Abstract
To the surprise of many, Yemen seems to be moving smoothly towards its first parliamentary elections for 11 years, but looks can be deceiving.
In the midst of Sana’a’s illustrious ancient stone and mud-brick tower houses it is easy to believe what the guidebooks tell you: that visiting Yemen is like “stepping back in time to a medieval, long-forgotten past”. But that wistful prose can be misleading. Yemen is certainly the forgotten sibling of her regional brethren. Yet the often maligned country of some 25 million people is currently hailed as the nearest thing to a post-2011 revolution success story by the international community and the United Nations.
the sense from many Yemenis is that political elites and old rivals are playing their own game
The UN-sponsored 2011 Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) transition deal, that brought to an end 33 years of President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s rule, set in motion a six-month period of national dialogue, due to reach its conclusion on 17 September. The next step now involves the constitution committee’s three-month deliberation before a new constitution is put to a national referendum. Finally, both parliamentary and presidential elections are, somewhat ambitiously, scheduled for next February – the first parliamentary elections in 11 years – to supposedly conclude the transformation from more than three decades of dictatorship to a new, civil society-based, democratic Yemen.
On paper it sounds relatively straightforward and achievable. However, as with the modern-day “medieval country” description, appearances can be deceptive in this corner of the Arabian peninsula. In reality most guidebooks on Yemen have been gathering dust on the shelves of expectant travellers for at least three years as drive-by shootings, assassinations of military personnel and kidnapping of foreigners have escalated, putting the country on par with only Somalia and Syria in the eyes of the British government’s worldwide travel advice for no-go countries.
Saleh’s three-decade rule through a power base entrenched in a deeply corrupt system of patronage built on nepotism, personal relationships and divide-and-rule tribal politics has been turned on its head since 2011. In the past 18 months the political elite has fractured, shifted and continues to jostle for fresh positions in the so-called “new Yemen”. The all-out war on the streets of the capital in 2011 was curtailed by Saleh’s eventual signing of the GCC deal in November of that year. Now, the conflict in the shadowy world of the political and military elites is being played out in a murky and sinister manner via seemingly random attacks, shootings and sporadic bombings, usually erroneously and conveniently blamed on the country’s al Qaeda network. A similar pattern of assassinations preceded the civil war between north and south in 1994.
Despite Yemen once again being dragged into the spotlight in August, thanks to its infamous al Qaeda off-shoot, AQAP, and a US-instigated terror plot that unnamed intelligence officials claimed emanated from Yemen, far more significant to the country’s future prospects was the re-start of the NDC following the Eid a-Fitr holiday. The southern representatives, led by Mohammed al Ahmed – who returned to Yemen last year after 18 years of self-imposed exile in Britain – set out new conditions for their continued participation in the talks, including transferring any discussions to a “neutral country”. These new stipulations may yet cause the NDC to fall at the final hurdle over the critical issue of the southern question.
The future of Yemen’s stability lies in the change, or lack of it, brought about by the soon-to-be drafted fresh constitution. Despite the necessity pinned to this perceived catalyst for change, arguably the country’s existing document – created when North Yemen and the former southern socialist state of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen unified in 1990 – was not inadequate. The problem lay in its implementation. Large parts of the existing constitution were ignored under Saleh’s reign, as he and his government chose not to adhere to the supposedly legally binding document.
The recent opaque political transposition has left Yemen’s new president Abd Rabbu Mansur Hadi – also Saleh’s former deputy since 1994 – grappling with military restructuring, in an attempt to at least weaken if not break old embedded allegiances and, through the National Dialogue Conference (NDC), confronting the long-standing issues of southern discontent and calls for secession, as well as the increasingly prolific northern-rebel movement of the Shia-Muslim Houthis calling for autonomy. The GCC deal and resulting period of national dialogue was Yemen’s best and only option to avoid further violence and possible civil war in 2011. But, if the transition period fails to bring the results expected by competing factions, the past 18 months will have been futile.
ABOVE: Anti-government protests in Sana’a in 2011
Credit: Reporter#25728/Demotix
Similarly, the extent to which the old order of widespread patronage will tolerate being undermined without further violent backlash beyond the current wave of assassinations is unpredictable. In addition, there has yet to be any benefit felt by the wider population, the majority of whom struggle to survive in remote rural areas completely divorced from the politics dominating the main cities.
On the dusty hillside of Yemen’s capital, the five-star Movenpick hotel – home to the NDC – dominates the skyline on the eastern edge of the city known locally as Sana’a’s green-zone. Close neighbours include the British and US embassies and the former Sheraton hotel, now the fortified residence of American embassy staff where US marines prowl the rooftop. The international community is viewed as not just physically removed from the everyday lives of Yemenis as it looks down on the rest of the capital. Due to foreign diplomats’ existence behind high-walled compounds with movements restricted in convoys of speeding armoured vehicles, they are also justifiably seen as being completely detached from the urgent yet basic challenges faced by most Yemenis in their daily quest for food, water and electricity that bears little reflection to the talks being carried out in the Sana’a-centric NDC forum.
While the international community buries itself in the intricacies of helping to build the country’s future, the sense from many Yemenis is that political elites and old rivals are playing their own game beyond the conference hall – a game that threatens to drag the country back to past conflicts. As a result critics claim the discussions over the new constitution are superficial, serving only to allow time for competing groups to strengthen their support before either renewed conflict or elections take place which will create new faces overseeing an un-changed system.
To add to the burden of expectation, the issues being discussed and agreed upon during the NDC are not binding. Even as the NDC presents its conclusions to the constitution committee this month there is nothing to stipulate that its findings must be included in the new constitution. And, even if they are, it is still far from certain if this fresh, all-encompassing charter can or will be applied by a new, fledgling system in Yemen, where government control extends to an ever-shrinking fraction of the country.
