1. This was not the first time, of course. In the nineteenth century, a mucn debated 'Cuban question' concerned whether or not the United States should annex Cuba outright. See Louis A. Perez, Jr., Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1990), pp. xiii-xv.

2. Dwight D. Eisenhower, 'Statement by the President concerning Premier Khrushchev's announcement of support for the Castro regime in Cuba', 9 July 1960, Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-1961 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 567.

3. Ibid., p. 568.

4. The phrase 'the Cuban problem' became customary in 1960. See, for example, Richard P. Stebbins (ed.), The United States in World Affairs, 1960 (New York, NY: Harper and Brothers, 1961), p. 298.

5. The history of US hostility towards Cuba since its 1959 Revolution is well known. For discussions of the physical threat that the United States has posed to Cuba, for instance during Operation Pluto and the invasion at the Bay of Pigs or during the Cuban missile crisis, see Perez, Jr., op. cit., in note 1; Carla Anne Robbins, The Cuban Threat (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 1983); and Robert E. Light and Carl Marzani, Cuba versus CIA (New York, NY: Marzan and Munsell, 1961). The persistent attempt by the United States to abrogate Cuban sovereignty is evidenced in Edward Lansdale, 'The Cuba Project (Program Review and Basic Action Plan for Operation Mongoose)', 20 February 1962, reprinted in Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh (eds.), The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Secairityflrchive Documents Reader (New York, NY: The New Press, 1992), pp. 23-37, and examined by Louis A. Perez Jr., Cuba rrnder the Plan Amendment 1902-1934 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), and op. cit., in note 1. US attempts to assassinate Castro and other members of the Cuban government are discussed in Warren Hinckle and William W. Turner, The Fish is Red: The Story of the Secret War against Castro (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1981); US Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report, 94th Congress, I st Session, 20 November 1975 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975); and Taylor Branch and George Crile, III, 'The Kennedy Vendetta: How the CIA Waged a Silent War against Cuba', Harper's Magazine (Vol. 251, No. 1503, 1975), pp. 49-63. Finally, the US embargo against Cuba is discussed in US Department of State, 'Establishment of United States Export Controls: State Department Statement', 19 October 1960, in Richard P, Stebbins (ed.), Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1960 (New York, NY: Harper and Brothers, 1961), pp. 521-24; US Congress, 'The Foreign Aid and Related Agencies Act, Fiscal Year 1963', Public Law 87-872, approved 23 October 1962, excerpt in Richard P. Stebbins (ed.), Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1962 (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 373-74; David Detzer, The Brink: Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (New York, NY: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1972); and Morris H. Morley, Imperial State and Revolution: The United States and Cuba, 1952-1986 (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1987). For Cuban reactions to this US harassment see, among others, Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado, Speech, 8 October 1962, United Nations, General Assembly, 17th Session, Plenary Meetings, Volume II, 5 October to 20 November 1962; 'Text of U.N.-Cuban Notes', New York Times, 28 October 1962, p. 31; Tad Szulc, Fidel: A Critical Portrait(NewYork, NY: William Morrow, 1986); Fidel Castro, 'There is Only One Road to Liberation: That of Cuba, That of Grenada, That of Nicaragua', Speech, 26 July 1980, in M. Taber (ed.), Fidel Castro Speeches: Cuba's Internationalist Foreign Policy, 1975-1980 (New York, NY: Pathfinder Press, 1981), pp. 316-38; and 'Transcript of Fidel Castro's Remarks at the Havana conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis', 11 January 1992, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, in Chang and Kornbluh (eds.), op. cit., pp. 330-45.

6. George Bush, 'Remarks at the Beacon Council Annual Meeting in Miami, Florida', 30 September 1991, Public Papers of the Presidents: George Bush, 1991 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 1233.

7. Bill Clinton, letter to the authors, 22 January 1994.

8. We use the label 'realism' to refer to a broad research program that encompasses both the classical realist theory associated with Hans Morgenthau and E.H. Carr, as well as the more recent structural version of realism associated with Kenneth Waltz. See Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Fifth Revised Edition (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978); Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, Second Edition (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1964 [1946]); and Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1979). For a similar treatment of realism as a single research tradition, see Justin Rosenberg, 'What's the Matter with Realism?', Review of International Studies (Vol. 16, No. 4, 1990), pp. 285-303. One among many discussions of the differences between these variants of realism can be found in Richard K. Ashley, 'Political Realism and Human Interests', International Studies Quarterly (Vol. 25, No. 2, 1981), pp. 204-36.

9. On the indeterminacy of realist theory, see Robert O. Keohane, 'International Institutions: Two Approaches', International Studies Quarterly (Vol. 32, No. 4, 1988), p. 381.

10. Cuba is a cluster of islands with a combined area of 42,800 square miles and a population of 10.8 million in 1992 (Europa World Year Book, 1994, Volume I, Thirty-Fifth Edition (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1994), p. 902). According to 1991 estimates, Cuba's GNP was $17 billion and its per capita income was $1,580 (CIA Hypertext World Fact Book [Electronic Database] (Bangkok: Bangkok Security Associates, 1993)). It is a mono-economy that has long been dependent on the export of sugar. Although some diversification of Cuba's economy has been achieved through import substitution and export diversification, sugar had only fallen to 73 per cent of its total exports by 1989 (Europa World Year Book, 1994, op. cit., p. 904). 'Cuban armed forces in early 1985 represented the second or third most powerful military force after the United States, and possibly Brazil, in the Western Hemisphere' (Phyllis Greene Walker, 'The Cuban Military', in Philip Brenner, William M. LeoGrande, Donna Rich, and Daniel Siegel (eds.), The Cuban Reader: The Making of a Revolutionary Society (New York, NY: Grove Press, 1989), p. 276). However, they are certainly no match for the military might of the United States.

11. See, for example, Waltz, op. cit., in note 8, pp. 97-99.

12. One might argue that small states faced with a 'hegemonial' or unipolar system lose their bargaining power and so face increased great power hostility. See, for example, Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System (London: Frank Cass, 1981), p. 172. However, this fails to explain why North Korea and Vietnam are not faced with a post-Cold War increase in US aggression, while Cuba is.

13. US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 'Developments in the Cuban Situation: Questions and Answers', Foreign Affairs Outlines, Department of State Publication 7454, Inter-American Series 81 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 1-2.

14. Ibid.

15. Robbins, op. cit., in note 5, pp. 72 and 81.

16. See Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 1076.

17. E.W, Kenworthy, 'US will indict Cuba before OAS on "Slander" Issue', New York Times, 18 June 1960, p. 8. Congress granted Eisenhower this power on 5 July; on 6 July, he cut the quota to zero. Using sugar as a toot to punish the Castro government became the subject of a lively debate. Those opposing this strategy included both domestic American sugar producers, who worried about presidential, rather than Congressional control over the sugar quota and those who thought that such a move might strengthen Castro domestically. On the former, see William M. Blair, 'US Weighs Move on Cuba's Sugar', New York Times, 9 January 1960, p. 24; on the latter, see the editorial comment, 'Cuban Sugar Quota', New York Times, 12 January 1960, p. 46.

18. Harry Schwartz, 'Soviet Will Send Cuba Vital Goods', New York Times, 19 February 1960, p. 6.

19. Robbins, op. cit., in note 5, p. 17.

20. Senator George Smathers (D-Florida), 18 June, quoted in E.W. Kenworthy, 'Senators Assail Castro's Actions', New York Times, 23 January 1960, p. 6. He was not alone in fanning the flames of hostility against Cuba. On the same day, Kenworthy also reported Representative Daniel Flood (D-Pennsylvania) as arguing that 'Cuba is more of a satellite country of Russia today than Poland and certainly more than Yugoslavia'; Senator Lyndon Johnson (D-Texas) as charging that Cuba might be the next place chosen by Khrushchev to increase 'cold war tensions'; and Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-Minnesota) as asserting that Castro's upcoming visit to Moscow was 'another effort on the part of the Russians to put their imprint on Latin America'.

21. Jules R. Benjamin, The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution: An Empire of Liberty in an Age of National Liberation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 194.

22. R. Hart Phillips, 'Castro Orders Seizure—Also Bitterly Attacks US Sugar Bill', New York Times, 30 June 1960, p. 1.

23. Tad Szulc, 'Last Two Refineries Seized by Castro; Oil Supplies Low', New York Times, 2 July 1960, p. 1.

24. 'Excerpts From Khrushchev's Talk Pledging Aid to Cuba', New York Times, 10 July 1960, p. 2.

25. R. Hart Phillips, 'Khrushchev Tells Cuba He Will Buy Sugar US Barred', New York Times, 11 July 1960, pp. 1 and 10.

26. Robbins, op. cit., in note 5, p. 95.

27. Gearóid Ó Tuathail and John Agnew, 'Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy', Political Geography (Vol. 11, No. 2, 1992), p. 192.

28. Hans Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p. 7, emphasis added.

29. Indeed, as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe have argued, 'the entire development of contemporary epistemology has established that there is no fact which allows its meaning to be read transparently'. See Laclau and Mouffe, 'Postmarxism Without Apologies', New Left Review (Vol. 166, 1987), p. 84. This insight underpins diverse contemporary social theories, although it is typically ignored in mainstream approaches to the study of international relations, and especially in realism. For an overview of contemporary developments in theories of language and meaning, see Michael Shapiro, Language and Political Understanding: The Politics of Discursive Practices (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981), or Michael J. Gibbons, Interpreting Politics (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1987).

30. Ole R. Holsti, 'Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy: Dulles and Russia', in David J. Finlay, Ole R. Holsti, and Richard R. Fagan (eds.), Enemies in Politics (Chicago, IL: Rand McNally & Company, 1967), p. 29.

31. David S. McLellan, The "Operational Code" Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: Dean Acheson's Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs', Canadian Jourmal of Political Science (Vol. 4, No. 1, 1971), p. 75.

32. Richard Little, 'Belief Systems in the Social Sciences', in Richard Little and Steve Smith (eds.), Belief Systems and International Relations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 45.

33. Michael J. Shapiro and G. Matthew Bonham, 'Cognitive Process and Foreign Policy Decision Making', International Studies Quarterly (Vol. 17, No. 2, 1973), p. 165.

34. Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, 'The Structure of Foreign Policy Beliefs Among American Opinion Leaders-After the Cold War', Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 22, No. 2, 1993), pp. 235-78.

35. Ibid.

36. See, for example, Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, 'Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics', Journal of Conflict Resolution (Vol. 1, No. 4, 1957), pp. 309-28.

37. For an elaboration of some of these issues, see Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes, 'Beyond Belief: Ideas and Symbolic Technologies in the Study of International Relations', paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, CA, April 1996.

38. Psychoanalytic theory, of course, complicates the picture even further, suggesting-with the introduction of the notion of the 'unconscious'—that one does not even know what goes on inside one's own head.

39. Stuart Hall, 'Signification, Representation, Ideology: Althusser and the Post-structuralist Debates', Critical Studies in Mass Communication (Vol. 2, No. 2, 1985), p. 105.

40. The discursive constitution of individual beliefs or subjectivity is discussed by Rom Harre and Grant Gillett, The Discursive Mind (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1994), and John Shotter and Kenneth J. Gergen (eds.), Texts of Identity (London: Sage Publications, Ltd., 1989).

41. Mark Laffey and Himadeep Muppidi, 'Can We Build Bridges with Epistemic Communities? Rationalism, Constructivism, and International Relations Theory', paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association-Midwest, East Lansing, MI, November 1992.

42. For discussions similar to our own on the importance of discursively constituted identities in international relations, see David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), and William Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), especially Chapter 2.

43. Campbell, op. cit., in note 42, Chapter 1.

44. O Tuathail and Agnew, op. cit., in note 27, pp. 192-93.

45. John Fiske, Television Culture (London: Routledpe, 1987), p. 14.

46. In Humean terms, 'causality' refers to a relation between two discrete and independent events or entities, is defined as 'constant conjunction', and can be identified if there exists 'priority, continuity, and constant conjunction'. See Wesley C. Salmon, Four Decades of Scientific Explanation (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 1989), p. 107.

47. In this sense, discourses are analogous to the causal mechanisms' of scientific realism. According to scientific realist explanations in the social sciences, causal claims refer to the 'causal powers' of social agents which are conferred onto those agents by the social structures and relations that constitute them. Social power can therefore be defined as 'the capacity to act possessed by social agents in virtue of the enduring relations in which they participate'. Jeffrey Isaac, Power and Marxist Theory: A Realist View (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 80. Causality is thus understood generatively and relationally, An adequate explanation, on this view, must identify the underlying causal mechanisms or causal powers that lay bare the 'conditions of possibility' of the phenomenon in question. Our discursive account of the production of 'the Cuban problem' is analogous to this form of explanation: discourses are the structures which provide the capabilities or social powers through which meaning is created. For discussions of different versions of the scientific realist conception of causation, see, among others, Jutta Weldes, Marxism and Methodological Individualism: A Critique', Theory and Society (Vol. 18, No. 3, 1989), pp. 369-71; Rom Harre and Edward H. Madden, Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1975); and Wesley Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

48. Stephen J. Majeski and David J. Sylvan, 'Modeling Theories of Constitutive Relations in Politics', paper presented at the XVth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Buenos Aires, July 1991, p. 8.

49. William E. Connolly, Appearance and Reality in Polities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 110.

50. Fiske, op. cit., in note 45, p. 15.

51. Trevor Purvis and Alan Hunt, 'Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology.., British Journal of Sociology (Vol. 44, No. 3, 1993), p. 492.

52. 6 Tuathail and Agnew, op, cit., in note 27, p. 194.

53. For theoretical accounts of the construction of identity, see Louis Althusser, 'Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatuses', in Althusser Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. B. Brewster (London; New Left Books, 1971), pp. 127-86; Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory (London: Verso, 1979); Stuart Hall, op. cit., in note 39; and Connolly, op. cit., in note 42.

54. Laclau and Mouffe, op. cit., in note 29, pp. 82-84.

55. Such non-linguistic practices and their role in constructing 'the Cuban problem' have been studied extensively. See, for example, Perez, Jr,, op. cit., in note 1; Morley, op. cit., in note 5; and Robbins, op. cit., in note 5.

56. The qualifier 'might' is important. 'Crises', such as oil shortages, can be manufactured in the absence of physical referents. Moreover, most people never actually saw the Soviet missiles in Cuba (nor would they have known how to interpret reconnaissance photographs)- That has not, however, kept them from accepting, on faith and in deference to experts and officials, that there actually were Soviet missiles in Cuba.

57. For a more extensive analysis of the construction of the so-called 'Cuban missile crisis', see Jutta Weldes, "The Cultural Construction of Cises: US Identity and Missiles in Cuba', in Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson, and Raymond Duvall (eds.), Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger, (unpublished manuscript, 1996), as well as Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests: The Logic of US National Security in the Postwar Era, PhD Dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1993, Chapters 6, 7, and 8.

58. See, for example, Carol Cohn, 'Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals', Signs (Vol. 12, No. 4, 1987), pp. 687-718.

59. Fiske, op. cit., in note 45, p. 14.

60. These identities are also produced out of the articulation of the discourse of 'the Cuban problem' with other discourses. Particularly important are the discourse of 'the Cold War', with the attendant Soviet and 'international Communist' threats, and the discourse of 'the Western Hemisphere', in which countries of Latin America are constructed as 'sister Republics' of the United States who occupy a so-called 'Western Hemisphere' that falls under exclusive US protection through the Monroe Doctrine and its successors. Examining these additional discourses is beyond the scope of this paper. They are discussed extensively in Weldes, Constructing National Interests, op. cit., in note 57, Chapter 8.

61. Our analysis of the discourse of 'the Cuban problem' has many similarities to other empirical analyses of state discourses, including those offered by Campbell, op. cit., in note 42; David Campbell, Politics Without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993); Simon Dalby, 'Geopolitical Discourse: The Soviet Union as Other', Alternatives (Vol. 13, No. 4, 1988), pp. 415-42; Simon Dalby, 'American Security Discourse: The Persistence of Geopolitics', Political Geography Quarterly (Vol. 9, No. 2, 1990), pp. 171-88; Simon Dalby, Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics (London; Pinter, 1990); Simon Dalby, 'The "Kiwi Disease": Geopolitical Discourse in AotearoalNew Zealand and the South Pacific', Political Geography (Vol. 12, No. 5, 1993), pp, 437-56 ; various of the analyses in James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (eds.), International/IntertextualRelations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989); Roxanne Lynn Doty, 'Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-positivist Analysis of US Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines', International Studies Quarterly (Vol. 37, No. 3, 1993), pp. 297-320; Richard Price, 'A Genealogy of the Conventional Weapons Taboo', International Organization (Vol. 49, No. 1, 1994), pp. 73-103; and Michael J. Shapiro, 'The Construction of the Central American Other: The Case of Guatemala', in Shapiro, The Politics of Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography and Policy Analysis (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), pp. 89-123. Our analysis is quite different, on the other hand, from the work of scholars such as Richard Ashley and R.B.J. Walker, who have set themselves the task of deconstructing the discourse of International Relations (IR) theory, particularly realism, rather than the discourse of states or, more accurately, of state officials. See, for example, Richard K. Ashley, 'The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics', Alternatives (Vol. 12, No. 4,1987), pp. 403-34; R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); and Walker and Ashley, 'Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies', International Studies Quarterly (Vol. 34, No. 3, 1990), pp. 367-416.

62. While US state officials are the most prominent agents in the (re)production of these representations, other 'intellectuals of statecraft' (6 Tuathail and Agnew, op. cit., in note 27, p. 193), including the 'defense intellectuals' associated with weapons contractors and weapons systems (Cohn, op. cit., in note 58) and 'security intellectuals' of think tanks such as RAND (Dalby, Creating the Second Cold War, op. cit., in note 61), play a role as well. Moreover, as our analysis below indicates, this discourse is (re)produced as well by agents outside of the state, including academics, columnists, journalists, and the producers of Radio Marti.

63. Purvis and Hunt, op. cit., in note 51, p. 496, and Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (London: Verso, 1991), Chapter 7.

64- Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. C. Gordon (New York, NY: Pantheon, 1980).

65. Doty, op. cit., in note 61, p. 298. Doty contrasts 'how-possible' questions to the conventional questions of foreign policy analysis which ask 'why particular decisions resulting in specific courses of action were made'. These 'why questions' are inadequate, as Doty explains, because they are incomplete. In particular, they 'generally take as unproblematic the possibility that a particular decision or course of action could happen. They presuppose a particular subjectivity (i.e., a mode of being), a background of social/discursive practices and meanings which make possible the practices as well as the social actors themselves' (p. 298), emphasis in original. See also Alexander Wendt, 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory', International Organization (Vol. 41, No. 3, 1987), pp. 335-70.

66. The discursive construction of US and Cuban identities takes place within at least three different contexts: an international context, a US context, and a Cuban context. A more complete understanding of international identity construction than we have space to undertake here would require that we take into account the complex relations among these contexts. For example, in this article we treat the official US discourse of 'the Cuban problem' as hegemonic relative to the official revolutionary discourse of the Cuban state; it is so both within domestic US politics and in much of international relations. In these contexts, the revolutionary C uban discourse is counter-hegemonic and, thus, potentially subversive. However, what counts as a dominant discourse depends largely on social context. In the context of Cuban politics, this seemingly subordinate discourse is itself hegemonic and is in turn challenged by other, counter-hegemonic discourses internal to Cuba. Moreover, relations among various discourses are not limited to those of opposition, that is, of hegemonic versus counter-hegemonic discourses. While the official US and Cuban discourses do largely stand in opposition to one another, as do the official and dissident Cuban discourses, other relations, such as those of co-optation or complementarity, may exist among discourses as well.

67. On the connection between identities and interests, see Stuart Hall, 'The Toad in the Garden: Thatcherism Among the Theorists', in Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (eds.), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1988), pp. 35-73; Hall, op. cit., in note 39; Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', International Organization (Vol. 46, No. 2, 1992), pp. 391-425; and Weldes, Constructing National Interests, op. cit., in note 57, Chapter 5.

68. Stebbins, op. cit., in note 4, pp. 292-93. See also John F. Kennedy, 'Senator John F. Kennedy on the Cuban Situation: Presidential Campaign of 1960', 18 October 1960, Inter-American Economic Affairs (Vol. 15, No. 3, 1961), pp. 79-95, and US Department of State, 'Cuba', State Department Publication 7171, Inter-Ainerican Series 6 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1961).

69. Stebbins, op, cit., in note 4.

70. Stebbins, op, cit., in note 4, p. 294. See also Kennedy, op. cit., in note 68; and US Department of State, 'Department Reports on Cuban Threats to the Western Hemisphere: Summary', Department of State Bulletin, 22 January 1962, pp. 129-30.

71. Stebbins, op. cit., in note 4, p. 305. See also Adlai Stevenson, 'Statement of April 17', Statement to the UN General Assembly, 17 April 1961, reprinted in Department of State Bulletin, 8 May 1961, pp. 668-75; US Department of State, op. cit., in note 68.

72. Stebbins, op. cit., in note 4, pp. 314 and 331. See also Eisenhower, op. cit., in note 2, pp. 567-68, and Adolf A. Berle, 'The Inter-American System and the Program for Economic and Social Progress', Address to the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 12 April 1961, reprinted in Department of State Bulletin, 1 May 1961, pp. 617-21.

73. Robert McNamara, quoted in US Senate, 'Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders', op. cit., in note 5, p. 157.

74. The elements of the discourse of 'the Cuban problem' mentioned in this section are discussed in more detail in Weldes, Constructing National Interests, op. cit., in note 57, Chapter 8.

75. Senator Mike Mansfield, 'New Horizons for the Americas', Speech delivered to the Special Session of Congress, 8 August 1960, reprinted in Inter-American Economic Affairs (Vol. 14, No. 2, 1960), p. 93.

76. See, for example, Mansfield, op. cit., in note 75, p. 93, and US Department of State, op. cit., in note 68, p. 34.

77. See, for example, George F. Kennan, Moscow Embassy Telegram No. 511 ('The Long Telegram'), 22 February 1946, reprinted in Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis (eds.), Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-50 (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1978), p. 58; Dwight D. Eisenhower, 'Message of the President on the Mutual Security Program for Fiscal Year 1960', 13 March 1959, reprinted in Paul E. Zinner, Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1959 (New York, NY: Harper and Brothers, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1960), p. 95.

78. See, for example, US Department of State, op. cit., in note 70, p. 130. See also, Adlai Stevenson, 'UN Security Council Hears US Charges of Soviet Military Buildup in Cuba', Speech to the UN Security Council, 23 October 1962, Department of State Bulletin, 12 November 1962, p. 730-31, and Dean Rusk, 'American Republics Act to Halt Soviet 'Threat to Hemisphere', Statement to the Council of the Organization of American States, 23 October 1962, reprinted in Department of State Buldeiin, 12 November 1962, p. 721.

79. Eisenhower, op. cit., in note 2, p. 567.

80. Berle, op. cit., in note 72, p. 618.

81. Kennedy, op. cit., in note 68, p. 91.

82. 'Summary of Editorial Comment on United States Break in Relations with Cuba', New York Times, 5 January 1961, p. 10.

83. US Department of State, op. cit., in note 68, p. 25.

84. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 772.

85. 'Cuba's Latin Goal behind US Break', New York Times, 4 January 1961, p. 6. See also Stebbins, op. cit., in note 4; Kennedy, op. cit., in note 68; US Department of State, op. cit., in note 68; US Department of State, op. cit., in note 69; and Stevenson, op. cit., in note 71.

86. Robbins, op. cit., in note 5, p. 3. As Robbins notes, however, 'most of the allegations raised against Cuba during the 1960s proved to be either spurious or exaggerated. While the Castro government was ideologically committed to the export of revolution, it never had the military means or the support of its allies necessary to mount a major campaign' (p. 4). Although the US govenunent estimated that Cuba was training between 1,000 and 2,500 Latin American guerrillas a year during the 1960s—for a total of between 10,000 and 25,000 Cuban-trained revolutionaries-no more than 2500 were actually trained from 1961 through 1969 (p. 53).

87. We add the modifier 'so-called' because these events can be represented and understood quite differently. In the Soviet Union, for instance, they were part of the very different 'Caribbean crisis', while in Cuba, they were part of the 'October crisis'. For an extensive analysis of the discursive construction of this crisis, see Weldes, Constructing National Interests, op. cit., in note 57, Chapters 6, 7, and 8.

88. Rusk, op. of., in note 78, p. 721.

89, C.P. Cabell, 'The Nature of the Communist Threat', Address to the National Security Commission, Meeting of the American Legion, Minneapolis, MN, 21 August 1959, reprinted in Vital Speeches (Vol. 25, No. 4, 1959), p. 751.

90. Robert J. Alexander, 'Cuba and the Sugar Quota', The New Leader, 21 March 1960, pp. 4-5. See also US Information Agency, 'United States Information Agency's Estimate of the Latin American Situation', 28 March 1961, reprinted in Inter-American Economic Affairs (Vol. 15, No. 2, 1961), pp. 88-91, and William J. Pulbright, 'Senator Fulbright's Defense of HR 6518', reprinted in Inter-American Economic Affairs (Vol. 15, No. 1, 1961), pp. 72-78.

91. US Information Agency, op. cit., in note 90, p. 90.

92. Schlesinger, Jr., op. cit., in note 84, p. 760.

93. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., quoted in Thomas G. Paterson, 'Fixation with Cuba: The Bay of Pigs, Missile Crisis, and Covert War Against Castro', in Thomas G. Paterson (ed.), Kennedy Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963 (New York, NY and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 127.

94. Schlesinger, Jr., op. cit., in note 84, pp. 783-84.

95. See, for example, US National Security Council, 'NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security', 14 April 1950, reprinted in Etzold and Gaddis (eds.), op. cit., in note 77, p. 390; Mansfield, op. cit., in note 75, p. 96; and Stevenson, op. cit., in note 78, p. 728.

96. Douglas Dillon, 'Statement at a Special Meeting of the Economic and Social Council of the OAS', Punte del Este, 7 August 1961, reprinted in Department of State Bulletin, 28 August 1961, p. 356. This invocation of Marti, of course, completely ignored the fact that Marti had become a film opponent of the United States and of US policy towards Cuba and the rest of Latin America (Perez, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 78-81). For a fuller analysis of the appropriation of Marti in US foreign policy discourse, see Diana Saco, Voices from the Distance: Radio Marti and the (Pen) Insular Construction of Cuban Identity (MA dissertation, Florida Atlantic University, 1992), pp. 86-100.

97. Dillon, op. cit., in note 96.

98. Hans Morgenthau 'Negotiations or War?' The New Republic, 3 November 1962, p. 9.

99. Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'Cuba in Soviet Strategy', The New Republic, 3 November 1962, p. 7.

100. John F. Kennedy, 'Excerpts from Kennedy Talk on Cuba', 6 October, reprinted in New York Times, 7 October 1960, p. 20.

101. US Department of State, 'The Land Problem in the Americas', Department of State Publication 7112, lnter-American Series 62 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 3.

102. Perez, op. cit., in note 1, p. 249.

103. US Department of State, op. cit., in note 68, p. 1.

104. Stevenson, op. cit., in note 71, p. 670. See also Rusk, op. cit., in note 78, p. 721; and John F. Kennedy, 'The US Response to the Soviet Military Buildup in Cuba', Report to the American People, 22 October 1962, Department of State Publication 7449, Inter-American Series 80 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 10.

105. John F. Kennedy, op. cit., in note 100, p. 20.

106. US Congress, Joint (Senate) Resolution, 'The Captive Nations', in Richard P. Stebbins (ed.), Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1959 (New York, NY: Harper and Brothers, 1960), pp. 206-207.

107. US National Security Council, 'NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security', 14 April 1950, reprinted in Etzold and Gaddis (eds.), op. cit., in note 77, p. 392.

108. Dwight D. Eisenhower, 'Statement by the President Restating United States Policy toward Cuba', 26 January 1960, in Eisenhower, op. cit., in note 2, pp. 135-36. See also Dwight D. Eisenhower, 'Statement by the President on Terminating Diplomatic Relations with Cuba', 3 January 1961, in Eisenhower, op. cit., in note 2, p. 891.

109. Lansdale, op. cit., in note 5, p. 23. See also Dean Rusk, 'Secretary Discusses Cuban Situation on "News and Comment" Program', 30 September 1962, Department of State Bulletin, 22 October 1962, p. 597, and Kennedy, op. cit., in note 100, pp. 14-15.

110. Lansdale, op. cit., in note 5, p. 23.

111. While the opposition of 'the Cuban people' to 'the Castro regime' was treated as an axiomatic truth within the discourse of 'the Cuban problem', this was, and is a contestable representation. Even Philip Bonsai, former US Ambassador to Cuba, has acknowledged that the US perception of popular opposition to the Cuban government was overly influenced by 'our largely anti-Castro informers'. For this latter comment, see Perez, op. cit., in note 1, p. 248.

112. See, for example, Kennedy, op. cit., in note 104, p. 14; US Department of State, op. cit., in note 68, p. 1; Stevenson, op. cit., in note 71, p. 670.

113. See, for example, 'Text of UN-Cuban Notes', op. cit., in note 5, p. 31.

114. Mansfield, op. cit., in note 75, p. 99.

115. Richard N. Goodwin, quoted in Paterson op. cit., in note 93, p. 125.

116. See Ronald Reagan, Reagan on Cuba: Selected Statements by the President (Washington, DC: Cuban-American National Foundation, 1986), pp. 22-23 and 13, respectively. For overviews of US-Cuban relations in the 1980s, see Perez, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 257-63, and Jorge 1. Dominguez, 'US-Cuban Relations in the mid-1980s', in living L. Horowitz (ed.), Cuban Communism, Sixth Edition (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1987), pp. 473-88.

117. Reagan, op. cit., in note 116, pp. 28 and 45-46, respectively.

118. Ibid., pp. 22-23. See also 'National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (Kissinger Commission) Report' (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1984), pp. 107-108.

119. George Bush, Bush on Cuba: Selected Statements by the President (Washington, DC: Cuban American National Foundation, 1991), p. 23.

120. It might be argued that Radio Martf transmissions are not the best data for this kind of analysis because discursive constructions in a propaganda program are deliberate and sometimes intentionally 'false'. However, the construction of US and Cuban identities takes place in multiple venues, including propaganda programs like Radio Marti. Furthermore, these discursive practices have particular effects (for example, a particular identity is constructed for Cuba) which occur regardless of the intentions of the speakers.

121. Commentary by Cuban exile Roberto Valero, RMP, 2 July 1991. All discussions of Radio Marti transmissions are based upon Diana Saco's translations. They are cited as RMP. For a more detailed study of Radio Marti and lengthier discussions of the transmissions analysed, see Saco, op, cit., in note 96.

122. Public Broadcasting Service, 21 January 1992.

123. Public Broadcasting Service, 11 February 1992.

124. RMP, 2 July 1991.

125. Ibid.

126. Commentary, RMP, 12 July 1991.

127. Voices of Liberty, RMP, 2 July 1991.

128. Realidades ('Realities'), editorial aired as part of Revista Juvenil ('Youth Review'), RMP, 1 July 1991.

129. See, for example, Bush, op. cit., in note 6, p. 1233.

130. Bush, op. cit., in mote 119, p. 64.

131. George Bush, 'Statement on the 90th Adversary of Cuban Independence', 20 May 1992, reprinted in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 25 May 1992, p. 905.

132. US Senate, Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Report for the 102nd Congress: Bill Text Report for S.2918, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session [Online]. Available through LEGI-SLATE.

133. Robert G. Torricelli, 'How to Bring About Change in Cuba', New York Times, 10 August 1992, p. A16.

134. Despite US claims that the Cuban Democracy Act reflects the concerns of the 'international community', it has been soundly criticised by many countries, including allies of the United States. Since the mechanisms for tightening the embargo-e.g., sanctioning foreign subsidiaries of US companies trading with Cuba and prohibiting ships trading with Cuba from docking in US ports for six months—would effectively subject foreign subsidiaries and shipping companies to US policy on Cuba, a number of US trading partners, including Canada, Great Britain, and Mexico, have argued that the bill infringes on their sovereignty (David Clark Scott, 'Plan to Stiffen Cuba Ban Annoys US Trading Allies', Christian Science Monitor, 23 June 1992, p. 1, and Julie Wolf, 'Cuba Embargo Angers EC', The Guardian, 9 October 1992, p. 15). In fact, on 24 November 1992, the UN General Assembly voted 59-3 to demand that the United States lift the embargo against Cuba. Only Romania and Israel voted with the United States, while 71 countries abstained (Stanley Meisler, 'U.N. Rebuffs US on Cuba Embargo', Los Angeles Times, 25 November 1992, p. A1). Furthermore, in June of 1994, 19 Latin American nations, plus Spain and Portugal, called for 'the elimination of unilateral economic and trade boycotts' of Cuba ('Castro Dons Civies for Latin Conference', New York Times, 6 June 1994, p. A3), while Canada restored economic aid to Cuba ('Canada is Restoring Aid to Cuban Regime', Plain Dealer, 21 June 1994, p. 6A). Despite these challenges to US policy, some US officials have continued to push for extended sanctions against Cuba: under a 1995 bill, for instance, Clinton's $263 million aid plan for Russia would be reduced by $200 million, the amount Russia pays Cuba 'for keeping the listening post' (Juan J. Walte, 'One-two Punch Hits Russian Aid Plan', USA Today, 10 February 1995, p. 4A).

135. Bush, op. cit., in note 131.

136. George Bush, 'Statement on Actions to Support Democracy in Cuba', 18 April 1992, reprinted in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 27 April 1992, p. 676.

137. See, for example, Enfoque ['Focus'], RMP, I July 1991.

138. See, for example, Samuel Huntington, interview on Enfoque, RMP, 1 July 1991.

139. Bush, op. cit., in note 136, p. 676.

140. Mimi Whitefield, 'Cuba Not Seen as Clinton Priority: Some Say Administration Might Work to Improve Ties', Miami Herald, 12 January 1993, p. 6A.

141. Bill Clinton, March 1993 interview, rebroadcast on This Morning, Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), 4 November 1993. See also his 'Remarks on Cuban Independence Day', 20 May 1993, reprinted in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 24 May 1993, pp. 916-17.

142. Warren Christopher, Public address given at Ted Mam Concert Hall, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, 27 May 1993.

143. We focus in this section on only one example-the role of the Cuban-American National Foundation-of both the importance of, and the problems involved in explaining the existence and persistence of 'the Cuban problem' in terms of domestic politics. One could, of course, provide other examples, including, for instance, the role of, and the discursive practices involved in the 1960 US presidential election with the prominent Republican pressures on the Kennedy campaign to appear 'tough' on Cuba. See, for example, Weldes, Constructing National Interests, op. cit., in note 57, pp. 532-535 ; Branch and Crile, op. cit., in note 5; and James Nathan, 'The Missile Crisis: His Finest Hour Now', World Politics (Vol. 27, No. 2, 1975), pp. 256-81.

144. Carla Anne Robbins, 'Dateline Washington: Cuban-American Clout', Foreign Policy (Vol. 88, 1992) p. 163.

145. In the same year, Mas Canosa was appointed to Reagan's Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba. For CANF's role in organizing Radio Marti, see John S. Nichols, 'When Nobody Listens: Assessing the Political Success of Radio Marti', Communication Research (Vol. 11, No. 2, 1984), pp. 281-304.

146. CANF's 65 directors make annual contributions of $10,000 per campaign to the foundation and contribute another $10,000 per campaign to the Free Cuba PAC (Robbins, op. cit., in note 134, p. 173). Between 1983 and 1988, campaign contributions totalled $385,400 (John S. Nichols, 'The Power of the Anti-Fidel Lobby', The Nation, 24 October 1988, p. 389), and, in the 1991-92 campaign cycle, Free Cuba PAC contributions were expected to amount to between $250,000 and $400,000 (Robbins, op. cit., in note 134, p. 173). In addition to lobbying and campaign contributions, CANF also publishes studies on purported atrocities and repression in Cuba and on the need for Cuba's continued economic and political isolation. (See, for example, 'The Issue is Cuba...', mail-order circular (Washington, DC: Cuban American National Foundation, n.d.) CANF also receives Federal grant support from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). According to Nichols, one of the first NED grants was awarded to CANF 'to gather and disseminate information about the human rights situation in Cuba' (Nichols, op. cit., p. 389) and, by 1988, CANF had received a total of $390,000 in Federal NED funds. It is interesting, in this context, that the NED was created in 1983 as an 'apolitical mechanism for making Federal grants to private organizations working to advance democracy abroad' (Nichols, op. cit., in note 146, p. 389, emphasis added). Clearly, how 'democracy' is defined is not considered, on this view, to be a political issue!

147. One instance of this was the Torricelli-Graham Bill that became the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992. CANF members helped to formulate and gave testimony in support of the Bill. In fact, Christopher Hitchens has argued that 'the moral author of the Torricelli-Graham bill [was] Jorge Mas Canosa', the founder of CANF (Hitchens, 'Minority Report', The Nation, 8 June 1992, p. 774).

148. For an elaboration of the discursive construction of 'the Cuban exile', especially in relation to Radio Marti transmissions, see Saco, op. cit., in note 96.

Making State Action Possible: The United States and the Discursive Construction of 'The Cuban Problem',1960-1994

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