The Structure of Middle Management Remuneration Packages: An Application to Australian Mine Managers

Abstract

This paper investigates the composition of remuneration packages for middle managers and relates the structure of remuneration contracts to firm-specific attributes. A statutorily defined position in a single industry is studied as an example of middle management. This allows us to control for differences in task complexity across managers and industry-induced factors that could determine differences in remuneration contracts. Higher-risk firms are expected to pay their mine managers a greater proportion of variable salaries and market and/or accounting-based compensation than low-risk firms. Results indicate that high-risk firms pay a higher proportion of variable salaries and more compensation based on market and/or accounting performance.

Keywords

MANAGEMENT REMUNERATION PACKAGES INCENTIVES RISK

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