Michel Foucault, 'The Political Technology of Individuals', in Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman and Patrick H. Hutton (eds,), Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault (London: Tavistock, 1988), p. 148.
2.
For discussions of these rationalities, see Michel Foucault, 'Governmentality ', Ideology and Consciousness (No. 6, 1979), pp. 5-21; Michel Foucault, 'Omnes et Singulatim ', in Sterling McCurrin, (ed.), The Tanner Lectures on Human Values (Salt Lake City, UT : University of Utah Press, 1981 ), pp. 225-54; Michel Foucault, 'Foucault at the College de France I: A Course Summary', Philosophy and Social Criticism (Vol. 8, No. 2, 1981), pp. 235-42; Michel Foucault, 'Foucault at the College de France II; A Course Summary', Philosophy and Social Criticism, (vol. 8, No. 3, 1981), pp. 349-59; Michel Foucault, 'The Political Technology of Individuals', op.cit, in note 1, pp. 145-62.
3.
For a succinct presentation of what is entailed by dovish and hawkish orientations, see Baruch Kimmerling, 'Exchanging Territories for Peace: A Macrosociological Approach', Journal of Applied Behavioural Science (Vol. 23, No. 1, 1987), pp. 13-33.
4.
A short paper is not the place to engage in fundamental methodological arguments with philosophical bases. I would merely like to state that I would reject the assertion that any social scientific explanation is more than an interpretation.
5.
The date of writing was 12 May 1991, though this pessimistic statement was first drafted a year previously, before the 1991 Gulf War and the consequent peace initiative. Whatever the final outcome of this recent effort, its possible success will not be attributable to a change in Israeli attitudes. It does seem unlikely that much progress can be made towards resolving the conflict unless Israeli governmental thinking alters, though I am not arguing that this is the only obstacle to peace. 6. Foucault , 'Omnes et Singulatim', op.cit ., in note 2, pp. 243-46.
6.
Foucault, 'The Political Technology of Individuals', op.cit, in note t, p. 152.
7.
Foucault, Governmentality ', op.cit, in note 2, p. 11.
8.
Foucault, 'Omnes et Singulatim ', op.cit, in note 2, p. 227.
9.
Michel Foucault , 'Afterword: The Subject and Power', in H.L. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982), p. 215.
10.
Foucault, 'Afterword: The Subject of Power', op.cit, in note 9, pp. 213 and 215.
11.
Foucault, 'The Political Technology of Individuals', op.cit, in note 1, p. 147.
12.
Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization (New York: Pantheon, 1965); Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York: Vintage, 1979); Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality ( Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978).
13.
Netanel Lorch, One Long War (Jerusalem: Keter, 1976).
14.
As an additional irony, it should be noted that some of these strategies were developed primarily to deal with Palestinian citizens of Israel, often between 1948 and 1967. However, as conceptions of peace, they are to be applied to non-citizen Palestinians in the occupied territories.
15.
Baruch Kimmerling , 'Determination of the Boundaries and Frameworks of Conscription', Studies in International Development (Vol. 14, No. 1, 1979), pp. 22-41.
16.
Michael Shalev, 'Israel's Domestic Policy Regime: Zionism, Dualism and the Rise of Capital', in Francis G. Castles (ed.), The Comparative History of Public Policy ( Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), pp. 104-16.
17.
Noah Lewin-Epstein and Moshe Semyonov, 'Noncitizen Arabs in the Israeli Labor Market: Entry and Permeation', Social Problems (Vol. 33, No. 3, 1985), pp. 56-65 ; Noah Lewin-Epstein and Moshe Semyonov, 'Ethnic Group Mobility in the Israeli Labor Market', American Sociological Review (Vol. 51, 1986), pp. 342-51; Emmanuel Farjoun, 'Class Divisions in Israeli Society', Khamsin (No. 10, 1983), pp. 29-39.
18.
The confusion between different sectors of Palestinians and other Arabs is a consequence of the indefinite use of the term 'Arab'. In Israel, 'Arabs' can refer to Israel's Arab minority (Israeli Palestinians), to the Palestinians in the occupied territories, to both these groups together, to all Arabs and to the Arab states. Thus, the term 'Arab-Israeli' conflict can be applied either to the conflict between Israel and the Arab states or Palestinians and Israeli Jews. Reports of Palestinian support for Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War heightened Israeli identification of Palestinians with Arabs as enemies in general and also caused certain figures in the Israel peace camp to express their 'disappointment' with their Palestinian counterparts.
19.
Yonatan Oppenheimer , 'The Druze in Israel as Arabs and Non-Arabs ', Machbarot Lemechkar Ulebikoret (No. 3, 1979), pp. 41-58, in Hebrew.
20.
For an account of government strategies of surveillance and discipline, see Foucault, Discipline and Punish, op.cit, in note 12.
21.
Although the military administration of Israeli Palestinians was abolished, much of the surveillance machinery still operates. See Stanley Cohen, 'Here, There and the Difference Between Them', Politika (No. 31, 1990), pp. 6-7, in Hebrew.
22.
My argument here is different from, but not incompatible with, Edward Said's claim that 'Orientalism governs Israeli policy towards the Arabs throughout', in Orientalism (London: Penguin, 1985), p. 306. The discourse of Orientalism probably furnishes the category of 'dangerous population' with more specific features (e.g., depraved, violent, unbalanced), but it does not entirely govern policy as it only alludes to appropriate strategies of government.
23.
Cohen, op. cit, in note 22; and Danny Rubinstein, 'The Law of the Intifada ', Politika (No. 31, 1990), p. 30, in Hebrew.
24.
The same logic was inherent in the 1947 United Nation's partition plan, according to which it would be easier to divide the territory of the mandate than to separate the two communities. Hence, a considerable proportion of the population in the proposed Jewish state would have been Arab. Interestingly, there were some Jewish groups during the mandate period that proposed a binational state, and whose thinking followed the logic of the peaceful co-existence of the two communities, rather than an equitable distribution of land.
25.
One of the Likud government's strategies during the diplomatic activity after the 1991 Gulf War was to attempt to separate the Palestinian question from the conflict with the Arab states. On the face of it, this might suggest that the Likud perceived that there are different types of conflict to be resolved. However, the strategy is a reflection of raison d'Etat style thinking: international negotiations must occur between states. Not surprisingly, the Arab states interpreted this strategy as an attempt to avoid the Palestinian question.
