Abstract
AT THE END OF 1997, Russia's economic situation at last appeared to be improving. Inflation was down to single figures; official statistics suggested the level of production was beginning to increase, having declined by 50 percent since the collapse of the USSR; and there was a healthy trade surplus on the back of high oil prices. Confidence in the rouble was on the up and in January 1998 it was redenominated at what seemed to be a comparatively stable exchange rate against the dollar of around 6:1. Since then, however, Russia has fallen spectacularly into its most severe political and economic crisis since 1992. This crisis, I will argue, has its roots primarily in the specific character of post-Soviet Russia's political economy and, despite a steadying of the ship under new prime minister Primakov, will remain a constant feature of Russian political and economic life.
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