Abstract
Campaigner
It has been a bloody year for the Uighur people of China. Throughout 2013, restrictions around religious practice have been tightened, land belonging to Uighur people has been illegally seized and the authorities in the region have deployed heavy-handed policing tactics. State-sponsored violence has led, unsurprisingly, to the escalation of tensions. In the Chinese government’s 64-year administration of the region, 2013 has been one of the worst in history, particularly since Xi Jinping assumed the presidency of the People’s Republic of China in March this year. Serious incidents across the region, in Yilkiqi, Akyol, Hanerik, Lukqun and Maralbeshi, have highlighted not only the Chinese state’s failure genuinely to address legitimate Uighur grievances, but also its willingness to sanction security officials’ increasing use of lethal force against Uighur civilians. The Chinese government’s aggressive policies of cultural repression, targeting Uighur identity, language, culture religious beliefs and practices, has left China’s Uighurs feeling constantly under threat.
In recent months, there have been hundreds of arrests, and police and members of the security forces have shot and killed dozens of Uighurs during protests and riots. Police and security officials have also lost their lives. In Lukqun on 26 June, 16 Uighur protesters and two police officers were among the dead; on 11 October, security personnel killed at least five Uighurs in Yingwusitang township in Yarkand county near Kashgar. Throughout the summer, Uighurs were detained on charges of religious extremism and distribution of material, deemed a threat to national stability.
The tight constraints placed on religious practice are widespread. Religious leaders such as imams are required to attend political education classes to ensure compliance with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regulations and policies; only state-approved versions of the Quran and sermons are permitted, with all unapproved religious texts treated as “illegal” publications liable to confiscation, with criminal charges levied against those in possession of them. Outward expressions of faith, such as men wearing beards or women wearing headscarves, are forbidden in government workplaces, hospitals and some private businesses.
State employees cannot enter a mosque, and neither can any individual under the age of 18 – a measure not in force in the rest of China. Organised private religious education is proscribed and facilitators of private classes about Islam are frequently charged with conducting “illegal” religious activities; students, teachers and government workers are prohibited from fasting during Ramadan. Uighurs are not permitted to undertake Hajj, unless it is with an expensive official tour, in which state officials carefully vet applicants.
During a recent visit to Turkey to discuss the ongoing tensions, one Uighur activist remarked, “There are three choices for the Uighur people now in China: accept Chinese cultural assimilation, go to prison for refusing to accept it, or die resisting it.” I asked him what option he would choose. He defiantly said: “None!” I asked what he really meant. He said, “I am not Han and don’t want to be Han. Uighurs are Uighurs and Han are Han. We are simply two completely different kinds of peoples with different languages, cultures, identity, religious beliefs, traditions and values. I am Uighur and my ancestors are Uighur. I don’t mind learning and speaking the Chinese language but I simply cannot accept cultural assimilation. I want to speak my beautiful Uighur language, practise my own religion, live within my own culture and tradition without state encroachment. I certainly don’t want to go to prison. It looks like I’ll go to prison eventually for asserting my identity and for not accepting cultural assimilation. But I am not going to outright resist the Chinese government because I will most likely be killed as a ‘violent terrorist’ by Chinese security forces for my non-violent expression of resistance.”
The message sent by the Chinese authorities to the Uighur people is loud and clear: resisting assimilation is futile. The end of Uighur identity is in sight, whether or not this is voluntarily accepted. The Chinese government will use any means necessary to achieve their aims, using lethal force to deal with any kind of dispute or confrontation. Those involved in these confrontations will continue to be blamed and labelled “violent terrorists”. International media and observers will continue not to be told the truth and prevented from giving an accurate account of what is going on. Chinese officials will simply cover up the killings and deny they have taken place. The story will be spun to both the domestic and international media in a way that serves the best interests of the Chinese government. No Uighur person, the Chinese Communist Party seems to be saying, can change what is inevitable.
“Is this inevitable?” I asked the activist in Turkey. He said, “No. This is the 21st century. This is a digital century. Yes, we live in fear and we are being punished for being who we are on a daily basis, but when the right time comes, we can tell the truth to the whole world in an instant.” He added that in an age of globalisation, cultural and ethnic genocides cannot take place without the world knowing, no matter how much power a country wields.
He said: “We have survived many invasions, occupations and massacres in our history, and we will surely survive this cultural genocide.”
Stifling dissent
The recent crackdown on Uighurs began following unrest in the Xinjiang (known as East Turkestan to Uighurs) capital Urumqi in July 2009, when a series of security policies were implemented, including the use of violence against ordinary Uighur citizens. On 5 July 2009, thousands of Uighurs assembled peacefully in Urumqi’s People’s Square to protest against the state’s failure to uphold their human, political and social rights. Chinese authorities indiscriminately fired on demonstrators, sparking days of unrest and resulting in the deaths of hundreds of people. To this day, Chinese officials fail to give a clear explanation of what happened: more than 130,000 troops were deployed to the region, including soldiers from other regions of China, in a bid to restore order and crack down on Uighur protesters. These actions effectively turned the region into a police state. Officials laid the blame squarely on the Uighur population, stating that it had evidence that many involved in the unrest had received training from al Qaeda-affliated insurgents. Since then, the government has specifically targeted Uighurs’ freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom of religion in the name of security. In the immediate aftermath of the massacre, authorities initiated an unprecedented information blackout in the region for nearly a year, blocking both the internet and international telephone communications. Hundreds of Uighur websites were shut down. Prominent Uighur activists, bloggers and journalists were arrested and given long prison sentences. Uighurs who had uploaded images and video footage of Chinese security forces attacking protesters on 5 July were arrested and dozens of people are still missing. Uighurs who had communicated with one another for religious purposes, or watched and downloaded religious content online, were severely punished.
Accusations of terrorism and the use of brutal force are consistently used as tools to silence legitimate Uighur dissent
To the 10.2 million Uighurs living there, the region is known as East Turkestan, referring to both the campaign for autonomy and the Turkic origins of the Uighur people. The Uighur struggle for autonomy dates back to 1949, when the Chinese military forcibly invaded East Turkestan, and in 1955 it was renamed Xinjiang, which translates as “new territory”. The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region was created, and the government promised Uighurs they would be entitled to self-rule and that the language, traditions and culture of the Uighur people would be protected. But this was never the case, and by the late 1960s, those working to protect Uighur heritage and secure a more promising future for their people were branded as “counter-revolutionaries”. Many of them were imprisoned. Though it is not known how many people have been killed, imprisoned and tortured since 1949, some sources have estimated somewhere in the region of one million people. The Uighur language is banned from schools and universities. And since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on the United States, China has waged its own “war on terror”, using the fact that the Uighur population are practising Muslims to justify its brutal clampdown.
When Xi Jinping assumed the presidency of the Communist Party he became the fifth generation of Chinese leaders to rule the region, and it was hoped that things would change. He was presented with a once-in-a-decade opportunity to genuinely embrace political reform. Instead, the newly appointed leader has offered little hope for those yearning for China to begin a transition to democracy and embrace universal human rights.
There are no official reports of how many Uighurs have been killed in recent months. Security in the region remains tight and arrests of Uighur people continue. Independent observers have access to very little information apart from scant accounts provided by the Chinese authorities and promoted through the official media. None of these accounts have been verified by external or objective sources. According to reports published by the New York Times and Radio Free Asia, the Chinese state has not revealed the full truth about events.
In a June 2013 clash between the authorities and protesters in Hanerik township near Hotan in the south of the region, official news source Tianshan Net reported that no one had died as a result of the clashes. Yet Radio Free Asia, citing local officials, reported that security forces had fired on demonstrating Uighurs rather than responding with restraint to civilian violence. Quoting local residents, a New York Times article reported that “scores of young men” were killed in the incident. Communications between those at the demonstration and the outside world were cut in an attempt to control the spread of information so it is hard to verify the truth.
In the only state media reference to an August 2013 incident in Yilkiqi, the Kashgar Daily reported on the heroism of a member of the security forces who was allegedly killed during a clash with so-called terrorists. By contrast, Radio Free Asia reported that 22 Uighurs were gunned down while at prayer. According to local sources, the bodies of the dead were buried in a mass grave in order to cover up the killings. In Maralbeshi, Radio Free Asia reported the deaths of 21 people, while in Lukqun some reports say the death toll was as high as 46, a number unreported in the Chinese media. There were also conflicting reports concerning an incident in Akyol, where three people were said to have been killed when security forces fired on protesters.
On 8 October 2013, both the Chinese and international media, including the BBC, reported that 256 people were under investigation for “spreading destabilising rumours” online. A further 139 people were investigated for spreading rumours about “jihad or Muslim holy war or other religious ideas”. Tianshan Net reported that 110 people had been detained; 94 of them were arrested on administrative charges and 16 on criminal ones. In addition, 164 individuals were given warnings. Without offering any details, the Chinese authorities labelled those in detention as “extremists”, closing down any debate about the truth of Uighur claims. Though many incidents are isolated, it appears the authorities have adopted a policy of using heavy-handed tactics to suppress any protest often sparked off by local grievances. Accusations of terrorism and the use of brutal force are consistently used as tools to silence legitimate Uighur dissent.
There has been very little economic growth in the region, despite initiatives set out in May 2010’s Xinjiang Work Forum, which aimed to boost the economy through state investment as well as providing jobs and improving education. The forum was initially prompted by Chinese officials’ tacit acknowledgment that policies in the region had failed to bring about economic and social development on par with growth in other parts of the country.
Inequalities stemming from the failure of previous policies, the effects of which have been felt largely by the region’s Uighur and other non-Han populations, were undeniably a factor in the turbulent unrest of July 2009. However, the policies set out at the forum failed to address inequalities and discrimination, giving rise to further tensions.
Four years after the turmoil in Urumqi, the region’s development strategy remains devoid of an adequate framework for evaluating and improving the harsh economic conditions the non-Han community experiences, including unequal income distribution, high levels of poverty, forced migration and continued appropriation of Uighur land for state development initiatives. The forum meets annually and is attended by top-level officials, but is marked by the absence of any Uighur representation. At its core, regional development is plagued by the lack of consultation with, and participation by, Uighurs and other non-Han residents. This means those who are directly affected by these policies have absolutely no say in their implementation.
Though I concur with what the Uighur activist expressed in Turkey, I have often felt terribly sorry for Chinese President Xi Jinping and members of the country’s Politbureau. They have the mindset of 19th century Chinese mandarins. Why else do they resort to 19th century policies when it comes to dealing with different cultures and beliefs? If these leaders thought like 21st century politicians, they would start genuinely embracing political reform. They would begin the transition to democracy by embracing universal human rights and finding a peaceful resolution to the “Uighur Question”.
2013: A year of clashes and turmoil
7 March: Four people are killed and eight injured in a knife attack in Korla, South of the capital Urumqi. One person was arrested, but the ethnicity of the suspect or victims could not be confirmed [check link]
23 April: 21 people are killed, including 15 police officers and officials. The foreign ministry said it had been a planned attack by a “violent terrorist group”, but ethnic groups questioned this
20 May: Seven Han Chinese workers are killed in an attack at a dam construction site. Hundreds of Uighurs are detained for questioning
26 June: 35 people are killed in clashes as rioters attack police stations and set fire to police cars in Lukqun. Sixteen of those killed by the rioters are Uighurs. Two police officers are also killed
26 June-31 August: Across Xinjiang, 139 people are detained and 164 people given warnings after being accused of religious extremism and distribution of material that threatened stability
28 June: State-run media report more than 100 people on motorbikes, some wielding knives, attack a police station
28 June: A 30-year-old Uyghuir man was killed in Uchturpan after he allegedly stabbed two people, including a police officer, because he refused to shave his beard whilst officials conducted street patrol aimed at curbing religious attire
28 June: After shouting religious slogans as they leave midday prayers, two Uighurs are shot dead by police and one is injured
11 July-9 October: Police report that video and audio files “spreading religious extremism” have been viewed over 5,100 times and downloaded 1,201 times. The files are said to have been uploaded by a 17-year-old student from Jiashi county
7 August: at least three Uighurs are killed and more than 50 left injured, including a four-year-old girl, after clashes in No 16 Village of Aykol town in Aksu. Between 300 and 400 people are detained
13 August: Two Uighur men are sentenced to death and three more are jailed over the 23 April clashes
20 August: At least 16 Uighurs accused of terrorism and illegal religious activity are shot dead by Chinese authorities in the Yilkiqi township in Kargilik
23 August: Up to 12 Uighurs are shot dead and 20 others wounded in a raid on what the authorities referred to as a “terrorist” facility in Poskam county
9 September: Following an argument, a Uighur fruitseller in his 20s is shot and seriously wounded by police
13 September: Three people are sentenced to death and one person sentenced to 25 years in jail over the clashes in Lukqun in June
18 September: Authorities place a Chinese flag at the head of a mosque in the Aksu area, forcing Uighurs to bow to it when they worship
24 September: About 100 Uighurs are rounded up after fleeing Yunnan and heading towards Lao. Women and children are among the detainees. On the same day, eight Uighurs are arrested by Yunnan police in Mohan and transferred to Xinjiang police
28 September: After police fire on a group of Uighurs at Yarkland railway station, one man is killed
1 October: Nine Uighurs are detained after marching to the Yarkand county government offices to protest against the 28 September attacks
3 October: Police shoot and kill two Uighurs in a private residence located in Abu Dona Village No 16
11 October: Five Uighurs are shot dead by security forces in Yingwusitang township in Yarkand county
Sources: al Jazeera, BBC, China Daily, Dawn, Radio Free Asia