Disaster usually takes organisations by surprise. Yet in retrospect it is often predictable. Extant literature mainly focuses upon the psychological traps which may impede decision-makers' ability to recognise weak signals. Although this perspective is important, it is partial, as organisations are often culpable too. This mainly theoretical and conceptual paper suggests that the counter-measures organisations take to guard against risk and danger may be more symbol than substance, upholding comforting views of the world that are severely at odds with reality. Implications of a symbolic perspective for theory, practice, policy and research are discussed.
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