Abstract
The Chinese government has released plenty of incentive policies to stimulate the diffusion rate of electric vehicles (EV) and the number of public charging stations, such as charging parking lots (PLs). This paper explores cooperative relationships between regional governments and PL owners in the process of investment in EV charging equipment, and a bi-level optimization model is built to examine their hierarchical relationships. Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are utilized to solve the NP-hard problem. Five PLs in Chengdu are selected as examples to examine the validity of this model. The optimal allocation decision of the government and the optimal investment decisions of PL owners are concluded through the calculation results. Compared with non-graded subsidies, the priority of the graded subsidy rules is confirmed. In line with the calculation results, subsidies can promote investors to provide more charging services, and a graded allocation rule can maximize the incentive performance of subsidies.
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