Abstract
A sense of vibrancy infuses accounts of geographical concepts, yet the prosaic endeavour of making them remains unexamined. Engaging Deleuze and Guattari, who regard concepts as composed of mutable matter with the ability to bring unexpected variations, this paper discusses attempts to deploy concepts less as semantic units belonging to a rarefied realm of theory than multimodal processes that facilitate experimentation with differently embodied and emplaced issues. Offering three critical figures to complement these efforts—the unevental, the unruly, the uncommon—the paper revisits the precarious design of a speculative research artefact to diversify practices and pedagogies of conceptualisation within geography.
I Introduction
Concepts animate geography. They are said to ‘proliferate’ (Simon and Randalls 2016, 11), have ‘open, temporary and mobile’ features (Clifford et al., 2008; xiv), ‘lack […] fixity’ (Agnew and Livingstone 2011, 12) and incite ‘struggle’ (Theodore et al., 2019, 10) when percolating through disparate communities of enquiry (Johnston and Sidaway 2015). Concepts also carry ‘world-making potentialities’ (Simon and Randalls 2016, 7) that enable interventions and foster ‘prefigurative’ thinking about alternatives (Cooper 2017, 336). And yet, although geographers are ‘concept-creating entities’ (Agnew and Livingstone 2011, 12), core assumptions about the form and function of concepts appear intact: they are treated primarily as semantic units bound to theoretical systems and articulated via the medium of academic writing. For Cooper (2014, 26-44), this ‘scholarly’ approach has led to an oversight of the ‘generative ground through which concepts develop, change, thrive, get stuck, and carry power.’ Conceptualisation, after all, occurs within diverse ‘material and technological cultures’ (Greenhough 2016, 38-39), where the thinkable is shaped by—among other factors—the ‘evolving spatialization of cognition’ as it converges with multimodal interfaces and platforms (Lynch and Del Casino 2020, 383).
Entering into dialogue with Deleuze and Guattari’s final co-authored book,
Continuing to extend and modify the work of Deleuze and Guattari, the paper considers making as an interrogative practice that probes the
This argument will progress through two parts: the first relying on Deleuze and Guattari to examine the consequences of understanding conceptualisation as making and the second cutting across their approach by proposing three critical figures applied to the development of a speculative research artefact. The
II Deleuze and Guattari on making concepts
According to Cooper (2014), a prevailing view of concepts situates them within the realm of theory from which they are enrolled to offer insight into empirical issues. 1 This has perpetuated an impression of concepts as ‘generalities floating above the ‘real’ world [or as] elements in some kind of autonomous mental film through which a material life ‘below’ becomes intelligible’ (Cooper 2014, 35-36). Deleuze and Guattari’s orientation countervails these and adjacent assumptions in three ways. First, concepts are speculative because they do not behave as propositions—true or false claims about the world—but intervene in situations by reaching beyond appearances, bringing ‘new variations and unknown resonances’ that can act as a ‘contour […] of an event to come’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 28-33). An event signals a fundamental disruption that alters the conditions of reality—not necessarily as an immediately discernible occurrence but by opening a vector of transformation. Rather than depicting actual circumstances, concepts chart sites of potentiality within everyday life, granting access to what Deleuze and Guattari (1994, 35-60) call a ‘plane of immanence’—an unqualified field of pre-personal forces in states of motion and rest, where something new might commence (Patton 2010; Smith 2012).
Geographical concepts rarely function as mere descriptors but are understood as inhering in and often interrupting arrangements of power and knowledge (Simon and Randalls 2016). Deleuze and Guattari, however, consider concept and world as
Deleuze and Guattari consequently raise a particular challenge for conceptual practices within geography: whether enough latitude is provided for concept and world to display their singularity by forming a novel composition that ’changes both the field of study and the concept itself’ (Malins et al. 2006, 514-515). As demonstrated by Ash et al. (2018, 170-171), concepts may be approached as ‘tiny autonomous machines of thought’ that ‘cross between a whole range of interfaces.’ Through the concepts of
Second, Deleuze and Guattari (1994, 23) widen the expressive scope of concepts by treating them less as carriers of meaning and more as ‘nondiscursive’ configurations that bring impersonal intensities, ‘a residue of activity from [their previous] role,’ a ‘rhythm […] in the flow of thought’ (Massumi 2002, 20).
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McCormack (2013, 83-90), for instance, transposes the concept of
As Cooper (2014, 26) remarks, while academics are constantly reimagining concepts, imbuing them with ‘flexible and evolving’ qualities, they often rely on specialised writing as the principal medium for conceptualisation. Concepts, however, are irreducible to linguistic content, as they can take a variety of expressions that transcend any organised system of signification and still possess a distinctive ‘conceptual force’ (Hawkins 2015, 252).
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Sachs Olsen’s (2021) involvement in curating the Oslo Architecture Triennale 2019, for example, rendered a textured array of articulations of ‘operates as a mode of transformative encounter rather than simply a technique for the illustration of pre-formulated concepts. […] the researcher must not only attend to the object or field of observation but become involved in processing those observations using a range of sensory, cognitive, kinaesthetic, and affective faculties, and – perhaps most importantly – must commit themselves to composing and decomposing prior conceptions in the rigour of seeing that process through.’
Third, conceptualisation is a distributed, impersonal process: ‘everywhere there are forces that constitute microbrains, or an inorganic life of things’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 213). The motif of the brain does not denote fixed structures but unexpected, nonlinear ‘cerebral movements’ that ramify across heterogeneous components (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 211). More than a biological organ, the brain indexes the contingency of thinking and the inventive pathways taken by concepts in response to changing situations, as the brain possesses ‘a capacity to disconnect determinisms and to establish unpredictabilities’ (Grosz 2012, 4). Another motif deployed by Deleuze and Guattari to investigate these fugitive qualities of thinking is the ’conceptual persona,’ which neither coincides with factual or fictional individuals, nor signals an ownership of ideas (Lambert 2019). Akin to Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, Plato’s Socrates or Descartes’ Cogito, a persona functions rather as a nonhuman ‘operator’ or ‘intermediary’ that articulates the process of concept-creation—an invented ‘agent of enunciation,’ it describes the distinctive movement of thought (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 61-83) and the relations between its components that ‘render possible the exercise and experience of […] creative thinking’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 75-76).
The motifs of the brain and the conceptual persona, then, demonstrate that conceptualisation involves not only the rearrangement of theoretical elements within the sphere of semantics but experimentation with ways of mediating and ‘narrating’ the process of thinking (Alliez 2004, 81). For Hayles (2012, 19), ‘[c]onceptualization suggests new techniques to try, and practices to refine and test concepts, sometimes resulting in significant changes in how concepts are formulated.’ It entails accounting for the expanding range of entities, from sensors (Turnbull et al., 2023) to art devices (Engelmann 2024), which reshape thinking across contemporary milieus where conceptualisation unfolds within diverse ‘cognitive assemblages’ that interact with human capabilities and incorporate mechanisms not immediately available to reflection (Hayles 2017, 119; see Lynch and Del Casino 2020). 8 In what follows, these ideas will be refracted through the assembly of a speculative research artefact.
III Concept work: Unevental, unruly, uncommon
Although Deleuze and Guattari markedly advance understandings of conceptualisation, they hold an uncompromising view of the process by privileging the variation of concepts across a plane of immanence, while neglecting to examine in sufficient detail the constrained everyday conditions under which concepts are made, including how they are ‘gravitationally situated’ within bodies and their environments (Simonetti 2017, 60), as well as how they might be weighed down by particular accountabilities and attachments (Povinelli 2021, 5-7). For Rabinow (2011, 119-124), ‘concept work’ cannot occur solely on the plane of immanence accessible via Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical method, but also requires ‘venues’—settings that, instead of diluting the singularity of thinking, allow it to be ‘adjusted, remediated, and ramified’ through the trialling of concepts in response to fluctuating circumstances.
Proposing the critical figures of the
The term ‘design’ is often associated with a prior framework guiding the creation of an artefact and ‘making’ refers to the messy material interactions required to generate it, but speculative practitioners collapse this distinction by understanding the latter as a mode of thinking in its own right. While the resulting concepts might not resemble their usual academic counterparts, they are equally conditioned by processes that—echoing the ’research-creations’ of practice-led geography (McCormack 2013, 190)—rarely serve a simple ‘illustrative’ purpose but instead actively transform thought, for instance by exploring and expanding its ‘emergent aspects’ (Boyd and Barry 2020, 309).
1 Unevental
For Wakkary (2021, 233), humans are one component within an ‘agentic […] assembly that together designs things.’ Deleuze and Guattari attest to this dispersed quality of thinking, yet Hayles (2017) observes how their insistence on the need for concepts to summon an event and assist the creation of novelty neglects an integral feature of thought: its dependence on systems that, albeit capable of contingencies, structure the process through determinate arrangements. As Simonetti (2017, 60) elucidates, Deleuze and Guattari exaggerate ‘the capacity of concepts for creating things,’ while omitting to study the appearance of the former from ‘ecological encounters […] and the forces of the medium in which [they] coexist.’ Deleuze and Guattari’s preference for the evental—and its supposed break with the prevailing situation—might only lead to the suppression of the
The initial stages of the workshop were permeated by the unevental. As a site for conceptualisation, the Design Department was equipped with standard production technologies, from laser cutters to 3D printers, which could be operated with the aid of organisers. Concept work was therefore already embedded within an ‘epistemic infrastructure’ that, as Lury (2021, 11-13) writes, highlighted ‘the ways in which knowledge-making requires and installs supports in the world.’ After introductory presentations on ‘wearables’ and ‘embodied interaction design,’
Labouring with the research artefact, we incrementally learned to inhabit the uneventalness of thinking, noticing how a concept may be composed of parts lacking the intensity described by Deleuze and Guattari. The making forced, following Hawkins (2019, 975), a ‘slowing down’ of thought by revolving around matter that ‘acts back, […] guides the maker, [and] is not simply [there] to be manipulated’ (Hawkins and Price 2018, 12). Staying within this process yielded an insight: how conceptualisation need not involve the creation of complete forms but examining, as Drazin (2014, 46) explains, thinking in a ‘state of incipience’. Analogous to Lury (2021, 205), who proposes a critical orientation to ‘methods themselves as objects as well as means of research,’ enquiring
Attending to the materialities of conceptualisation, then, may bring out the vast hinterland of entities that think with—and sometimes for—geographers. Hayles (2017, 10-11) challenges academics to become more invested in the media shaping their thought-practices—media that often rely on ‘nonconscious’ information processing and sensory filtering, facilitating aspects of conceptuality even without reflective awareness. Although geographers have addressed the ongoing expansion of ‘more-than-human cognition’ (Lynch and Del Casino 2020, 385) within the context of proliferating algorithmic power (Amoore, 2020) and artificial intelligence (Lundman and Norström 2023), there has been limited consideration of how automatisation affects concept work. MacFarlane (2017, 305), for example, investigates recent geographical citation data on Deleuze and Guattari, whose concepts appear deeply imbricated with a digital economy, where, MacFarlane claims, they assume a ‘mimetic function,’ repeating rather than resisting established thought. Thornton (2018, 430-435) similarly demonstrates how the discipline is inextricably embedded within the ‘marketplace’ of platforms, which assign values to words via ranking and profiling systems that reward well-cited sources and give precedence to specific cultural features and forms of ‘linguistic privilege’ (Müller 2021, 1441). This raises questions about the extensive cognitive assemblages on which contemporary knowledge-production depends, here taking the form of an institutional space equipped with certain resources and techniques that invited speculation but also framed it in potentially constraining ways (Hawkins and Price 2018, 6-7). Acknowledging the unevental structures of conceptualisation may thus serve as an incentive for closer critical analysis of the components that participate in geographical thinking and, as the next section indicates, for interventions aimed at altering its circumstances.
2 Unruly
Although Deleuze and Guattari engage concepts as restless entities said to occupy the edge of chaos, they seem remarkably coherent by adhering to a logic that affirms a philosophical system laid out beforehand (Povinelli 2021).
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As Cooper (2014, 126-127) remarks, exploring the profoundly uncertain effort of sustaining concepts can reveal how they ‘lose or fail to exert force [and turn into] designs that do not take off.’ This may not denote flawed reasoning that requires correction through enhanced theoretical rigour but stresses the inescapable
This was also the case during the workshop. Feeling confined by the institutional context, we went outside and wandered amid campus trees, stumbling across twigs, bark and leaves laying on the ground. Drawn to their variegated shapes and surfaces, we started to collect them randomly, holding this mosaic of decaying matter and carrying it back to our desk, which we covered with a jumble of organic and synthetic fragments. We then tested haphazard combinations, reacting to how they felt in the hand, against the skin. Intermittently, we could discern something taking form. Disjointed words announced themselves, converging on the nascent arrangement, yet not fully coinciding with it either: a set of devices worn as jewellery, close to the body, generating irregular, barely perceptible haptic feedback from sensors that track chemical processes, moisture levels, diameter growth and other phenomena pertaining to a tree’s life. For lack of suitable terms, we settled on A piece of sensing jewellery. A box with fragments of past entanglement.

Contrary to Deleuze and Guattari’s effort to grow the capacities of concepts, unruly ones can be allowed to push against their limits—even to the point of falling apart. It is evident that
Exploring the unruliness of concepts, Cooper (2014) engages with informal, situated practices of utopian thinking at the
Facilitating the unruliness of concepts involves accepting their ‘alienness,’ defined by ‘contingent conditions, interactions, and affects that change us but, at the same time, escape us’ (Salter 2015, 241). A concept might even be allowed to slip beyond the control of geographers, as in the case of LeRon Shults (2022), who rethinks Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of
3 Uncommon
For Massumi (2002, 20), Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts foster ‘connectibility’—they are circulating entities recombining with others to facilitate transformation. And still, concepts might also defy relationality. Povinelli (2021, 7) draws on the French-Caribbean philosopher and poet, Édouard Glissant (1997) to wonder ‘whether any concept matters outside the world from which it comes and towards which it intends to do work.’ Claiming that concepts are a ‘gathering from […] actual regions of existence,’ Povinelli (2021, 130) reflects on the inheritances of colonial violence and examines concepts as fraught with situated entanglements that travel with difficulty—if at all. As Povinelli (2021, 5-7) notes, Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptuality is narrowly invested in advancing their philosophical project, at times eclipsing the strained conditions for thought. This raises the question whether concept work should instead enable an
The uncommon featured during the later phases of the workshop. We developed an assortment of designs contained in two boxes: one holding ‘sensing jewellery,’ such as headpieces reminiscent of bird nests, the other fragments of past entanglement, such as obsolete electronic components entwined with exfoliated bark (Figures 1 and 2). In the display text, we maintained the need for avoiding an uncritical expansion of empathy, whose ‘inescapable limits’ are revealed when confronted with processes that ‘will never become entirely knowable.’
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This was accentuated by the deliberate elimination of functionalities within the design—including the capacity for data recording and storage—which aimed to allow a degree of
There is an assumption across the discipline of concepts as units with continuously expanding relational capacities. Concepts, for example, serve to ‘sensitize attention to become more attuned to different elements of experience,’ not necessarily by lending the world added meaning but rather by facilitating nonrepresentational modes of awareness (McCormack 2013, 10). An overlapping view is that concepts, although undoubtedly contested and incomplete, remain inherently movable and shareable (Johnston and Sidaway 2015; Theodore et al., 2019). As a consequence, there have been attempts at diversifying collaborative conceptualisation beyond the academia, including research by Corsín Jiménez and Estalella (2016, 145), whose work with urban communities to generate creative spaces in support of experimentation with the concept of
Although the above efforts have engaged a wealth of media that invite a multitude of ‘authorial agencies’ and ‘relations of commoning’ (Adema 2021, 117, 194), they tend to assume the availability of an accessible forum for negotiating convergences and divergences between types of knowledge. For Rabinow (2011, 151), the commitment to extend concept work may lead to a proliferation of ostensibly inclusive projects, whose ‘esoteric’ modes of expression actually sustain a ‘totality’ of ideas that might elicit only restricted crossover. Even gestures towards ‘decentering’ Euro-American conceptualisation—including a transnational study developing an ‘enriched vocabulary’ for urban geography—appear to perpetuate existing conventions by involving primarily scholars, seen as mediators capable of bringing ‘processes from the different territories in conversation with each other’ (Schmid et al., 2018, 33).
These narratives of collective conceptualisation can be qualified with Verran and Christie’s (2014, 58-59) decolonial databasing project involving a platform for storing cultural items, from sounds to images, collected by Aboriginal peoples in Australia. Along with diverse stakeholders, Verran and Christie (2014, 68) designed a living archive that would avoid imposing ‘preemptive categorization’ on indigenous culture via a system embedded in settler colonial notions. For Verran and Christie, databases embody ontological commitments that surreptitiously shape knowledge—for instance, the concept of ‘assume that places exist in the here and now as single, whole things. Places might achieve a form of ephemeral singularity when a firing or some other such collective activity occurs—if all the correct people are present and things are done in a correct manner. Those ephemeral unities of actual existence are achieved reenactments of an originary act of creation by spiritual ancestors. For this reason, to organize our digital resources within a database under the category of “place,” for example, might easily compromise the here-and-now ontic work that Aboriginal knowledge practices demand’ (Verran and Christie 2014, 68).
Turning again to the speculative artefact, it is evident that concepts can also fracture connection. Like the sensing jewellery, concepts may even function in a self-limiting way, rather than accumulating knowledge at all costs—an argument that resonates with Jazeel’s (2016, 658-661) account of ‘untranslatability,’ moments when the impossibility of conveying concepts from one place to another reveals the expansionist inclinations of the discipline (Jeyasingh 2025). Christie and Verran (2013, 308) suggest that concept work could be based on the realisation that ‘possibilities for total separation [between knowledges] need also to be ensured.’ Contra Deleuze and Guattari, geographical thinking does not have to consist in an endless variation of concepts but can sustain intervals where differences are registered and upheld. This approach stands apart from projects built around ‘spaces of confrontation’ where disagreement is considered crucial to debate (DiSalvo 2015, 5). It intersects with forms of ‘abyssal’ enquiry, which question the assumption that dialogue—even when inviting disagreement—is achievable, as it overlooks the radical ruptures in reality sustained by entrenched violences, forcing certain bodies into a position of nonbeing and denying any shared experience of the world (Chandler and Pugh 2023, 2024; Povinelli 2021).
IV A pedagogy of making geographical concepts
The uncertain passage of the speculative artefact, then, can clarify the geographical implications of Deleuze and Guattari’s view of conceptualisation as
Evoking a distinctive pedagogy of concepts, the three figures hold particular relevance for geography. First, the
Second, recognising the
Third, contrary to the assumption that geographical concepts—despite being contested and contingent (Johnston and Sidaway 2015; Theodore et al., 2019)—enable the exchange of ideas across heterogeneous settings, acknowledging their
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
This paper has benefitted from the incisive comments of Noel Castree, Rob Imrie, Andy Morris, as well as the Editor and the reviewers of
Funding
This work was partially undertaken through an Open University FASSTEST scholarship project, supported by the Centre for Scholarship and Innovation at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
