The Problem of Relativism in International Ethics

I. Much of the recent discussion of relativism by philosophers has been collected by Michael Krausz and Jack W. Meiland (eds.), Relativism. Cognitive and Moral (Notre Dame, IN and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), and Michael Krausz (ed.), Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation (Notre Dame, IN and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989).

An excellent point of entry into these questions is provided by Richard H. Popkin , The History of Scepticism (Berkeley, CA and London: University of California Press, 979).

For example R.J. Vincent , Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 37-57.

I consider these distinctions at greater length in Terry Nardin , 'Realism and Redistribution', Journalof Value Inquiry (Vol. 23, 1989, forthcoming).

Peter Singer , Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 158-81.

Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 125-76.

See Steven Lukes , Marxism and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 142-49; Chris Brown , 'Marxism, Morality and International Relations', a paper presented at the joint convention of the International Studies Association and the British International Studies Association, London, March-April, 1989.

Many of the issues raised by the idea of commensurability are considered by Germain Grisez , 'Against Consequentialism', American Journal of Jurisprudence (Vol. 23,1978),pp.21-72.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr. , Nuclear Ethics (New York : Free Press. 1986). p. 91.

Russell Hardin 'Deterrence and Moral Theory', Canadian Journal of Philosophy (Supplementary Vol. 12,1985),p. 163.

II. I will use this label to identify both moralists who consciously invoke an inherited tradition of moral precepts and non-consequentialist theorists of traditional morality.

For examples of the charge that traditional morality is 'self-indulgent and egocentric' in its preoccupation with 'clean hands' and 'personal integrity', see Russell Hardin , op. cit, p. 166 and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. , op. cit, pp. 19 and 132. 'At some point does not integrity become the ultimate egoism of fastidious self-righteousness in which the purity of the self is more important than the lives of countless others?', Nye asks. Notice that these are complaints about what is alleged to be a moral, rather than a theoretical, failing on the part of traditional morality and non-consequentialist moral theory.

The non-consequentialist argument against deterrence is most fully developed by John Finnis , Joseph M. Boyle, Jr. , and Germain Grisez , Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).

Alan Donagan , The Theory of Morality (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 149-157.

Michael Oakeshott , On Human Conduct (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 71.

For a recent statement of this point, well-known to students of legal and political philosophy, by a moral philosopher see Conrad D. Johnson , 'The Authority of the Moral Agent,' Journal of Philosophy (Vol. 82, No. 8, 1985), pp. 391-413.

It is worth noticing that the classical utilitarians - Bentham, James Mill, and J.S. Mill - are, as moralists of international relations, noticeably more interested in the rule of law and in fidelity to moral principle than more recent, and more radical, utilitarians like Peter Singer. An essay like J.S. Mill's 'A Few Words on Non-intervention' is hardly the work of an act-utilitarian.

Alan Donagan , op. cit, p. 210.

Ibid, pp. 2l0-43.

See Bernard Williams , 'Practical Necessity', in his Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 124-31.

Lawrence Becker offers the following statement of the comprehensive view of morality rejected here: 'The moral point of view is the most inclusive one we can manage - the one we use when we say "All things considered, here is what we should do." Prudence, self-interest, altruism, social welfare, efficiency, economy, etiquette, and aesthetic considerations are all relevant ... to moral argument understood in this way.' Lawrence Becker , Reciprocity (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul , 1986), p. 5.

Interestingly, a few moralists working within the natural law tradition have embraced the pluralist view that there are many important goods, each of which morality invites us to respect in action even though they cannot be measured and balanced in consequentialist terms. See John Finnis , Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 92-5.