Abstract
Claims that college students as well as scientists follow a strategy of confirmation bias in rule-discovery tasks are challenged in this study. A more fine-grained analysis of inquiry behaviour in a standard rule discovery task indicates that the best predictor of a reasoner's success is the use of a rational strategy called `conterfactual inference'. Contrary to earlier results, a disconfirmation strategy fails to distinguish between solvers and non-solvers. More strikingly, evidence shows that over half of the unsuccessful adults employ the same counterfactual reasoning which bears a superficial resemblance to confirmation bias. This normal inquiry behaviour is described in terms of a process model, and supports views in the philosophy of science that advocate the use of multiple hypotheses in testing theories. The data present a challenge to educators, cognitive scientists and psychologists regarding their selection of an `expert' discovery strategy for the purpose of guiding students. Training in counterfactual reasoning is advised, since it may make explicit an implicit strategy already in use.
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