Bringing Order to the Causes of War Debates

K.N. Waltz , Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York : Columbia University Press, 1959 ). Behind the three questions formulated here are thus more fundamentally different 'images of war' than the 'three images' of 'man, the state and the international system' identified by Waltz.

K.N. Waltz (ibid., pp. 231-32) categorises causes of war into two types: 'efficient' causes, which make a particular war occur, and 'permissive' causes, without which war could not occur at all. In ibid., p. 233, he identifies 'the permissive cause' of war in 'the international environment'. As shown in ibid., p. 232, by 'the international environment' he means the fact that 'there is nothing [there] to prevent [wars].'

See K. Lorenz , King Solnmon's Ring: New Light on Animal Ways. translated from the German by M.K. Watson (London: Methuen , 1961), chapter 12.

According to Waltz, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 228-29, the third-image thesis (that war occurs because there is nothing in the international system to prevent it) is as true as remarks from the first two images ('that a society of perfectly rational beings, or of perfect Christians. would never know violent conflict' and 'that without the imperfections of the separate states there would be no wars'). Earlier in his book (ihid., pp. 28-29). Waltz dismisses as trivially true the assertion that war results from defective human nature: such a remark. he says. reminds him of a runner who, when asked why he lost the race, replied: ?ran too slowly. It is not surprising therefore to find Waltz acknowledge (in ibid., p. 229) that all these 'statements (including the third-image one) are, unfortunately, as trivial as they are true and that '[t]hey have the unchallengeable quality of airtight tautologies.'

See K.N. Waltz , ibid.: K.N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading. MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979); and K.N. Waltz. 'The Origins of War in Neorcalist Theory' in R.I. Rotberg and T.K. Rabb (eds.), The Origins and Prevention of Major Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 39-52.

It is not remembered that Waltz (in op. cit., in note 1. p. 234) refers to two scenarios of war. One is where state A wants X from state B, and resorts to war to obtain it: and the other is where A, fearful of being outdone by B in a security competition, resorts to war against B to 'cut state B down a peg now'. The 'efficient cause' of the first kind of war. according to Waltz, is A's desire, and that of the second kind A's fear. In his view. 'the permissive cause' of war is international anarchy in either case, but in the second case, the efficient cause (or fear) 'is derived from' international anarchy. Implicit in Waltz's analysis here is his own recognition that not all wars result from a mutual fear, and that the 'efficient cause' of a war does not always derive from international anarchy. The Falkiands War illustrates this last point quite well.

By 'possibility' is meant, in this paragraph and throughout this paper, an absolute quality contrasted to 'impossibility'. 'Possibility' is not 'low probability'. It must be added that 'probability' is contentless unless its magnitude is specified. Thus, whereas it requires no testing to see that international anarchy makes war possible, a common remark that under international anarchy war is probable is too vague to be tested.

Waltz is himself hesitant to accord a causal status to the international environment. Thus he says in op. cit., note 1. pp. 231-32, that international anarchy 'counts in a way different from the ways usually associated with the word "cause"'. He also remarks (in ibid., p. 232): If the [international] framework is to be called cause at all. it had best be specified that it is a permissive or underlying cause of war.'

See K.N. Waltz , Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 1979), pp. 66ff.

See H. Suganami , The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

Waltz, having at one point acknowledged the semantic basis of his third-image assertion (see note 4 above), should have been more careful in his use of the concept of possibility. However, by addinga temporal dimension to the idea of possibility, and calling it 'constant possibility' (op. cit.. in note 1, pp. 188 and 277). he activates it. so to speak. and turns it into something rather more menacing than a sheer logical possibility. By the time the 'constant possibility of war' is made interchangeable with the idea that 'any state may at any time use force to implement its policies' (ibid., p. 160), or that 'war may at any moment occur' (ibid., p. 232), he has transformed the idea of 'possibility', contrasted to 'impossibility', into something close to 'imminence'. The innocuous assertion that war may occur somewhere, sometime is very different from the alarmist suggestion that any state may at any moment resort to war. but these are made effectively interchangeable by Waltz's loose use of the idea of possibility. The first assertion is true of any international system. The second suggestion grossly exaggerates the degree of tension that normally exists in the system. Of course, a tense situation where two states are conscious that war may at any moment break out between them may lead to a pre-emptive strike by one against the other, and hence forms part of the explanation of some wars. However, this is not what makes war possible. Waltz's insufficient clarity on this point reveals also that whereas he is aware of the difference between our questions (1) and (3) - we know this because of his distinction between 'permissive' and 'efficient' causes (see note 2 abovc)- he fails to use the distinction consistently within his analysis.

See M.W. Doyle , 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs ', Philosophy and Public Affairs (Vol. 12. No. 3, 1983). pp. 205-34; and M.W. Doyle. 'Kant. Liberal Legacies. and Foreign Affairs, Part 2', Philosophy and Public Affairs (Vol. 12. No. 4, 1983). pp. 323-52.

M.W. Doyle , 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign AITairs ', Philosophy and Public Affairs (Vol. 12, No. 3, 1983), pp. 225-32.

R. Rummel , 'Libertarianism and International Violence'. Journal of Conflict Resolution, (Vol. 27, No. 1, 1983). p. 67.

See ibid., pp. 27-28.

If a fire breaks out. the presence of oxygen is not usually regarded even as a cause. Nonetheless, from the viewpoint of science, the presence of oxygen is a cause of any combustion, including this fire. Furthermore, even from the viewpoint ofordinary-language, the presence of oxygen can be regarded as a cause (and even the cause) of a fire if it breaks out, for example, in a laboratory, where special precautions are normally taken to exclude oxygen during part of an experiment. See H.L.A. Hart and A.M. Honore , Causation in the Law(Oxford: Clarendon Press , 1959). p. 33.

R. Rummel , op. cit, in note 14, pp. 52ff.

M.D. Wallace . 'Arms Races and Escalation: Some New Evidence ', Journal of Conflict Resoliation (Vol. 23. No. 1. 1979), pp. 3-16.

ibid, p. 15. Emphasis in original.

ibid, p. 15.

See, for example, D.M. Taylor , Explanation and Meaning: An Introduction to Philosophy(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 15-16.

See J. Galtung , Theory and Methods of Social Research (London: Allen and Unwin, 1967), pp. 365-66.

See P.F. Diehl , 'Arms Races and Escalation: A Closer Look', Journal of Peace Research (Vol. 20, No. 3, 1983), pp. 205-12.

Ibid., p. 207.

On narrative accounts, see F.R. Ankcrsmit , 'The Dilemma of Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Philosophy of History', History and Theory(Beiheft 25. 1986), pp. 1-27.

See, for example, T.C.W. Blanning , The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars (London: Longman, 1986), chapter 1.

See, for example, R. Scholes , Strueturalism in Literature ( London: Yale University Press. 1974 ),

See P. Veyne , Writing History: Essays on Epistemlogy translated from the French by M. Moorc-Ronvolucri (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), chapter 6. This tripartite division of causes is an ancient one, and was revived by Wilhelm von Humboldt. See ibid., p. 307, n. 18. A corresponding division is found, for example, in Huizinga, who refers to blind necessity', 'human will' and 'God's providence and continual act of creation'. See J. Huizinga , 'Historical Conceptualization ' in F. Stern (ed.), The Varieties of History, (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), pp. 289-303. at p. 293. See also E.H. Carr , What is History? (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1964), chapter 4, where the tripartite division is implicit in the discussion.

An example ofa chance coincidence, which plays a significant part in bringing about a war, is found in Robert Stephens' narrative ofthe origins of the Suez War. In his account. the timing of the dismissal of General Glubb by King Hussain of Jordan was unfortunate. Glubb was the British commander of the Arab Legion and a symbol of British paternalism. His dismissal coincided with Selwyn Lloyd's meeting with Nasser in Cairo. Lloyd was given a message about Glubb's dismissal as he was returning from dinner with Nasser, and Nasser heard the news only after he had left Lloyd that evening and apparently believed that Glubb had been withdrawn by the British government. Convinced that Nasser was responsible, Lloyd was angry, thinking that Nasser had deceived him that evening. To make matters worse, Nasser told Lloyd the next morning that he considered the British withdrawal of Glubb a sensible move. By now, Lloyd was furious, thinking that Nasser was making fun of him. Eden, learning of this incident, reached an abrupt and angry decision that Nasser must be eliminated. See R. Stephens , Nasser: A Political Biography (London: Allen Lane, 1971). pp.179-80.

See J.S. Levy , 'Organizational Routines and the Causes of War ', International Studies Quarterly (Vol. 30, No. 2, 1986), pp. 193-222, at pp. 207ff.

See Aquarius (pseudonym), 'Causation and Legal Responsibility. The South African Law Journal (Vol. 62, 1945), pp. 126-45. The terms 'recklessness. or wilful negligence' and 'heedlessness, or inadvertent negligence' come from ibid. Aquarius distinguishes these two types of 'negligence' from 'contributory negligence': in the latter the contributorily negligent actor receives harm. In the list (a) to (e), however, the category of 'heedlessness' has been modified from the version found in Aquarius. According to him, 'heedlessness', being a form of 'negligence' rather than 'contributory negligence', brings harm to the opponent. His category of inattention' (where the actor is not just heedless of the likely consequences of his action, but so inattentive that he does not realise he is acting in that way at all) is excluded from the list.

One pioneering work in this direction is W.H. Dray , 'Concepts of Causation in A.J.P. Taylor's Account of the Origins of the Second World War'. History and Theory (Vol. 17, No. 2, 1978), pp. 149-74.

See M. Rossabi . Khubilai Khan: His Life and Times ( Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 99-103, 206-13.

See 1. Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War ( London: Longman. 1985).

See A. Iriye , The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Purilir (London: Longman , 1987).

See P.M.H. Bell , The Origins of the Second World War in Europe (London: Longman. 1986).

On 'inattention', see note 31 above.

See [riye, op.cit., in note 35. pp. 183-84.

A 'pre-emptive war' must be clearly distinguished from a 'preventive war'. A 'preventive war' is where A thinks that, in order to achieve its aims, war with B will he necessary some time in the near future (perhaps within the next few years), and resorts to it now when in its own calculation it has a better chance of winning. A 'pre-emptive war', by contrast, is where A. sensing the imminence of B's attack on A. resorts to a retaliatory strike in advance.

See G. Blainey , The Causes of War. Third Edition ( London: Macmillan. 1988): J.G. Stoessinger , Why Nations Go to War, Fourth Edition (London: Macmillan, 1985): and R. Jervis , 'War and Misperccption ' in R.I. Rotberg and T.K. Rabb (eds.). op.cit., in note 5. pp. 101-26. Incidentally. Jervis is right to note that the proposition that every war involves at least one serious misperception is not true by definition. See ibid., pp. 103-05.

See R. Ovendale . The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Was (London: Longman. 1984 ): and P. Lowe , The Origins of the Korean War ( London; Longman. 1986).

For the idea of 'explanation' as distinct from 'narrative', see W.B. Gallie , The Historical Understanding'. History and Theory (Vol. 3, No. 2. 1963). pp. 149-102. Gallic, however, fails to explain what makes narratives intelligible.

See J. Joll , The Origins of the First World War (London: Longman. 1984): and Bell , op.cit, in note 36.

See Dray , op.cit , in note 32. pp, 169ff.