Helen V. Milner, Resisting Prolectiorrisrn: Glahal Indusrrie.s and the Politics of International Trade (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 298.
2.
See Vinod K. Aggarwal , Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985).
3.
In ibid., Aggarwal has dealt at length with the multilateral negotiations concerning the MFA under the auspices of GATT. In order to illustrate the importance of the linkages between international market developments and domestic political processes, this article will focus primarily on the interaction between France and the EEC.
4.
Interview with Mme. Bourdeleau, Union des Industries de I'Habillement, Paris, 20 February 1985; Union des Industries de l'Habillement, Propositions de l'Industrie Française de l'Habillement pour I'AMF IV (Conclusion de la Commission Economique), UIH internal memorandum (mimeo), 15 November 1984.
5.
The concept of 'nesting', developed by Aggarwal, is useful here. See Aggarwal, op. cit., in note 2, especially Part I on theory, pp. 27-28.
6.
Stephen D. Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables', in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.). International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 2.
7.
For example, Peter 1. Katzenstein (ed.), Between Power and Plenty (Madison, Wl: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978); Peter A. Gourevitch, 'The Second image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics', International Organization (Vol. 32. No. 4, Autumn 1978); Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye.Power and Interdependence: World Pnlitics in Transition ( Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1977).
8.
Stephen Haggard and Beth Simmons, 'Theories of International Regimes', International Organization (Vol. 41, No. 3, Summer 1987 ), pp. 498-509.
9.
Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations ( Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1987), p. 86 and see also pp. 72-73. Gilpin's account will serve as a basis for this discussion, but this is not to dismiss other verions of the theory. See Aggarwal.op, cit, in note 2. by way of example.
10.
Robert Keohane.After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press , 1984), p. 31.
11.
Gilpin, op. cit, in note 9. p. 77.
12.
Ibid., p. 89.
13.
Roben Keohane.op. cit.. in note 10. pp. 32-39.
14.
Gilpin.op. cit., in note 9. p. 86 and see also pp. 72-73.
15.
Ibid., p. 78.
16.
Ibid., pp. 72-73.
17.
Aggarwal, op. cit, in note 2, p. 4.
18.
Ibid., p. 4.
19.
Ibid., pp. 22-26.
20.
Ibid.. p. 26.
21.
Ibid., p. 34.
22.
Ibid., p. 4.
23.
Ibid., p. 39.
24.
For example, see Gilpin, op. cit., in note 9. p. 39; and several of the articles in Krasner (ed.), op. cit., in note 6.
25.
For example, Haggard and Simmons, op. cit., in note 8. pp. 491-517; James N. Rosenau. 'Before Co-operation: Hegemons, Regimes, and Habit-Driven Actors', International Organization (Vol. 40, No. 4, Autumn 1986), pp. 849-94: Helen V. Milner, 'Resisting the Protectionist Temptation: Industry and the Making of Trade Policy in France and the United States during the 1970s', International Organization (Vol. 41, No. 4, Autumn 1987), pp. 639-65: Stephen Haggard, 'The Institutional Foundations of Hegemony: Explaining the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934', International Organization (Vol. 42. No. 1. Winter 1988). pp. 91-119. Susan Strange has contested the whole concept of regimes since it began to gain acceptance in international political economy. See, for example, Susan Strange, 'Cavel Hic Dragones!: A Critique of Regime Analysis'. in Krasner (ed.), op. cit., in note 6, pp. 337-54; and Susan Strange, 'Protectionism and World Politics', International Organization (Vol. 39. No. 2, Spring 1985). pp. 233-59.
26.
See. among the works by Susan Strange. 'The Study of Transnational Relations '. International Affairs (Vol. 52, No. 3. July 1976). particularly pp. 341-45; 'The Management of Surplus Capacity: Or, How Does Theory Stand Up to Protectionism 1970s Style?'. International Organization (Vol. 33, No. 3, Summer 1979), pp. 309-10: Susan Strange and Roger Tooze, 'States and Markets in Depression: Managing Industrial Surplus Capacity in the 1970s', in Susan Strange and Roger Tooze (cds.), The International Politics of Surplus Capacity ( London: George Allen and Unwin. 1981), pp. 3-21.
27.
Susan Strange . 'Protectionism and World Politics", International Organization (Vol. 39. No. 2. Spring 1985), p. 259.
28.
Susan Strange , 'Cave! Hie Dragones!: A Critique of Regime Analysis ', in Krasner (ed.), op. cit., in note 6, p. 349.
29.
Ibid.
30.
Susan Strange . 'The Management of Surplus Capacity: Or. How Does Theory Stand Up to Protectionism 1970s Style?'. International Organization (Vol. 33. No. 3. Summer 1979). pp. 309-10; 327-28.
31.
This was once of central importance to interdependence literature. See Peter J. Katzenstein , 'Introduction', in Katzenstein (ed.). op. cit., in note 7: and Gourevitch.op. cit, in note 7. Domestic-international linkages have been emphasised more recently by: Milner, op. cit, in note 25 ; Rosenau, op. cit., in note 25. in terms of 'micro- and macro-' level variables: and Haggard and Simmons, op. cit, in note 8, stressing the importance of domestic political processes in determining outcomes. Gourevitch has also continued his concern with the two-way relationship between domestic and international factors in his book. Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises (Ithaca, NY; Cornell University Press, 1986). See, for example, the discussion in the final chapter, particularly pp. 234-36.
32.
Aggarwal.op. cit., in note 2. p. 39. The methodology of his study, including the role of 'process-tracing ', is explained in the section beginning on p. 38. The issue of process-tracing is discussed at greater length in the conclusion to this article.
33.
Along these lines. Robert Cox , in 'Social Forces. States, and World Orders ', in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neo-Realism and its Critics (New York. NY: Columbia University Press. 1986) points out that any theory of international structure requires an explanation of the relationship between social forces and configurations of state power (pp. 225-26).
34.
As in Rosenau's account of micro- and macrovariables, op. cit., in note 25.
35.
Their importance is emphasised by Strange, op. cit., in note 30, p. 327.
36.
See Gourevitch, op. cit, in note 7.
37.
Ibid., p. 904.
38.
Gourevitch, op. cit, in note 3 1, p. 65.
39.
As in Katzenstein's strong state/weak state dichotomy of domestic structure in op. cit., in note 7; and Aggarwal's similar use of the concept in op. cit., in note 2, pp. 33-36.
40.
As in the theory of hegemonic stability.
41.
Cox, op. cit, in note 33. p. 218.
42.
Hans Keman and Dietmar Braun, 'Economic Interdependence. International Regimes, and Domestic Strategies of Industrial Adjustment', European Journal of Political Research (Vol. 15. 1987), p. 552.
43.
Susan Strange , 'The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony', International Organization (Vol. 41, No. 4, Autumn 1987), p. 564.
44.
For a further account of the importance of recognising sectoral differences in this regard, see Michael Atkinson and William D. Coleman, 'Strong States and Weak States: Sectoral Policy Networks in Advanced Capitalist Economies ', British Journal of Political Science (January 1989).
45.
In the sense meant by Suzanne Berger, 'The Traditional Sector in France and Italy', in S. Berger and M. Piore (eds.). Dualism and Discontinuity in Industrial Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
46.
Pace Gourevitch, op. cir, in note 7, pp. 901 and 904.
47.
For more on the organisational aspects of international regimes, see Gayl D. Ness and Steven R. Brechin, 'Bridging the Gap: International Organizations as Organizations', International Organization (Vol. 42, No. 2, Spring 1988 ).
48.
Rosenau, op. cit, in note 25, p. 867.
49.
See articles by Haggard and Simmons, op. cit., in note 8, and by Milner , op. cit, in note 25. Along with Rosenauop. cit, in note 25, they see important domestic-international linkages through transnational actors.
50.
Finished wearing apparel comprised the largest part (by a long way) and in fact the majority (by a small margin) of final consumption of textile products in Western Europe. See Pierre Hoffmeister, 'Le Textile Européen: Secteur en Crise', Revue d'Ecnnomie Politique (Vol. 6, 1980), p. 931.
51.
See Jean-François Boss and Alain Boudon, La Formation du Prix des Vêtements à la Consommation, 2 Volumes ( Paris : Les Cahiers de la CESA, 1978), pp. 67-145.
52.
Income elasticities for specified products greater than one. See Oecd, Textile and Clothing Industries - Structural Problems and Policies in OECD Countries (Paris: OECD. 1983), p. 29.
53.
France, Senat, Rapport au nom de la Commission d'enquêe parlementaire chargée d'examiner les difficultés de l'industrie du textile et de l'habillement. 2è session ordinaire de 1980-1981 (No. 282, 6 June 1981), p. 212, after CTCOE (Centre Textile de Conjoncture et d'Observation Economique) calculations.
54.
France, Assemblée Nationale, Rapport fait au nom de la Commission d'enquête parlementaire chargée d'examiner les problèmes de l'industrie textile et les moyens à mettre en oeuvre pour les resoudre, 3 vols., 6è Legislature (No. 2254, 18 March 1981), Vol. 3 (Annexes), pp. 52 and 55, after CTCOE calculations.
55.
On the notion of dualism in modem industrial societies, see Berger.op. cit., in note 45, pp. 90-98.
56.
See Donald B. Keesing and Martin Wolfe, 'Questions on International Trade in Textiles and Clothing'. The World Economy (Vol. 4, No. 1, March 1981), pp. 79-101.
57.
France, Assemblée Nationale, op. cit, in note 54, p. 172.
58.
See Benoit Boussemart and Jean-Claude Rabier, Le Dossier Agache-Willot: Un Capitalisme à Contre-Courant (Paris: Presses de la FNSP, 1983), p. 26; France, Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII), Les Economies Industrialisées Face à la Concurrence des Pays du Tiers Monde: le cas de la filière textile ( Paris: CEPII, August 1978), p. 65: OECD Report, op. cit., in note 52, p. 88
59.
See Lynn KriegerMytelka, 'The French Textile Industry - Crisis and Adjustment' in Harold K. Jacobson and Dusan Sidjanski (eds.). The Emerging International Economic Order: Dynamic Processes, Constraints, and Opportunities (Beverley Hills, CA: Sage, 1982), pp. 129-66.
60.
See Berger, op. cit, in note 45.
61.
There were some spectacular bankruptcies among the major firms, in particular the Boussac and Agache-Willot concerns.
62.
Robert Jim Berrier , The Politics of Industrial Survival (PhD Thesis, MIT, 1978). p. 198.
63.
OECD Report, op. cit., in note 52. p. 15.
64.
Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE). unpublished series (relates to Collections de l'INSEE, series E, no. 78). For a more detailed account of the extent of the crisis in France, sec France. Assemblee Nationale. op. cit. in note 54. Vol. l. Similar reports were produced by the Senate and the Conseil Economique et Social at roughly the same time.
65.
OECD Report, op. cit., in note 52. p. 15.
66.
France. Assemblée Nationale, op. cit. in note 54, Vol. I. p. 50.
67.
Sec Erhard Friedberg . 'L'Etat et l'Industrie en France: Rapport d'Enquête ' (Paris: CNRS mimeo. 1976), and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill, ' Neo-Corporatist Theory and the Politics of Industrial Decline', European Journal of Political Research (October 1988), pp. 494-500.
68.
On the importance of the relationships between sectoral bureaucracies and industry associations they ostensibly regulate, see ibid., and Atkinson and Coleman, op. cit, in note 44.
69.
Yves Mény and Vincent Wright, La Crise de la Sidérurgie Européenne 1974-1984 ( Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1985), p. 41.
70.
See, for example, the debate on the 1981 proposed budget for the Ministry of Industry in the National Assembly, Journal Officiel Edition Débats Parlementaires, (No. 79. 14 November 1980). pp. 3806-66. Other years revealed the same trend.
71.
A merciful abbreviation for the following: Centre Interprafessionnel pour la Restructuration et la Modernisation des Structures Industrielles et Commerciales de l'Industrie du Textile.
72.
See Underhill, op. cit, in note 67, pp. 497-500.
73.
See the arguments of Keesing and Wolfe, op. cit, in note 56, pp. 94-95; and see also OECD Report, op. cit, in note 52, pp. 136-37.
74.
'Nested' within the GATT. to paraphrase Aggarwal, op. cit., in note 2.
75.
For an account of the development of the textile trade regime prior to the MFA. see ibid., Chapters 3-5.
76.
Annexe B(3) of Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles (MFA Treaty). translated from the French version as published in France. Assemblée Nationale, op. cit. in note 54, Vol. 3 (Annexes), p. 217.
77.
On these difficulties, see Chris Farrands, 'Textile Diplomacy: The Making and Implementation of European Textile Policy 1974-1978'. The Journal of Common Market Studies (Vol. 18, No. 1. September 1979), pp. 25-27, and Michael B. Doian . 'European Restructuring and Import Policies for a Textile Industry in Crisis', International Organization (Vol. 37, No. 4, Autumn 1983), p. 589.
78.
José de la Torre and Michel Bachetta, 'The Uncommon Market: European Policies towards the Clothing Industry in the 1970s', Journal of Common Market Studies (Vol. 19, No. 2, December 1980), p. 98.
79.
Farrands, op. cit, in note 77, pp. 25-26.
80.
Ibid., p. 28.
81.
Ibid., p. 29.
82.
Ibid., pp 28-29.
83.
France and Britain had both done so in 1976-77, and threatened to do so again in the event of failure to negotiate a tougher MFA.
84.
ln many industrial sectors, coalitions of interests were not at all in favour of a move toward protectionism. See Milner, op. cit., in note 25, for a convincing explanation of why this might be so.
85.
To provide an illustration. this France had done in August 1979 (Le Monde. 10 August 1979). and in September 1980 (Le Monde, 17 September 1980). Paris invoked Article 115 of the Treaty of Rome. which was a safeguard clause requiring the authorisation of the Commission in Brussels. 75 times in 1980 for textile products alone. This was more than the total of all sectors for any other EEC member-state. New restrictions were imposed in concert with Ireland and Italy, with the authorisation of the Commission, in April 1981 (Le Monde, 23 April 1981).
86.
Previously, the huge deficit in textile products had been compensated for by a surplus in clothing trade. See Benoit Boussemart.Industrie de Main d'Oeuvre et Division Internationale du Travail - l'Avenir de l'Industrie Textile de la Region Nord-Pas-de-Calais. 3 vols., (These pour le Doctorates [doctorat d'Etat] en Sciences Economiques, Université de Paris X [Nanterre], December 1984). Calculated from Annexe 3, after French customs statistics.
87.
Or quota restrictions applying to all product categories as a whole.
88.
Dolan, op. cit, in note 77, p. 609.
89.
See Aggarwal, op. cit, in note 2, especially the introduction and conclusion.