplies. This study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze the strategic interactions among crash participants, VTOL operators, and road authorities in the context of expressway rescue. The analysis identifies the most favorable equilibrium as one where point-to-point rescue is adopted, VTOL services are actively provided, and road conditions are effectively managed. This setup encourages coordination among stakeholders and enhances overall rescue efficiency. The evolutionary path is affected by factors such as road regulation costs, subsidy coefficients, and stakeholders’ initial willingness to cooperate. Notably, higher initial cooperation from crash victims and VTOL operators accelerates convergence toward stable outcomes. These findings improve understanding of the feasibility conditions for VTOL deployment in emergency scenarios and guide cost-sharing mechanisms, stakeholder alignment, and policy design to support the practical implementation of VTOL-based rescue strategies.
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