Global Environmental Change and International Governance

Malcolm W. Brown , '93 Nations Agree to Ban Chemicals that Harm Ozone', The New York Times, 30 June 1990 , pp. 1-2.

Among those interested in environmental matters, this phenomenon is often discussed in terms of the 'tragedy of the commons' metaphor. See Garrett Hardin , 'The Tragedy of the Commons', Science (Vol. 162, 1968), pp, 1243-48,

Russell Hardin , Culfective Action (Baltimore. MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1982). 4. Robert D. Putnam , 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games'. International Organization (Vol. 42, Summer 1988), pp. 427-60.

Stephen D. Krasner (cd.), International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 1983); Oran R. Young , Irrferuntinnal Cooperation: Huilding Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment ( Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989); and Robert 0. Keohane , International Institutions and State Power (Buulder, CO: Westview. 1989).

Beth V. Yarborough and Robert M. Yarborough , International Institutions and the New Economics of Organizations', International Organization (Vol. 44, Spring 1990 ), pp. 235-59.

Richard N. Cooper , The International Monetury System: Essays in World Economics ( Cambridge. MA: MIT Press, 1987) ; Charles P. Kindleberger , The International Economic Order: Essays on Financial Crisis and International Public Goods (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 1988); and Robert O. Keohane , Afler Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ; Princeton University Press . 1984).

Richard Elliot Benedick , Ozone Diplomary: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet ( Washington, DC: World Wildlife Fund, 1990).

Peter H. Sand , 'International Cooperation: The Environmental Experience', in Jessica Tuchman Malhews (ed.), Preserving the Global Environment: The Challenge of Shared Leadership (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990).

Simon Lyster , International Wildlife Law ( Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1985).

Peter Thacher, who participated on behalf of the United Nations Environment Programme during the Mediterranean Action Plan discussions, has observed that the strategy of those who negotiated the pollution cqnirol regime for the Mediterranean was to devise a framework convention and several protocols simultaneously and to require states signing the framework convention to adhere to at least one of the protocols at the same time.

The MARPOL Convention does, however, contain a number of annexes that can be ratified or rejected on a case by case basis.

Kenneth A. Oye. 'Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies ', in Kenneth A. Oye (ed.), Cooperation Under Anarrlry (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1986), pp. 1-24.

Keohane. op. cit., in note 7, Chapter 3.

For an argument that the proposition is also suspect on theoretical grounds, see Duncan Snidal , 'The Limits of Hegemonic Stahility Theory ', International Organization (Vol. 39, Autumn 1985), pp. 579-614.

On the idea of structural power, see Stephen D. Krasner. Structural Confliet: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (Berkeley. CA : University of California Press. 1985): and Susan Strange , States and Markets: An Introduction to International Political Economy (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988).

Institutional bargaining refers to efforts on the part of autonomous actors to reach agreement on the terms of constitutional contracts or interlocking sets of rights and rules that are expected to guide their subsequent interactions in a given issue area.

On the concept of a 'veil of uncertainty' and the differences between this idea and Rawls' 'veil of ignorance', see Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan , The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Politicai Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1985). Chapter 2,

Oran R. Young. 'The Politics of International Regime Formation: Managing Natural Resources and the Environment', International Organization (Vol. 43, Summer 1989 ), pp. 349-75.

For an account of the power of ideas in international society. see Ernst B. Haas , When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley. CA: University of California Press, 1990).

Robert W. Cox , 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method', Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 12. No. 2. Summer 1983), pp. 162-75.

See Peter M. Haas. 'Obtaining International Environmental Protection through Epistemic Consensus', in this issue of Millennium: Journal of International Studies.

Sharon L. Roan , Ozone Crisis (New York: John Wilcy, 1989).

Oran R. Young , 'The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables', in James N. Rosenau (cd.), Governance without Government in International Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky , Implementation: How Grear Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland, Second Edition (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973).

Oran R. Young. Compliance and Puhlic Authority: A Theory with International Implications (Baltimore. MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979); and Roger Fisher , Improving Compliance with International Law (Cliarlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1981 ).

Stephen D. Krasrter , 'Sovereignty: An Institutional Pcrspective', in James A. Caporaso (ed.). The Elusive State: International and Comparative Perspectives ( Newhury Park. CA: Sage. 1989). pp. 69-96.

These considerations account for the high level of interest currently being expressed in the work of the Preparatory Committee for the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development.

Young, op. cit., in note 5. Chapter 2.