The performance of different sequential auction settings for the procurement of truckload services is compared. In this environment, demands arrive randomly over time and are described by pickup and delivery locations and hard time windows. When loads arrive, carriers compete for their transport. Different auction and information disclosure settings are studied. Learning methodologies are discussed and analyzed. Simulation results are presented.
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