Alliance or Independence? Optimal Operation of Commuter Buses by Suburban Employers Based on Cooperative Game Theory

Abstract

To reduce commuting expenses incurred by suburban employers and their urban employees, this paper proposes the operation of commuter buses by an employer alliance and builds a bi-level programming model to optimize their operation. The upper model determines the composition of the alliance with the objective of minimizing total commuting expenses. The lower model optimizes the commuter bus routes so as to minimize the total commuting expenses of the alliance through a consideration of differences in the value of employees’ time. We fairly allocate total operating costs among alliance members based on cooperative game theory, which reinforces the optimized alliance’s stability. This paper then takes Meishan District in Ningbo as a numerical case study. The analysis shows the following: (1) under the alliance model, the total commuting expenses of three allied employers will be reduced by 8.09% per day; (2) the total commuting time of employees can be reduced by 3.75% per day; moreover, (3) the spatial distribution of the bus stops has a significant impact on employers’ willingness to participate in an alliance as opposed to operating an independent commuter bus service. Specifically, the farther dispersed the bus stops and the fewer the employees at each stop, the greater the likelihood that the employer will participate in an alliance.