Previous literature has attempted to explain the existence and for M of franchising agreements by proposing agency related hypotheses. In this paper we illustrate the complexity of putting such a structure in place by using a case study of the franchising of dental practices in Australia. We use this to develop a number of hypotheses about the impact of various regulations on the development of these contractual structures.
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