WilliamsonO., The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: Free Press, 1985.
2.
CoaseRonald, ‘The Nature of the Firm’, Economica, 4(3), 1937, pp. 386–405.
3.
OkunArthur, ‘The Invisible Handshake and the Inflationary Process’, Challenge, Vol. 22, January-February 1980, pp. 5–12.
4.
WilliamsonO., WachterM., and HarrisJ., ‘Understanding Employment Relations: The Analysis of Idiosynchratic Exchange’, Bell Journal of Economics, 6(1), 1975, pp. 250–78.
5.
LeibensteinHarvey, Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth, New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc.,1963, Chapter 6.
6.
A useful review is available in YellenJanet, ‘Efficiency Wage Models of Unemployment’,American Economic Review, 74(2), 1984, pp. 200–5.
7.
DunlopJohn T., ‘The Task of Contemporary Wage Theory’, in DunlopJohn T. (ed.) The Theory of Wage Determination, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957, pp. 3–27.
8.
For details see Raff,Daniel M.G. and Summers,Lawrence H., ‘Did Henry Ford pay efficiency wages?’, Journal of Labor Economics, 5(4) Part 2, 1987, pp. S57–S86.
9.
BeckerGary S., and Stigler,George, ‘Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers’, Journal of Legal Studies, 3(1), 1974, pp. 1–18.
10.
LazearEdward P., ‘Why is there mandatory retirement?’, Journal of Political Economy, 87(6), 1979, pp. 1261–84.
11.
LazearEdward P., ‘Agency earnings profiles, productivity, and hours restrictions’, American Economic Review, 71(4), 1981, pp. 606–20.
12.
The marginal product may also lie below the opportunity cost of leisure to the individual so making retirement socially optimal.
13.
In the USA the 1978 and 1986 amendments to the Age Discrimination and Employment Act exempted most workers from mandatory retirement.
14.
Lazear,Edward P., ‘Pensions as severance pay’ in BodieZvi, and ShovenJohn (eds), Financial aspects of the US pension system, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983, pp. 57–89.
15.
AlchianArmen A., and Demsetz,Harold, ‘Production, information costs and economic organization’, American Economic Review, 62(5), 1972, pp. 777–95.
16.
MalcomsonJames M., ‘Work incentives, hierarchy and internal labor markets’, Journal of Political Economy, 92(3), 1984, pp. 486–507.
17.
LazearEdward P., and Rosen,Sherwin, ‘Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts’, Journal of Political Economy, 89(5) 1981, pp. 841–64.
18.
O'Reilly,Charles A., Main,Brian G.M., and Crystal,Graef S., ‘CEO compensation as tournament and social comparison: a tale of two theories’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 33(2), 1988, pp. 257–74.
19.
Main,Brian G.M., O'Reilly,Charles A., and Wade,James, Top executive pay. Tournament or teamwork?, Haas Business School, University of California, Berkeley, 1990, Working Paper (November).
