Abstract
This article takes an epistemological turn, warning that certain areas of social and cultural anthropology face the death ray of bathos, due to deference to an essentialist skepticism. An approximating skepticism is suggested as a means of cheating the death ray. Foucault’s regimes of truth (RoT) standpoint is investigated using such skepticism, and shown to be made more politically relevant if transformed into an anthropology of hypocrisy. In the process of doing this, notions of epistemic practice as well as those of asserted and approximate truth are explicated. The anthropology of hypocrisy approach is formulated through an exploration of Foucault’s understanding of RoTs. The approach is applied through consideration of the work of four anthropologists who interrogate different aspects of imperial and liberal RoTs. Finally, it suggests how an anthropology of hypocrisy both makes anthropology more politically valuable, while cheating the death ray of bathos.
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